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ARMED INJUSTICE:
ABUSE OF THE LAW AND COMPLEX CRIME
IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
THOMAS FIRESTONE
"For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from
law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous,
and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue,
which he may use for the worst ends. "'
"[A] club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the most
efficient is the court."
Nikolai Krylenko, Commissar ofJustice of the Soviet Union, 1936-1938 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Abuse of the legal system has become a central technique in various
fraudulent and extortionate schemes in Russia. Examples include:
* "commissioned" criminal prosecutions brought for the purpose of extorting
money from the victim or driving him out of business;
* "intellectual property squatting" in which "squatters" exploit legal
loopholes to register rights to a trademark or patent then initiate
extortionate legal proceedings against alleged "infringers";
* "corporate raiding"3 in which criminals use corruptly obtained legal
documents, such as shareholders' resolutions, court judgments and
state registration documents, as justification to seize a victim
company's assets; and
Resident Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Embassy-Moscow. The views and opinions
expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice or
the U.S. government. For reasons set forth below, very few of the cases discussed herein have resulted
in criminal convictions. Therefore, in discussing particular cases, this article relies heavily on publicly
available allegations by victims and law enforcement. Unless otherwise noted, nothing in this article
should be taken as a statement by the author or the U.S. government that the individuals or companies
mentioned as defendants or subjects of investigation are in fact guilty or that they should not be
presumed innocent. The author would like to thank the following for their helpful comments: Pavel
Boulatov, Richard Daddario, Eric Hamrin, Rosie Hawes, Kathryn Hendley, Daniel Klein, Lauren
McCarthy, Catherine Newcombe, Peter Prahar and Daniel Rosenthal.
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 29 (Benjamin Jowett & H.W.C Davis eds., Cosimo Inc. 2008)(1905).
2. HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 36 (1963) (quoting N.V. Krylenko in 1923).
3. See generally, Thomas Firestone, Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia, 42 INT'L LAW. 1207
(2008) (discussing corporate raiding in Russia as "a new and sophisticated form of organized crime").
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* collusive litigation in which private parties create a pretextual lawsuit to
obtain a predetermined judicial ruling which is then used as part of a
scheme to misappropriate the victim's assets.4
American businesses, such as Hermitage Capital and Starbucks have
reportedly been victimized by the practices described in this article and, according
to a U.S. federal judge, "esteemed" U.S. law firms have been used as an instrument
in at least one such scheme in the United States. From a purely criminal
standpoint, such schemes are brilliant. Using the law as both sword and shield,
the perpetrator turns the victim into a legal defendant, misappropriates the state's
legal enforcement power for private ends, and obtains a cover from liability
through the claim that he is merely enforcing a legal right.
Despite a wealth of quality literature on the various manifestations of
organized crime in contemporary Russia, analysts have failed to isolate and study
this dangerous trend. 6 This article attempts to fill that gap by: (1) identifying and
explaining some of the most common schemes relying on manipulation of the legal
system; (2) tracing the historical origins of this phenomenon; (3) analyzing the
steps the government is taking to combat the problem; and (4) identifying possible
implications of this study for those concerned with the rule of law in Russia.
II. SCHEMES RELYING ON ABUSE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Commissioned Prosecutions
Commissioned criminal prosecutions ("zakaznye dyela"), a term referring to
(a) criminal cases "commissioned" by third parties as a way of sabotaging business
competitors and (b) criminal cases initiated by law enforcement for extortionate or
other improper purposes, are probably the most clear-cut examples of criminal
legal abuse in Russia. As Genri Reznick, the head of the Moscow City Bar
4. These schemes are not mutually exclusive and sometimes supplement one another as part of
the same scheme. For example, commissioned prosecutions and collusive litigation are often used in
support of corporate raids. They are separated here only for purposes of analytical clarity.
5. See Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm LLC, 587 F. Supp. 2d 594, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(expressing "outrage[ ]" and "surpris[e]" that "two esteemed New York law firms" had become
instruments of Storm and the Altimo's scheme to use a "sham" Ukrainian judicial ruling in a U.S.
court).
6. For English language literature, see, e.g., JOSEPH SERIO, INVESTIGATING THE RUSSIAN MAFIA
(2008); MIsHA GLENNY, MCMAFIA: SERIOUSLY ORGANIZED CRIME 30-31, 312-13 (2008) (discussing
Russian cybercrime and money laundering); STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL: RUSSIA'S
NEW MAFIYA (1995); VADIM VOLKOV, VIOLENT ENTREPRENEURS: THE USE OF FORCE IN THE MAKING
OF RUSSIAN CAPITALISM (2002); PAUL KLEBNIKOV, GODFATHER OF THE KREMLIN: BORIS
BEREZOVSKY AND THE LOOTING OF RUSSIA (2000); ROBERT I. FRIEDMAN, RED MAFIYA: HOW THE
RUSSIAN MOB HAS INVADED AMERICA (2000); RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME: THE NEW THREAT? (Phil
Williams ed., 2d ed. 2000); JAMES 0. FINCKENAUER & ELIN J. WARING, RUSSIAN MAFIA IN AMERICA:
IMMIGRATION, CULTURE, AND CRIME (1998); Louise Shelley, Crime, Organized Crime and
Corruption, in AFTER PUTIN's RUSSIA: PAST IMPERFECT, FUTURE UNCERTAIN 183-98 (Stephen K.
Wegren & Dale R. Herspring eds., 4th ed. 2009).
7. According to some, only cases initiated by third parties should be referred to as
"commissioned cases," given the role of a third party in "commissioning" the case. However, given the
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Association, recently said, "commissioned prosecutions" are the "most repulsive
phenomenon in our justice system." 8
The problem of commissioned cases is widespread and openly recognized at
the highest levels of government. In 2008, President Medvedev called on law
enforcement to stop "terrorizing" business through "attacks" motivated by
commercial aims.9 Prime Minister Putin recently stated that the majority of
regulatory inspections of businesses (often the first stage of a criminal case) were
likely "commissioned." 0  And in 2006, Prosecutor General Yuriy Chayka
identified commissioned prosecutions as a major problem for Russia,
acknowledged at least 20 such cases in Russia's Central Federal District alone, and
promised a review of all criminal cases to determine if they had been
commissioned." Of course, the United States has seen its share of abuse of the
criminal justice system for extortionate ends. But in the United States, such cases
typically involve extortion of criminals who are, by definition, vulnerable to the
threat of criminal prosecution. 12  In Russia, however, extortionate prosecutions
have expanded to target legitimate businesses, a feat accomplished by the creative
use of legal loopholes and ambiguities to create a threat of criminal prosecution
which would not otherwise exist.
One example of the creative abuse of legal ambiguity is provided by the so-
called "Chemists Case," in which corrupt agents of the State Drug Control Agency
(FSKN) tried to extort money from the owners of a chemical business. As part of
the scheme, the agents brought criminal charges against them for the distribution
of diethyl ether, a chemical solvent commonly used as an anesthetic.13 The agents
perception of a tight connection between corruptly motivated private parties and corrupt law
enforcement and the widespread belief that some cases are "commissioned" by higher-ups within the
government or law enforcement for improper motives, the term is used to refer generally to criminal
cases brought for improper commercial or political motives. See P.A. SKOBLIKOV, KORRUPTSIYA V
SOVREMENNOI RossII 33-34 (2009). Given the frequent overlap of corrupt commercial motives
between these two types of cases, the similarity in techniques that such prosecutions employ and
common legal issues that such cases raise, this article uses the term "commissioned cases" to refer to
both and treats them as one phenomenon.
8. Interview with Genri Reznick, Sept. 18, 2009, available at http://www.rusnovosti.ru/pro
gramms/prog/39964/ 51027/.
9. Medvedev Poprosil Perestat' "Koshmarit" Biznes, [Medvedev Asked to Stop "a Nightmare"
Business] LENTA.RU, July 31, 2008, http://www.lenta.ru/news/2008/07/31/koshmarit/.
10. Nigina Beroeva, Vladimir Putin: "Bol'shinstvo proverok biznesa - "zakazniye" ili
nedobrosovestniye" ["The Majority of Russian Business inspections -- are "commissioned" or
unscrupulous"], KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA [THE TRUTH OF THE KOMSOMOL], Nov. 25, 2009,
available at http://pskov.kp.ru/print/article/24400/576309/.
11. Yuri Chaika prekratit "zakaznye dela," [Yuri Chaika Stop "Custom Action"], LENTA.RU,
Aug. 15, 2006, http://lenta.ru/news/2006/08/15/chaika/. It is not clear what became of this promised
review and Russian sources are devoid of any indication that it was ever conducted or its results
announced.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004) (extortion of drug dealers
by corrupt police officers); United States v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 968 (3d Cir. 1985) (extortion of
illegal gambling operations by corrupt police officers).
13. See Gregory L. White, Once Jailed Russian Executive Pushes Law Changes, WALL ST. J.,
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relied on Article 234 of the Russian Criminal Code, which criminalizes the
commercial distribution of so-called "virulent" substances, a term nowhere defined
in the criminal law. 14 The absence of a statutory definition allowed the officers to
rely on a list of allegedly "virulent" substances that had been prepared by an
outside expert who had no official status or legislative or administrative
authority.15  After a disavowal of the list by the Ministry of Health and a public
campaign highlighting the absurdity of the prosecution, the case was eventually
dropped. 16 However, the subjects each spent at least seven months in jail.17
Similar cases, relying on contradictions and ambiguities in Russian law
related to the anesthetic ketamine (which was prohibited by one official act, but
authorized for veterinary anesthetic purposes by another) were brought in 2003
against veterinarians for administering ketamine to pets during routine
operations." In these cases, drug control agents set up sting operations in which
they brought animals in for treatment. As soon as the veterinarian administered
ketamine, they arrested him. 19 Approximately 20 such cases were initiated during
2003.20 Eventually, the Ministry of Agriculture officially approved the use of
ketamine for veterinary uses and almost all of the criminal cases were closed.21
Another common technique of subjecting businesses to enhanced penalties for
the purpose of facilitating extortion involves the use of Article 171 of the Criminal
Code, "Illegal Enterprise" ("operating an illegal enterprise without registration or a
special permit (license), in cases where such permit (license) is obligatory"), in
conjunction with Article 174.1(1), which criminalizes the use of illegally generated
proceeds for "pursuance of entrepreneurial or another economic activity."22
Because Article 174, in contrast to U.S. money laundering laws, is not based on a
Dec. 30, 2009, at A7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126212533991109359.html; see
Thomas J. Evans, The Unusual History of Ether (2008), http://www.anesthesia-nursing.conVether.html.
See also Materiali Dyela Khimikov NPK Sofeks, [The Case Materials Chemists],
http://www.himdelo.ru/material/podrobnee/008/ [hereinafter Khimikov] (describing the events of the
arrest and subsequent proceedings).
14. Ugoloynyi Kodeks RF [UK] [Criminal Code] art.234 (Russ.).
15. See Khimikov, supra note 13.
16. Id.; Interview with Yanna Yakovleva, one of the defendants in the case, in Moscow, Russia
(Feb. 2010) [hereinafter Yakovieva Interview] (on file with author).
17. Yakovieva Interview, supra note 16.
18. Sid Yanyshev, Dyelo Veterinarov-Vreditelyei [Case Veterinary Pests], GAZETA.RU, Dec. 26,
2003, http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/12/25/vovsemvinove.shtml.
19. Elya Vermisheva, Prokuratura Moskvi priznala zakonnim izpol'zovaniye ketamina v
veterinarnoi praktike [Prosecutors in Moscow have Recognized the Legitimate Use of Ketamine in
Veterinary Practice], GAZETA.RU, June 19, 2004, http://www.medlinks.ru/article.php?sid=16360.
20. Id.
21. Id; Prikaz Ministerstvo sel'skogo khozyaistva Rossisskoi Federatsii ot 29 Dekabrya 2003 g.
N 1580/619 g Moskva ob utverzhdenii perechnya narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnikh veshestv
ispol'zuyemykh v veterenarii [Order of the Ministry ofAgriculture of the Russian Federation, Ministry
of Health of the Russian Federation of December 29, 2003 Moscow N 1580/619 Approving the List of
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Used in Veterinary Medicine], Feb. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.rg.ru/2004/02/03/veterinary-doc.html.
22. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] [Criminal Code] arts.171, 174 (Russ.).
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list of specified unlawful activities, any crime (with the exception of certain tax
offenses) can be used as a money laundering predicate. Thus, taken together, these
two statutes allow corrupt law enforcement officers to use a paperwork violation in
a company's registration documents to charge the business owners with illegal
entrepreneurship, declare all of the business's proceeds illegal, and then threaten
the owners and employees with aggravated money laundering (an offense which
carries up to 15 years incarceration and a fine equal to the defendant's total
earnings).23
For example, such a scheme was allegedly used in the so-called "Pharmacists'
Case." In that case, the lead defendant, Fyodor Dushin, co-owned a pharmacy in
the city of Podolsk with a business partner, Vagif Kuliyev. Kuliyev sought to buy
him out, but Dushin refused. According to Dushin, Kuliyev then initiated a
criminal case against him and helped law enforcement officers plant false
evidence, ostensibly showing that the pharmacy was distributing prescription
medicines without an appropriate license. This formed the basis for an Article 171
illegal entrepreneurship charge which, in turn, provided a basis for charges of
money laundering by an organized group under Article 174.1. Eventually, Dushin
was sentenced to seven years incarceration and 10 of his employees were each
sentenced to two years incarceration.24
According to Viktor Denisenko, a businessman in Taganrog recently
subjected to similar charges, there are currently five prosecutions relying on the
same combination of Articles 171 and 174 just in the city of Taganrog (population
of approximately 260,000).25 The abuse of these statutes has become so
widespread that lawmakers recently announced a plan to redraft parts of the
Criminal Code in order to make such schemes impossible by, for example,
excluding proceeds from "illegal entrepreneurship" from the scope of Article
174.26
23. See, e.g., Dyelo farmatsevtov: obshchestvennaya otsenka prigovora [Lawsuit of the
pharmacists: the public evaluation of the sentence], DYELO FARMATSEVTOV, Apr. 6, 2009,
http://www.himdelo.ru/hrono/podrobnee/139/; Aleksander Tveretin, Obrasheniye k deputatam
Gosudarstvennoi Dumi RF [Turning to Deputies of the State Duma RF] (July 29, 2008), transcript
available at http://www.himdelo.ru/prima/podrobnee/168/; Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] [Criminal
Code] arts. 174.1 (Russ.).
24. See Tveretin, supra note 23. Kuliyev, who allegedly had responsibility for establishing and
implementing the pharmacy's policies on distribution of medicines and also for all financial
disbursements in the pharmacy, escaped prosecution altogether, a fact which seems to corroborate
Dushin's claims that the case was orchestrated by him.
25. Denisenko was charged under Articles 171 and 174 on the grounds that his industrial machine
parts laboratory allegedly lacked a necessary "supplemental license." Viktor Denisenko, Kak menya
naznachali prestupnikom [As they Appointed me the Criminal] transcript available at
http://www.kapitalisty.ru/prime/podrobnee/016/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2010); The Official Website of the
City of Taganrog, http://www.taganrogcity.com/guide.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
26. See, e.g., Chast' Gosdumi Priznayet NeobkhoDimost'popravok v Stat'yu ob Otmyvanii Deneg
[A Part of Gosduma Recognizes the Necessity of Amending the Statute Which Concerns Money
Laundering], FINAM FM, Nov. 10, 2010, http://finam.fm/news/39388/printl [hereinafter - Money
Laundering]. Partly in response to this initiative, in April 2010, the Duma amended Article 174.1 of the
2010 559
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B. Intellectual Property Squatting
"Intellectual property squatting"-the practice of registering trademarks and
patents on brands and products already in use and then threatening civil or criminal
litigation against the existing rights holders if they do not pay-is another prime
example of legal abuse in Russia. According to one analysis, the business of
misappropriating others' brands has reached "colossal proportions."27 Russia has
even spawned a class of professional IP "marauders"-lawyers who specialize in
identifying trademarks and patents vulnerable to attack, registering them, and then
initiating litigation against the true rights holders in order to force a buyback.28
Allegedly, they earn hundreds of millions of dollars annually.29 One famous
trademark squatter, Sergey Zuykov, stated publicly that each successful case of
squatting brings him approximately $10-15,000.3O
Russia's IP squatters rely on a variety of legal techniques. For example,
under Article 1486(1) of Part IV of the Civil Code, which regulates intellectual
property rights, a trademark can be invalidated if not used for more than three
years and anyone has the right to file an application to cancel a trademark on the
grounds of non-use.31 Zuykov relied on this provision to cancel and then re-
register the Russian trademark of the American coffeehouse Starbucks (which had
registered in Russia in 1997, but then delayed its entry into the market because of
the financial crisis of 1998) in the name of a company he controlled.3 2 Zuykov
demanded a $600,000 payout from Starbucks to sell the trademark.33 Although the
company refused to pay and eventually won the case in court, Zuykov was able to
delay Starbucks' entry into the Russian market by three years,34 a fact which
makes the threat of trademark extortion potent for other potential victims.
Similarly, in patent squatting schemes, a "patent racketeer" takes one
distinctive aspect of an established product, describes that aspect in an original
way, obtains a patent on that part, and then initiates litigation against the maker of
the complete product.35  One example might be obtaining a patent on a machine
Criminal Code to exclude from its scope the use of criminal proceeds for the realization of
entrepreneurial activity. See Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] 174.1.
27. Mastera na Vsye Znaki [Masters of all Trademarks], RUWEB, http://www.ru-
web.com/index.php?vprn-yes&id=39 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Masters of all
Trademarks].
28. See, e.g., Dmitrii Denisov, Intellektual'noye maroderstvo bez vzloma [Intellectual Looting
without the Breaking], BIZNES-ZHURNAL, Jan. 25, 2006, http://www.linnik-patent.conarticle0O30.
html.
29. Masters of all Trademarks, supra note 27.
30. Patentnyi reket v Rossii: Vorovstvo tovarnykh znakov i brendov [Trademarks: Racketeering of
Patents in Russia], http://www.advertme.ru/znaki/9 (last visited April 8, 2010).
31. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] Part IV, art. 1486(1) (Russ.).
32. See Denisov, supra note 28; Andrew Kramer, After Long Dispute, A Russian Starbucks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/business/worldbusiness
/07sbux.html.
33. See Denisov, supra note 28; Kramer, supra note 32.
34. Kramer, supra note 32.
35. Dmitrii Denisov, Ostorozhno Zliye Patenti! [Careful, Evil Patents!], BIZNES-ZHURNAL, Sept.
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that produces cavitation bubbles of a certain size at a certain depth in water at a
certain temperature and then suing manufacturers of Jacuzzis for infringement.36
In one famous case, a company called Technopolis took one aspect of the design of
bottles used by several beer makers - a rounded cone-like shape at the top -
described it in a novel, complicated and almost incomprehensible way (referring,
in part, to vessels with fragments of a slanted conical diameter with an inside and
outside) obtained a patent on this "design" and then demanded 5% of the beer
companies' proceeds.37 Eventually, the beer companies were able to get the
Technopolis patents annulled.38
Patent racketeers typically rely on a "utility model patent," a simplified form
of patent, not available in the United States, which does not require an extensive
world-wide search for analogous products or a thorough examination of the
product's originality.3 9 According to the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), utility model patents are primarily designed for small and medium sized
businesses that make minor improvements to and/or adaptations of existing
products.40 Therefore, the applicant often does not need to prove an "inventive
step" or "non-obviousness" of the invention, as is the case with ordinary patent
applications, and patent offices do not make a substantive examination of the
application of the patent before approving it.41 For example, under Russian law, an
invention can be patented if it is: (1) new; (2) has "inventive level" (i.e. inventive
42
step); and (3) has industrial application. For utility models, however, the
requirements are relaxed and the applicant need not demonstrate "inventive
level."43
30, 2008, http://www.business-magazine.ru/trends/competition/pub307157.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Tatyana Samoilova, Kak ya izobrel butylku, gvozd' i skvorechnik, [How I invented the bottle,
the nail, and the birdhouse], 12R INTERNET LIBRARY, http://i2r.ru/static/494/out 9815.shtml (last
visited Apr. 6, 2010).
39. See Vladislav Sorokin, Taina Patentnykh Trollei [The Secret of Patent Trolls] (NTV
Television broadcast July 6, 2009 at 19:19) available at http://ip.ntv.ru/news/2745/.
40. See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Protecting Innovations by Utility
Models, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ipbusiness/utilitymodels/utilitymodels.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2010).
41. Id. According to WIPO, only a small but significant number of countries make utility model
patents available. These include: Albania, Angola, Argentina, ARIPO, Armenia, Aruba, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, China (including Hong Kong and
Macau), Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, OAPI, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Taiwan, Tajikistan,
Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan. See WIPO, Where can Utility Models
be Acquired?, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip business/utilitymodels/where.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2010).
42. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] Part IV, art. 1350(1) (Russ.).
43. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] Part IV, art.1351(1) (Russ.).
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Whatever their merits may be, the relative ease of obtaining utility model
patents makes them ideally suited to abuse. As one Russian lawyer said, a utility
model patent can be obtained on almost any product, so long as it is described in
an original way. For example, one could theoretically obtain a utility model patent
for a standard eyeglass case by describing the plastic trim at the intersection of the
two sides as a distinguishing characteristic guaranteeing the hermetic seal of the
case. 44 Other lawyers claim that not even this much is required, and that a utility
patent model can be obtained on almost any product which is not already patented
within six months, as no substantive review is required.45 Although utility model
patents generally enjoy lesser protection than ordinary patents (in Russia, they are
protected for 10 years, while ordinary patents are protected for 20 years46), this is
still more than enough time for the patent racketeer to shake down his prey
(especially given that annulling a utility model patent can often take up to three
years47). And under Russian law, when a patent holder, no matter how nominal or
dubious his claim to the patent may be, brings an infringement suit, the burden is
on the defendant to prove non-infringement, rather than on the plaintiff to prove
the validity of the underlying patent, a rule which facilitates extortionate
litigation.48
Patent extortion is also facilitated by the fact that Russian law, in contrast to
U.S. law, provides for criminal liability for patent infringement. 49 This allows
patent racketeers to enhance their threats by initiating criminal prosecutions against
"infringers." According to Daniel Klein, a U.S. patent attorney practicing in
Moscow and a partner in the law firm of Hellevig, Klein & Usov, the cost to a
patent racketeer of initiating a criminal proceeding against his victim is relatively
low. However, once the criminal case begins, the victim may face serious business
disruptions because law enforcement authorities can seize property, temporarily
close importation and manufacturing operations, and arrest the business's
managers. Such attacks disrupt the company's physical operations and drive away
customers, who may fear criminal prosecution for purchasing potentially infringing
products and/or be prohibited from doing business with suppliers under criminal
investigation. In short, the combination of operational disruption and reputational
damage resulting from a racketeer's attack can destroy a legitimate business.o
Moreover, annulling a utility model patent that was obtained in bad faith can
often take three years, thus creating the likelihood that the victim "infringer" will
be prosecuted and serve his sentence before he succeeds in demonstrating the
44. Denisov, supra note 35.
45. Interview with Daniel Klein, Partner-In-Charge, Hellevig, Klein & Usov, in Moscow, Russ.
(Dec. 17, 2009) (on file with author); Interview with Denis Uzoykin, in Moscow, Russ. (Dec. 17, 2009)
(on file with author).
46. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 1363(1) (Russ.).
47. See Klein, supra note 45; Uzoykin, supra note 44.
48. See Sorokin, supra, note 39.
49. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art.147 (Russ.).
50. E-mails from Daniel Klein, Partner-In-Charge, Hellevig, Klein & Usov, to author, (Feb.
2010) (on file with author).
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invalidity of the faux patent, which gave rise to his criminal prosecution.5 1 Finally,
Russian law does not clearly criminalize squatting,52 thus allowing squatters to
claim, as Zuykov once stated, "it's not fair, but it's legal."53
C. Corporate Raiding ("Reiderstvo")
Corporate raiding ("reiderstvo"), a phenomenon which President Medvedev
has called "shameful" and which the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) estimates
generates approximately 120 billion rubles (approximately $40 million) a year in
illegal profits, is "legal racketeering" at its worst. 4 Raiding lacks an official legal
definition in Russia and the word is used carelessly to describe a number of
unethical business practices. For purposes of this article, corporate raiding will be
defined as the seizure, or attempted seizure, of a business or a substantial part of its
assets, through the corrupt reliance on a legal document, including, but not limited
to, a court order, judicial decision, corporate resolution, corporate charter
document, or state registration document. The execution of a corporate raid
typically involves the following three stages: (1) the raider creates or corruptly
obtains a legal document establishing faux legal title to some assets, usually shares
or real property of a business; (2) the raider carries out a forcible takeover of the
target property; and (3) the raider launders the seized property through a series of
shell companies to an ostensible "good faith purchaser" from whom it is essentially
impossible to recover the property. Typically, the shell companies disappear as
soon as they have fulfilled their purpose and the victim is left with no one to
pursue. Each stage relies on abuse of the legal system.
51. There is some indication that intellectual property racketeering has now moved into
cyberspace. According to one report, Burger King recently filed suit against squatters who registered
the internet domain name burgerking.ru. See Christina Busko, Forgery of a Hamburger, KOMMERSANT,
Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocslD=1297726.
52. For example, there is no article in the Criminal Code on intellectual property squatting.
Article 147 of the Criminal Code criminalizes, inter alia, the "illegal use of a ... utility model" but it is
not clear if this applies only to the misappropriation of a third party's utility model or to the (mis)use of
one's own utility model for extortionate purposes. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 147
(Russ.). Article 180 of the Criminal Code criminalizes the illegal use of "another's" trademark, thus
seemingly excluding the use of one's own trademark for extortionate purposes. Ugolovnyi Kodeks
[UK] [Criminal Code] art.180 (Russ.). Finally, Article 163, Extortion, applies by its terms to threats to
damage "another's property." Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art.163 (Russ.). It is not clear
how this statute applies in a situation where the victim no longer holds legal title to the intellectual
property in question because such title has been acquired by the squatter. The author is unaware of any
criminal prosecutions of squatters under Article 163 and is unaware of any legal authority the
applicability of Articles 147, 163 or 180 to intellectual property squatting.
53. Andrew Kramer, Ex-salesman Stalls Starbucks' Russian Entry, INDIAN EXPRESS, Oct. 13,
2005, http://www.indianexpress.conVoldStory/79886/.
54. See, e.g., Rosbalt Informationnoe Agenstvo [Rosbalt Information Agency], Medvedev: Za
Reiderstvo Nuzhno Bit' po Rukam [Medvedev: Corporate Raiding Should be Punished],
http://www.rosbalt.ru/2008/02/27/460264.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010); Philip Aldrick, Exposing
Russia's Corporate 'Corruption', Apr. 4, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2787471/
Exposing-Russias-corporate-corruption.html; PAVEL ASTAKHOV, PROTIVODEISTVIYE REIDERSKIM
ZAKHVATAM 5-6 (2007).
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Stage 1 - Obtaining the Documents
In the most blatant schemes, the raider simply creates false legal documents
purporting to establish title to the property he intends to take. For example, in one
2005 case in Moscow, a real estate developer was convicted of creating false
documents purporting to establish ownership of 400 hectares of land, worth 6.5
million rubles." Sometimes, the raider blackmails or bribes an employee of the
target company for access to the documents, which are then falsified to install a
false board of directors. According to court documents from one recent case, a St.
Petersburg organized crime boss, Vladimir Barsukov, a/k/a "Kumarin," and several
of his associates were convicted of a raiding scheme in which they deposited false
documents with the State Registry of Corporate Entities, purporting to transfer
ownership of the target businesses to Kumarin's co-conspirators. This official
registration then generated other official documents which were used as the pretext
for the forcible takeover of the businesses. In some cases, officials at the State
Registry were simply deceived into believing that the deposited documents were
authentic. In other cases, they were bribed to accept documents that they knew to
be false.56
In more sophisticated schemes, the raider files a lawsuit against the target,
often in a remote location where the raider has influence over the local judiciary,
and then obtains a judicial order authorizing seizure of some or all of the target's
assets. 7 This tactic was allegedly used in the much publicized Ilim Pulp case,
which involved an attempted (but unsuccessful) raid of Ilim Pulp, Russia's largest
forest products company by an entity controlled by oligarch Oleg Deripaska. In
2002, a minority shareholder in one of llim's mills filed suit in a remote location in
Siberia, alleging that Ilim had failed to comply with all the terms of its 1994
privatization." A judge awarded the plaintiff $113 million in damages, confiscated
two-thirds of the mill's stock, and transferred the stock to the St. Petersburg State
Property Committee, which then sold the stock to Deripaska and his partner.5 9 Ilim
55. Denis Tykulov, Prokuratura Proveryaet Skupshchikov Podmoskovnykh Zemel' [Prosecution
Checking Buyers of Land in the Moscow Suburbs], GZT.RU NOVOSTI [GZT.RU NEWS],
http://gzt.ru/print.phpp=home/2005/12/19/211137.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
56. See Prigovor Imenem Rossiiskaia Federatsii [Conviction by the Russian Federation],
ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.] Nov. 12, 2009 (Russ.) Case No. 1-41/09 [hereinafter Kumarin
Judgment] (on file with author), 8, 14. The Kumarin case is the largest raiding case which has been
successfully prosecuted in Russia and the court's very detailed judgment provides a rich source of
information on the mechanics of raiding schemes. Therefore, this article relies extensively on the
judgment. See also Vladimir Fedosenko, Srok i Avtoritet [Time and "Authority"], ROSSIISKAIA
GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.] Nov. 13, 2009, available at http://www.rg.ru/2009/11/13/barsukov.html.
57. Ivan Novitskii, Tezisy doklada deputata Moskovskoi gorodskoi dumy [Theses of the report of
a Deputy of the Moscow City Duma] 7 (Nov. 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(presented at roundtable on raiding, Moscow Oblast Advocates Chamber).
58. Sabrina Tavernise, Handful of Corporate Raiders Transform Russia's Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2002, at Al; Daniel J. McCarthy & Sheila M. Puffer, Ilim Pulp Battles a Hostile Takeover, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA 300, 304 (Daniel J. McCarthy, Sheila M. Puffer & Stanislav V.
Shekshnia eds., 2004).
59. Tavernise, supra note 58, at Al; McCarthy & Puffer, supra note 58, at 304.
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Pulp's owners claimed that they were never notified of the suit, (though Deripaska
claimed that notice had been sent by mail.)60 The Deripaska companies then sent
in a private security force to seize the mill and court bailiffs arrived with an order
installing a new director. 61 However, the mill's owners refused to yield and filed
several countersuits against the Deripaska companies.62 Eventually, according to
Ilim, the case was settled amicably out of court.63
The same tactic was also allegedly used in a shareholder dispute within the
telecommunications company, VimpelCom, between shareholders Telenor, a
Norwegian telecommunications company, and Alfa Group, a Russian investment
group. In that case, Farimex, a tiny Virgin Islands company that owned less than
1% of VimpelCom filed suit against Telenor in a remote court in Siberia, a
location that had no discernible connection to the case. Nevertheless, the Siberian
court (at 2:00 a.m. on a Saturday) handed down a $1.7 billion damage award on
behalf of Farimex.64 This award was then used to freeze Telenor's assets in an
effort to compel it to pay $1.7 billion to Farimex. 65
Other tactics are also possible. For example, one lawyer told the author about
a situation in which a land raider offered the legitimate occupants the opportunity
to rent the land on extremely favorable terms. When they agreed, the rent
agreements were offered in court as evidence of their affirmation of his legal title
to the land.66
Stage Two - Takeover
During stage two, the documents obtained during Stage One are used as legal
cover for the forcible takeover of the target business. For example, in the Telenor
case discussed above, a lawyer for Farimex justified Alfa's attempts to force
Telenor to pay $1.7 billion by stating that "Everything is happening in strict
compliance with the law."67 Similarly, the court's judgment in the Kumarin case
identifies several instances in which the raiders used corrupt registration
documents during the forcible seizure of target businesses.68 A dramatic
illustration of this tactic is provided in the novel Raider by Pavel Astakhov, a well-
60. Tavernise, supra note 58, at Al.
61. Id.
62. Id.; McCarthy & Puffer, supra note 58, at 305.
63. Hugo Miller & Yury Humber, Determined Deripaska Casts a Long Shadow, THE ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?story id=25836
&action id=2.
64. Dan Sabbagh, Telenor to Fight Siberian Court Order, The TIMES (London), Aug. 18, 2008,
available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industrysectors/telecoms/article4553417
.ece.
65. Nadia Popova, Court Marshals Order Sale of Telenor Stake in VimpelCom, THE ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 23, 2009, available at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action-id=2&
storyid=29306.
66. Interview with Viadmir Lisnyak, Attorney, in Moscow, Russ. (Mar. 2009) (on file with
author).
67. Popova, supra note 65.
68. Kumarin Judgment, supra note 56, at 11.
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known Russian lawyer. In the novel, the head of the victim business is confronted
in his office by the raider's armed thugs, who tell him that he has lost his position
and must leave. The victim protests and calls the police. When the police arrive, a
judicial marshal working with the raiders presents a package of documents,
including minutes of a shareholders' meeting at which a new board of directors
was selected and a judicial order restraining 90% of the corporate shares. Satisfied
that the takeover is legally authorized, the police officers let the raiders continue
their business.69
Stage 3 - Laundering
During the "laundering" stage, the raider typically transfers the seized assets
through a series of shell companies to an ostensible "good faith purchaser,"
exploiting provisions of Russian law which make recovery of misappropriated
assets from a "good faith purchaser" almost impossible.70 What this means, as a
practical matter, is that even if a raiding victim succeeds in obtaining a court ruling
voiding the transfer of his company's assets, he cannot recover the misappropriated
assets. As the Chief of the Investigative Committee of the General Procuracy,
Aleksander Bastrykhin, has written, "after a raiding takeover, the property is
laundered through a series of fictitious or offshore firms and eventually becomes
the property of a good faith purchaser. Demanding it from such an entity is
practically impossible." 71 Similarly, an August 2008 report by the National Anti-
Corruption Committee cites a typical case in which raiders falsified corporate
documents and transferred the seized assets through a series of offshore shell
companies to another offshore shell company which, relying on its alleged good
faith purchaser status, sent in its security forces to forcibly remove the real owners
from the property.72
69. PAVEL ASTAKHOV, REJDER [RAIDER] 25-26 (2008).
70. Article 167 of the Russian Civil Code provides that when a transaction is declared invalid,
each of the parties to the transaction must return to the other everything it has received in the deal or
make appropriate monetary compensation. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 167 (Russ.).
However, Russia's Constitutional Court held that these provisions "cannot be extended to a good faith
purchaser unless this is specifically provided by statute." WILLIAM BURNHAM, PETER B. MAGGS &
GENNADY M. DANILENKO, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 356 (Juris
Publishing 3d ed. 2004). By contrast, U.S. law allows for recovery of assets from a third party in a civil
proceeding upon a showing that the purchaser "possesses knowledge of facts that suggest a transfer may
be fraudulent." See Banner v. Kassow, 104 F.3d 352, 352 (2d Cir. 1996). In addition, some states
recognize a "larceny exception" which defeats even a good faith purchaser's claim when it can be
shown that that the seller acquired title to the transferred property by larceny. Dimension Funding LLC
v. DKA Assocs., Inc., 191 P.3d 923, 926 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). For a complete discussion of the
aspects of Russian law that make recovery from a good faith purchaser difficult, see Firestone, supra
note 3.
71 Letter and recommendations from A.I. Bastrykhin, Chairman of the Investigative Comm. of
the Procuracy of the Russian Fed'n, to E.P. Velikhov, Chairman of the Counsel of the Public Chamber
of the Russian Fed'n para 2 (Oct, 30, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bastrykhin Letter].
72. DOKLAD NATIONAL'NOGO ANTIKORRUPCIONNOGO COMMITTETA [NATIONAL
ANTICORRUPTION COMMITTEE REPORT], PREDLOZHENIYA Po POVYSHENIYU EFFEKTIVNOSTI BORBY S
REIDERSTVOM (NEZAKONNYM ZAKHVATOM SOBSTVENNOSTI) [SUGGESTIONS TO INCREASE
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This technique was also at the heart of the Kumarin case. According to the
court's judgment, Kumarin's organization recruited co-conspirators to pose as
"good-faith purchasers" and then arranged the sale of the seized businesses from
one to the other. Kumarin even retained lawyers to create litigation among the
good faith purchasers,74 a process which obscures the legal status of the
misappropriated assets, making their recovery, and any possible criminal
prosecution, more difficult. Bastrykhin considers abuse of the law on good faith
purchasers to be so severe that he recommends changing the traditional rule to
make it easier for raiding victims to get property back from even legitimate good
faith purchasers.
D. Collusive Litigation
Perhaps the most sophisticated form of legal abuse involves collusive
litigation, in which a party concocts uncontested litigation with the goal of
obtaining a judicial decision that can be used for criminal purposes. Collusive
litigation is sometimes used as a means to effectuate a raid (as, for example, in
Kumarin's orchestration of suits among the various "good faith purchasers"
through whom he laundered the raided business assets). But it can also be used in
support of other fraudulent schemes. For example, collusive litigation was
allegedly at the heart of a massive tax fraud in the infamous Hermitage Capital
case. According to Hermitage, raiders, operating in conjunction with law
enforcement officials, obtained a search warrant for the offices of certain
Hermitage law firms located in Moscow. During the search, the officials seized
corporate seals, charters and articles of association of Hermitage investment
companies, transferred ownership of the seized companies to co-conspirators, and
sued the misappropriated companies, using shell companies as the nominal
plaintiffs.76 According to court documents, lawyers representing the seized
companies conceded the claims entirely and the courts entered judgments against
the seized companies for hundreds of millions of dollars. Using these judgments,
the raiders claimed that the lawsuits had wiped out the historic profits of the seized
companies and obtained a refund of $230 million in "overpaid taxes" from the
government.
EFFECTIVENESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF PROPERTY] 13-14 (MA Krasnov, KV
Kabanov, CB Vasya, EM Golenkovoy & GA Shantina, eds., 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), [hereinafter NACC Report].
73. Kumarin Judgment, supra note 56, at 9, 13.
74. See, e.g., id at 7.
75. Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71, at para. 2.
76. See Persecution of Hermitage Capital in Russia in Order to Steal US $230 Million from the
Russian People, LAW AND ORDER IN RUSSIA, Oct. 7, 2009, http://lawandorderinrussia.org/news
releases/presentations/ [hereinafter Persecution ofHermitage].
77. Id. at 26, 56. See also Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniya [Protocol of Legal Proceeding], No
A5622479/2007 (Arbitrazhniy Sud Sankt-Peterburga i Leningradskoj Oblasti [Arbitration Court of St.
Petersburg and Leningrad Region] Aug. 28, 2007) (on file with author).
78. Persecution ofHermitage, supra note 76, at 50.
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According to Russian experts, collusive litigation is also used in complex
frauds that typically work as follows. The corporation perpetrating the fraud (the
"fraud corporation") enters into a contract, often with a foreign party (the "counter-
party"). In order to protect itself against the vagaries of the Russian court system,
the counter-party inserts a clause requiring that disputes be adjudicated in an
international arbitral forum. The counter-party performs its obligations under the
contract. The fraud corporation does not. The counter-party avails itself of the
arbitration clause, files a claim, and wins an award. The fraud corporation then
arranges for a shareholder to bring a suit in a Russian court alleging that the
contract should be declared null and void because the representative who entered
into the contract on behalf of the fraud corporation lacked the requisite authority
under Russian law or had an interest in the transaction. The corporation does not
contest the charge in any meaningful way and the court finds that the contract was
entered into in violation of the corporation's internal rules and declares the entire
contract, including the arbitration clause, null and void. As a result, the arbitration
award cannot be enforced and the fraud corporation walks away with the benefits
of the contract, but no liability.79
Perpetrators of such schemes often create the fraud corporation solely to enter
into the contract and deliberately create violations during negotiations with the
goal of using the violations to later invalidate the contract.so Schemes such as
these are made possible by several aspects of Russian corporate law, including: (1)
provisions that certain major transactions and transactions involving a possible
conflict of interest can be declared null and void if entered into without
shareholder approval or the approval of the Board of Directors, or in some cases,
shareholder approval;" (2) provisions allowing almost any shareholder, whether or
not the individual held stock at the time of the transaction, to challenge a corporate
transaction;8 2 (3) the absence of serious penalties for bad faith litigation;83 and (4)
79. B.R. KARABEL"NIKOV, KOSVENNIYE ISKI KAK SPOSOB UZAKONIT NARUSHENIE
ROSSIISKIMI KOMPANIAMI IKH SOBSTVENNYKH OBIAAZATELSTV [Indirect Lawsuits by Russian
Companies as a Way to Legalize the Breach of Their Responsibilities] 1 (2007) (on file with author).
80. Conversation with P.A. Skoblikov, Professor, Acad. of Mgmt. of the Ministry of Interior
Affairs of Russ. (Dec. 29, 2009) (on file with author).
81. See, e.g., Federal'nyi Zakon ob Aktsionernykh Obshestvakh [FZAO] [Federal Law on Joint
Stock Companies] (2007), No. 120, art. 79(1) (requiring that a large scale transaction must be approved
by Board of Directors or General Shareholders Meeting as provided for herein); id. art. 79(3) (requiring
that a transaction involving more than 50% of the balance price of the corporation's shares must be
approved by 75% of voting shareholders at a general shareholders' meeting); id. art. 79(6) (indicating
that a major transaction concluded in violation of the Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies can be
declared null and void based on a suit by the corporation or a shareholder); Federalnyi Zakon ob
Obshestvakh s Ogranichenoi Otvetsvenostyu [Federal Law on Limited Liability Companies] [FZOOO]
(2007), No. 14-FZ, art. 45(3) (requiring that a transaction involving a conflict of interest must be
approved by a general shareholders' resolution); id art. 45(5) (requiring that a transaction involving
conflict of interest concluded in violation of art. 45 of the Law on Limited Liability Corporations can be
declared null and void based on a suit brought by the corporation or a shareholder); KARABEL"NIKOV,
supra note 79, at 1, 2.
82. FZAO, supra note 81, art. 79(6); FZOOO, supra note 81, art. 45(5); KARABEL"NIKOV, supra
note 79, at 2.
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Russian courts' reluctance to award quantum meruit damages in breach of contract
cases. 84
A collusive litigation scheme was apparently used in part of the litigation
discussed above between Telenor and Alpha. Telenor and Alpha jointly owned
Kyivstar, a Ukrainian telecommunications venture, pursuant to a contract that
provided for arbitration of any disputes before an arbitral tribunal in New York."
Eventually, Telenor fell into a dispute with the subsidiary through which Alpha
exercised its ownership of Kyivstar, an entity named Storm, and initiated
arbitration against Storm in New York.8 6 Storm then initiated a lawsuit in Ukraine
in which Alpren, a company which owned a minority share of Storm, sought a
declaration that the Storm-Telenor contract was invalid because Storm's General
Director had concluded it without the requisite shareholder approval.
According to a court in the Southern District of New York which was called
upon to consider the arbitrability of the Storm-Telenor dispute, the Ukrainian
litigation had a "number of curious features." For example, Storm did not retain
counsel or file any written opposition.8 9 Storm's legal representative in the case
was not a lawyer, but was the Vice President of the holding company that owned
both Storm and Alpren.90 The proceeding lasted just ten minutes and, not
surprisingly, given the lack of any opposition, ended in a ruling that the
shareholders' agreement was invalid.91 Moreover, when Storm appealed the
decision, it failed to submit any real defense of its position.92 The appellate court
not only affirmed the lower court's decision against Storm, but broadened it by
finding specifically that the Arbitration Agreement was invalid, a ruling which
Storm used to contest the arbitrability of the dispute in New York.93 After
extensive litigation, the Southern District of New York rejected Storm's
arguments, finding that "Storm colluded in the bringing of this litigation against
itself," held the dispute arbitrable, and eventually upheld the arbitration panel's
83. E.g., Grazhdanskii Protsessual'nyi Kodeks RF [GPK] [Civil Procedural Code] art. 99 (Russ.)
(allowing courts to award damages to victims of bad faith litigation; however, such a provision is
useless in deterring collusive litigation given that the "victimized" party is by definition connected to
the offending party). See also Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 10 (Russ.) (stating
broadly that "abuse of rights" shall not be permitted, but the only remedy it provides is for the court to
refuse to protect the rights of the offending party, a remedy that would not have any effect in cases of
collusive litigation). The Criminal Code does not criminalize collusive litigation or abuse of process.
84. KARABEL"NIKOV, supra note 79, at 2.
85. Storm LLC v. Telenor Mobile Commc'ns, No. 06 Civ. 13157 (GEL), 2006 WL 3735657, at 1
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006).
86. Id. at 1-2.
87. Id. at 2, 4.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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award of relief to Telenor.94 Storm then returned to Ukraine and through more
collusive litigation obtained a ruling that compliance with the New York court's
decision would place it in violation of Ukrainian law. 5 In rejecting this argument,
the court stated:
The [Ukrainian] opinions appear to be nothing more than a sham, a
pseudo-legal excuse for Storm and the Altimo Entities to continue to
refuse to do what they have all along refused to do. It is outrageous,
though not surprising given their prior conduct in this matter, that Storm
and the Altimo Entities would construct such a sham. It is both
outrageous and surprising that their counsel-two esteemed New York
law firms-would represent that sham to the Court, unexamined, as a
bona fide basis for their clients' refusal to comply with the [arbitration
panel's] Final Award.96
A recent legislative amendment based on a 2008 ruling by the Russian
Constitutional Court in the "case of Surinov" may provide new opportunities for
collusive litigation scams. The defendant, Tatevos Surinov, was convicted of
embezzlement. 7 While the criminal case was proceeding, Surinov initiated
litigation in the commercial (arbitrazh) courts98 and obtained rulings that he had
acquired the subject property legally. He then attempted to use these rulings to get
the criminal case dismissed.99 The court hearing the criminal case refused to give
preclusive effect to the commercial court rulings. 00 Surinov then challenged his
conviction in the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the criminal court's
refusal to give deference to the rulings of the arbitrazh courts was unconstitutional.
The Constitutional Court agreed, holding that the presumption of innocence
requires courts of general jurisdiction to give deference to arbitrazh court rulings
favorable to a criminal defendant.o In fulfillment of the Surinov decision, in 2009
President Medvedev signed into law amendments to the Code of Criminal
94. Id. at 12.
95. Telenor, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 608 n.14.
96. Id. One of the New York law firms was Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP.
97. P.A. Skoblikov, Preiuditsiya Aktov Arbitrazhnykh Sudov v. Ugolovnom Protsesse: Novoe
Prochteniye [Prejudicial Acts ofArbitral Courts in Criminal Procedure: The New Reading], 2 J. Russ.
L. 69, 75 (2008).
98. Russia has a tripartite court system consisting of: (1) arbitrazh or commercial courts which
have jurisdiction over disputes between legal entities and between the state and legal entities; (2) courts
of general jurisdiction, which are empowered to hear criminal cases as well as civil disputes between
individuals and legal entities; and (3) the Constitutional Court, which is authorized to hear challenges to
the constitutionality of certain statutes. BURNHAM ET. AL., supra note 70, at 50.
99. Skoblikov, supra note 97, at 75.
100. Id. at 77. Specifically, Surinov challenged the constitutionality of Article 90 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part, that a sentence imposed by a court of general
jurisdiction has preclusive effect in a subsequent criminal investigation. Article 90 is silent with regard
to the potentially preclusive effect of a ruling in a civil case, an omission generally understood to mean
that a ruling by a commercial court has no preclusive effect in a criminal case. Ugolovno-
Protsessual'nyi Kodeks RF [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 90 (Russ.).
101. Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71, at 12 (on file with author).
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Procedure essentially making the factual findings of arbitrazh court decisions
binding on investigators and prosecutors. 102
'Like many of the other rules discussed in this article, the Surinov ruling and
the amendments to Article 90 on issue preclusion appear well-motivated.
However, in the hands of criminals, they could easily be abused. Some Russian
experts contend that organized crime groups will now use collusive litigation in the
arbitrazh courts to obtain desired rulings on property issues that will then be used
to defeat criminal prosecutions or, even worse, initiate criminal prosecutions for
malicious purposes. 103 For example, a fraudster accused of misappropriation of
property could concoct litigation in the arbitrazh courts to establish faux title to the
property in question and then use that ruling to obtain the dismissal of the criminal
prosecution. Alternatively, raiders could orchestrate litigation in the arbitrazh
courts to establish their title to someone else's property and then use the arbitrazh
court ruling to initiate a criminal prosecution of the real property owner as part of a
scheme to misappropriate the property.
III. CAUSES
Upon first glance, it may appear that widespread legal abuse in contemporary
Russia is simply the result of state and judicial corruption. While there is
undoubtedly truth to this, corruption does not appear to provide a complete
explanation for at least two reasons. First, many of the schemes described herein
do not require corruption. For example, in collusive litigation schemes, a judge
presented with an uncontested claim has little choice but to enter judgment for the
plaintiff. 104 Similarly, trademark squatters do not need to corrupt state officials if
they identify trademarks that have lapsed. Patent squatters do not need to corrupt
state officials if they are adept enough at drafting applications for utility model
patents. And even raiding does not always require corruption. For example, while
some of the state officials who registered fraudulent documents in the Kumarin
case were bribed, others were simply deceived.1 05 Second, to the extent that legal
102. See DOMINIQUE TISSOT & ANASTASIA PROZOR, CMS RUSSIA, RUSSIA TAX OUTLOOK #9
DECEMBER 2009 - JANUARY 2010: MAJOR AMENDMENTS TO RUSSIAN TAX LEGISLATION COMING
INTO FORCE IN 2010, at 5 (2010) (discussing Federal Law "On Amendments to Part 1 of the Tax Code
of the Russian Federation and Certain Regulations of the Russian Federation" No. 383-FZ dated 29
December 2009); KPMG, RUSSIAN LEGISLATIVE NEWS: TAX 2 (Feb. 10, 2010),
http://www.kpmg.ru/russian/supl/publications/periodicals/RussiaLegislativeNews/2010/1 RLN 10.pdf
(discussing Federal Law "On Amendments to Part 1 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and
Certain Regulations of the Russian Federation" No. 383-FZ dated 29 December 2009).
103. See Skoblikov, supra note 97, at 80-81 (on file with author); Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71,
at 12-15 (on file with author).
104. It should be noted that Article 70(4) of the Arbitrazh Procedure Code provides that a judge
should not accept a party's concession if there is a basis to believe that the concession was made with
the goal of concealing certain facts. Arbitrazhno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks RF [APK] [Code of
Arbitration Procedure] art. 70(4) (Russ.). However, if the litigation is collusive and neither party has an
interest in presenting the relevant facts, it is hard to know how the judge could identify a basis for
rejecting the concession.
105. Kumarin Judgment, supra note 56, at 8 (on file with author).
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abuse does rely on corruption, explaining it as the result of corruption is simply
circular. It does not explain the underlying cause of the corruption or why it takes
the particular form that it does. Therefore, an additional explanation must be
sought elsewhere.
This explanation can be found in the continuing legacy of certain aspects of
the Soviet legal system. While the Russian legal system has, of course changed
since Soviet times, the current legal system is still heavily influenced by its Soviet
predecessor (which was, in turn, heavily influenced by its imperial predecessor).
As President Medvedev has noted, fifteen years is not sufficient to overcome the
legacy of traditional Russian legal attitudes.106 According to the leading textbook
on the Russian legal system:
[T]he Soviet and imperial past have left their marks on Russia's legal
system. This legacy affects not only the content of legal institutions and
rules, but also underlying attitudes about the nature and significance of
law and the way it should be reformed and enforced .... The effects of
the traditional Soviet and imperial authoritarian administrative style are
felt at every level and branch of government. 107
For purposes of this article, three aspects of the Soviet legal system appear
particularly relevant to explaining the prevalence of legal abuse.
First, the Soviet legal system was based on the notion that law is an
instrument of political rule rather than a neutral system for the arbitration of
disputes. According to historian Peter Solomon, "most Bolshevik leaders adopted
an instrumental view of the law. Without enshrining the law as a value and always
stressing the subordinate status of the law, Lenin and his colleagues used the law
as a tool for implementing their policies."108 The leading early Soviet legal theorist
E. B. Pashukanis provided a theoretical rationale for this approach, writing: "In
bourgeois-capitalist society, the legal superstructure should have maximum
immobility-maximum stability-because it represents a firm framework of the
movement of the economic forces whose bearers are capitalist entrepreneurs ....
[L]aw occupies among us, on the contrary, a subordinate position with reference to
politics."l 09
This approach reached practitioners, such as Procurator General Andrei
Vyshinsky, who in 1935 wrote: "[t]here might be collisions and discrepancies
between the formal commands of laws and those of the proletarian revolution ....
106. Dmitri Medvedev: Pravovoi nigilizm poiavilsia ne vchera [Dmitri Medvedev: Legal Nihilism
Did Not Occur Yesterday], VSLUH.RU NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.vsluh.ru/news/politics/
155483.html [hereinafter VSLUH.RU NEWS -Legal Nihilism].
107. BURNHAM ET. AL., supra note 70, at 6.
108. PETER H. SOLOMON, JR., SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN 17 (1996).
109. BERMAN, supra note 2, at 42 (quoting E. B. Pashukanis, Director, Institute of Soviet
Construction and Law, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Revolutsiia Prava [The Soviet State and the
Revolution of Law] (1930) translated in HUGH W. BABB, SOVIET LEGAL PHIL. 237-80 (1951)).
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This collision must be solved only by the subordination of the formal commands of
the law to those of party policy."110
Use of the law for political repression found its fullest and most dramatic
expression in the "show trials" in which Stalin's political enemies were convicted
of crimes against the state." This public abuse of the legal system set an example
for ordinary citizens, some of whom apparently began to use criminal denunciation
to advance their personal interests. Historian Sheila Fitzpatrick maintains that one
offshoot of the Stalinist terror was the denunciation by ordinary citizens of their
neighbors and co-workers as a way of settling personal scores and advancing their
personal interests. 1 12 Fitzpatrick cites one typical case that bears eerie similarity to
contemporary raiding and commissioned prosecutions. Two con men joined a
collective farm (kolkhoz), persuaded the kolkhoz members to criticize the
chairman for abuse of power, then used these criticisms to write denunciations
accusing him of corruption, all in order to get him replaced by their own man and
obtain control of the kolkhoz assets for themselves.113 Although the post-Stalin era
saw significant reforms, according to Solomon, "[t]he Stalinist mold of criminal
justice proved to have lasting significance, for it persisted for decades after the
death of the tyrant . . . each of [the] core features of Stalinist criminal justice
remained alive in the 1980s .... "114 For example, the use of criminal prosecution
to repress political dissent continued into the Brezhnev era.15
Given this history, it is not surprising that the post-Soviet period still
maintains some features of what President Medvedev has termed "legal nihilism"
(defined as disrespect for the law), a problem which he identified as a legacy of
Russia's past. 1 6 It is also not surprising that many continue to view the law as an
110. Id.at42-43.
111. THE GREAT PURGE TRIAL, at ix-x (Robert C. Tucker & Stephen F. Cohen eds., 1965).
112. See SHEILA FITZPATRICK, EVERYDAY STALINISM: ORDINARY LIFE IN EXTRAORDINARY
TIMES: SOVIET RUSSIA IN THE 1930s 205-08 (1999); Nellie H. Ohr, The Care and Feeding of Homo
Sovieticus, H-RussIA, Mar. 2000, at 2 (reviewing SHEILA FITZPATRICK, EVERYDAY STALINISM:
ORDINARY LIFE IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: SOVIET RUSSIA IN THE 1930s (1999)). See also Vladimir
A. Kozlov, Denunciation and Its Functions in Soviet Governance: A Study of Denunciations and Their
Bureaucratic Handling From Soviet Police Archives, 1944-1953, in ACCUSATORY PRACTICES:
DENUNCIATION IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY, 1789-1989, at 121, 133 (Sheila Fitzpatrick & Robert
Gellately eds., 1997) (identifying "interested denunciations" directed against supervisors, co-workers
and neighbors as one of the main forms of Stalin-era denunciation).
113. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Signals from Below: Soviet Letters of Denunciation of the 1930s, in
ACCUSATORY PRACTICES: DENUNCIATION IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY, 1789-1989, at 85, 107-08
(Sheila Fitzpatrick & Robert Gellately eds., 1997).
114. SOLOMON, supra note 108, at 453.
115. See, e.g., ON TRIAL: THE SOVIET STATE VERSUS "ABRAM TERTZ" AND "NIKOLAI ARZHAK"
(Leopold Labedz & Max Hayward eds., 1967) (discussing a case that occurred in 1966, during the
Brezhnev Era 1964-1982).
116. VSLUH.RUNEWS -Legal Nihilism, supra note 106; Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko also note
that "legal nihilism in the mass consciousness ... continues to undermine efforts to install legality as a
principle on which both society and the state should be based" and the Council of Europe has also
identified the development of a "legal culture" of respect for the law as one of Russia's main tasks.
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 70, at 6-7.
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instrument for achieving extra-legal ends. During the Soviet period, abuse of the
law usually took the form of government use of the legal system for political ends.
Today, with the disappearance of Soviet ideology, it appears to have devolved all
too often into an instrument of extortion and fraud by criminals. But the
underlying principle of utilitarian manipulation of the law for improper ends
remains the same.
The second cause appears rooted in the Soviet legal system's relationship to
private property. The Soviet legal system criminalized entrepreneurial activity,
provided almost no protection for private property, and even provided a legal
mechanism for the expropriation of property. As Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko
write:
According to Marx, the abolition of private ownership of [the] means of
production was an absolute prerequisite for a just society. Guided by
this theory, the Soviet communists nationalized all means of production
and almost all private property .... As private property disappeared and
a command economy replaced private industry and commerce, most of
the private civil and commercial law disappeared. 117
The legacy of this system lives on in laws like the criminal prohibition on
"illegal entrepreneurship" that underlies many commissioned prosecutions, the
uncertain protection of intellectual property rights underlying patent racketeering
and trademark squatting, and the attitude among some law enforcement officials
that the "terrorization" of business is acceptable. It also lives on in the split
between general jurisdiction courts and arbitrazh courts (successors to the Soviet
state arbitrazh system which settled disputes between state enterprises), 18 which
make possible the issue preclusion schemes discussed above. Moreover, because
of the absence of a well-defined body of law regulating property rights, the post-
Soviet privatization of state assets was carried out without a firm legal framework.
As a result, property rights in contemporary Russia are uncertain, making it
possible to present a legal challenge to almost any property ownership, thus
creating fertile ground for all the schemes discussed above. 119 This point is well
illustrated by a recent survey in which 45 percent of Russian business owners said
that Russian property law provides no protection against illegal takings by the state
and 24 percent said that it actually facilitates the misappropriation of private
property by the state. 120
117. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 70, at 4-5.
118. Id. at 77.
119. SKOBLIKOV, supra note 7, at 35 (noting that pursuit of certain business activities in post-
Soviet Russia almost inevitably involves violations of the law).
120. BUSINESS SOLIDARNOST': ORGANIZACIYA ZASCHITI PREDPRIYATIY [ORGANIZATION FOR
PROTECTION OF ENTERPRISES], ISSLEDOVANIYA BIZNESS ZHURNAL-ONLAIN [INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
BUSINESS JOURNAL-ONLINE], SCHITAETE LI VY CHTO ZAKONODATEL'NAYA BAZA I
PRAVOPRIMENITEL'NAYA PRAKTIKA POLNOST'YU ZASHISHYAYET VASH BIZNES OT POSYAGATEL'STV SO
STORONY GOSUDARSTVA? [DO YOU THINK THAT THE LAW AND ITS PRACTICE PROTECTS YOUR BUSINESS
FROM ILLEGAL TAKING BY GOVERNMENT?] (2009), http://www.kapitalisty.ru/research/podrobnee/003/.
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Third, the Soviet legal system was rigid, formalized and abstract, like
European civil law in the 19th Century, before the advent of legal realism. As
Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko write:
[T]he Soviet legal system missed out on developments that took place in
Western European civil law systems during the 20th [C]entury. One of
these was the relaxation in Western continental systems of many of the
more absolutist and dogmatic aspects of legal theory. In essence, many
aspects of Soviet legal theory remained stuck in a "time warp." To the
extent that it had a kinship with Western European civil law systems,
Soviet legal theory reflected 19th Century ideas that had long ago been
discarded by Western European legal scholars. 121
Such a pre-legal realism approach provides fertile opportunity for those who
seek to manipulate the letter of the law while violating the spirit of the law. For
example, formalism encourages judicial actions based on facially valid documents
without a meaningful inquiry into the process that generated the documents, thus
making the system vulnerable to raiding and collusive litigation. It promotes the
mechanistic enforcement of intellectual property rights that makes patent and
trademark squatting possible, as well as the literal application of rules on "good
faith purchasers" so often exploited by raiders. But perhaps most importantly, it
limits judges' ability to hold parties to a flexible notion of "good faith" and to
fashion practical, equitable remedies on a case by case basis, something that is
essential to preventing the kinds of schemes discussed herein.122 In short, as
Jeffrey Kahn has written:
Russia is not tabula rasa when it comes to law and legislation. Russia is
not starting from scratch, which certainly has advantages, but it has the
disadvantage of a lot of bad legal habits. Worst of these is a historical
attachment to bare legal positivism as a tool for state control. 123
IV. POSSIBLE CURES
Yet, not all is bleak. Consistent with President Medvedev's calls for an end to
the "terrorization" of business, the government appears to be taking important
initial steps to combat raiding and official extortion. Some of these measures are
designed to prevent raiding, others to facilitate its prosecution.
A. Prevention
In terms of prevention, on July 19, 2009, the Duma passed a series of
amendments to existing legislation, which was designed to limit the opportunities
121. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 70, at 4.
122. See, e.g., Gevorg Beknazar-Yuzbashchev, Zloupotreblenie Pravom i Printsip Dobroi Sovesti v
Grazhdanskom Prave Rossii I Germanii [Abuse of the Law and the Principle of Good Conscience in
Russian and German Civil Law] 3, 24-5, (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Avtoreferat, Institut
Gosudarstva i Prava Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk [The Russian Science Academy Institute of
Government and Law]) (on file with author).
123. Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511,
520 (2008).
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for raiding. 124 For example, in order to prevent schemes in which a raider obtains a
judicial decision in a remote location freezing the target corporation's assets (as
allegedly happened in the Ilim Pulp and Telenor/Farimex cases discussed above),
the law requires that corporate disputes and motions for restraint of corporate
assets be brought in the district where the corporation is located. 125 In order to
prevent "sneak attacks," the law also requires commercial courts to post on their
web sites information about the filing of the case and its progress. 126 To deter raids
accomplished through falsification of the corporate register, the law amends the
Law on Joint Stock Companies to provide that the company and its registrar will
be subject to joint and several liability for shareholder losses resulting from
improper maintenance of the shareholder register.127 Other provisions of the July
19 amendments will make collusive litigation schemes more difficult. For
example, one provision amends the law on limited liability companies to provide
judges the discretion to refuse to invalidate corporate transactions concluded in
violation of internal corporate rules if such violations were not "material" and did
not cause damages to the company or the party bringing the claim.128
In another significant act, in December 2009, President Medvedev signed
amendments to the Criminal Code which provide tax offenders the opportunity for
exoneration from criminal liability if they pay their tax in arrears within a
designated period of time and which eliminate pretrial detention in criminal tax
investigations, two steps which are expected to reduce extortionate tax
129prosecutions. In April 2010, the Duma passed legislation restricting the
possibility of pre-trial detention in cases involving white collar crimes, including
fraud and money laundering.130 This legislation will also make it much more
difficult to use criminal prosecution to extort businesses.
B. Prosecution
In terms of prosecution, the Kumarin case, which resulted in a fourteen-year
sentence for Kumarin and convictions for seven other members of his gang, was a
notable success in the battle against raiding. 131 To facilitate future raiding
124. See, e.g., Federal'nyi zakon ot 19 iyulya 2009 0 vnesenii izmenyenii v otdel'nye akti
Rossisskoi Federatsii [Federal Law of July 19, 2009 on Amending Some Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation] 2009, N. 205-FZ [No. 205-FZ ] [hereinafter July 19, 2009 Law]. Arbitrazhnyi
Protessual'nyi Kodeks RF [APK] [Code of Arbitration Procedure] arts. 38(4.1), 99(3.1) (Russ.).
125. See July 19, 2009 Law, art. 10.
126. Arbitrazhnyi Protessual'nyi Kodeks RF [APK] [Code of Arbitration Procedure] art. art.
225.4(1) (Russ.).
127. July 19, 2009 Law, art. 3; FZAO, art. 44(4), in BERNARD S. BLACK, RENIER KRAAKMAN &
ANNA S. TARASSOVA, GUIDE TO THE RussIAN LAW ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES app. III p. 36 (1998).
128. July 19, 2009 Law, art. 6; see FZOOO, art. 43.
129. TisSOT & PROZOR, supra note 102; see Yana Yakovleva, Medvedev's Battle Against Legal
Nihilism, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?storyid=30693
&action id=2 (discussing Federal Law "On Amendments to Part 1 of the Tax Code of the Russian
Federation and Certain Regulations of the Russian Federation" No. 383-FZ dated 29 December 2009).
130. Ugolovno-Protessualnyi Kodeks RF [UPK] art. 108 1.1
131. Kumarin Judgment, supra note 56, at 168-71 (on file with author); Barsukov (Kumarin)
Priznan Vynovnym po Delu o Reiderstve v Sankt Peterburge [Barsukov (Kumarin) Found Guilty of
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prosecutions, Investigative Committee Chief Bastrykhin recently put forward a
series of legislative proposals which include the following: (a) "introducing
criminal liability for corruptly obtaining and using unlawful rulings from civil
litigation" (this would facilitate the prosecution of collusive litigation schemes and
raids based on corruptly obtained arbitrazh court decisions); (b)changing the law to
give civil court decisions only a rebuttable presumption of preclusive effect in
criminal cases and creating a mechanism for prosecutors to appeal decisions of
arbitrazh courts (this would help address the Surinov problem); and (c) amending
the law on good faith purchasers to address the laundering aspects of raiding.132
Moreover, in 2009 a new law on cooperating witnesses took effect. The law
provides, in pertinent part, that defendants who cooperate completely and honestly,
as certified by the prosecutor and judge, cannot be sentenced to more than one-half
of the otherwise applicable maximum sentence.133 While applicable to all multi-
defendant cases, this law could be especially valuable in raiding prosecutions. As
Bastrykhin notes, prosecuting crimes that use corrupt judicial rulings is difficult
because it requires proof that rulings which are facially valid were corruptly
obtained with criminal intent. 134 Testimony from insiders who were part of the
scheme is often the only way to obtain such evidence and the new cooperating
witness law will, for the first time, provide Russian prosecutors with a legal
mechanism to reward witnesses for such testimony.135
C. Expansion of Jury Trials
One solution that the government has not yet pursued may lie in the
expansion of jury trials, currently available only for a limited class of criminal
cases, to all criminal cases.13 6 There are at least two reasons for this. First, trial by
jury is a deterrent to commissioned prosecutions, a fact recognized even by
America's founders. As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist 83, trial by
jury provides security against corruption because it is much harder to corrupt a jury
than a single judge. "By increasing the obstacles to success," Hamilton wrote, this
"complicated agency" discourages "[a]rbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of
Corporate Raiding in St. Petersburg], POLIT.RUNovoSTI [POLIT.RU NEWS], Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.
polit.ru /news/2009/11/12/Kumarin.html.
132. Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71, at 14 (on file with author).
133. Federal Law 383-FZ, December 29, 2009 "On the Introduction of Amendments in the First
Part of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation."
134. Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71, at 1 (on file with author).
135. Russian prosecutors appear to appreciate the value of the law. In a recent survey conducted
by the author, 109 out of 131 respondents indicated they think that the new cooperating witness law is
an "essential" element in combating organized crime and stated that they intend to use the new law in
their work. Survey by Thomas Firestone, Survey of Russian Prosecutors (2009) (on file with author).
Moreover, the law is already being used. For example, according to statistics of the Sverdlovsk District
Court, within the first three months, thirteen applications for cooperation were approved just in the city
of Belgorod. Statistics of the Sverdlovsk District Court (Oct. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
136. Trial by jury is not available for illegal entrepreneurship, money laundering, fraud and
criminal patent infringement - some of the statutes that are most commonly abused for extortionate
purposes. Nor is it available for any civil cases.
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prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary
convictions."3 This theory seems to apply even more so in contemporary Russia.
While the acquittal rate in bench trials is less than 1%, the acquittal rate in Russian
jury trials is approximately 20%,138 making commissioned prosecutions much less
likely to succeed. Moreover, according to judges and former jurors, Russian juries
regularly reject cases that they perceive as fabricated, commissioned, or brought
for improper purposes. 139 For example, in 2007, feeling that they were all that had
protected a businessman from wrongful conviction in a commissioned prosecution,
a group of former jurors even formed an association to protect and expand trial by
jury in Russia and to lobby for legal reform. 140 As one former investigator bluntly
wrote on a Russian blog, "commissioned cases fall apart in jury trials." 141 Thus,
the expansion of jury trials to more criminal cases, especially white collar crimes,
would reduce the opportunity to use criminal prosecution for extortionate
purposes.
Second, trial by jury can be an effective means of instilling popular respect
for the law and curing so-called "legal nihilism." In Democracy in America,
Alexis de Tocqueville described jury service as an education in civic virtue and
said that trial by jury in the United States had helped to "promote the legalistic
attitude even down to the lowest of the social classes." 142 According to
Tocqueville, jury service:
[M]olds the human mind to its procedures and becomes bound up, as it
were, with the very conception of justice .... Juries ... help to instill in
the minds of all the citizens something of the mental habits of judges,
which are exactly those which best prepare a people to be free. They
spread respect for the courts' decisions and the concepts of right
throughout all classes ... 143
A recent study of almost one hundred former jurors conducted by the Russian
Academy of Sciences suggests that jury service has begun to have such an effect
on Russians. In oral interviews, former jurors repeatedly described developing a
137. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 498-500 (CLINTON ROSSITER ED., SIGNET CLASSIC 2003) (1788).
138. Kahn, supra note 123, at 547.
139. Interview with Russian Jurors, Meeting of the Russian "Jurors' Club," in Moscow (Mar.
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Russian Jurors, Meeting of the Russian "Jurors' Club," in St.
Petersburg, (June 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Russian Jurors, Meeting of the Russian
"Jurors' Club," in St. Petersburg (Oct. 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Russian Jurors,
Meeting of the Russian "Jurors' Club," in Moscow (Dec. 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Russian Jurors, Meeting of the Russian "Jurors' Club," in Sochi (Sept. 2009) (on file with author).
140. Club of Jurors, About Us, GUILD OF COURT REPORTERS, 2008, http://www.juryclub.ru.
141. Andrei Skrobot, "Ne Vinoven: Pervyi v Moskve Sud Prisyazhnykh Opravdal Podsudimogo
Obvinyavshevosa v Ubistve" ["Not Guilty: The First Moscow Jury Acquitted a Defendant Accused of
Murder"], NEZAVISIMAYA GAz. [THE INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER], Aug. 15, 2003, Posting of Arthur
Poghosyan to http://www.advokatrus.ru/doc/292 (Jan. 31, 2007).
142. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 316, 321 (GERALD E BEVIN TRANS.,
PENGUIN BOOKS 2002) (1835).
143. Id. at 320-21.
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sense of responsibility for the fate of another person. Many indicated that, even
months after their jury service ended, they continued to feel stress over the verdict
and to wonder whether they had done the right thing. 144 In numerous interviews
that the author has conducted with former jurors, they repeatedly described the
experience as empowering and explained that it had instilled in them a new interest
and respect for the law. Thus, jury service, if available to a large enough portion
of the population, can help to create a culture in which abuse of the law is less
tolerated.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
What are the implications of this study?
First, at the most general level, this study reminds us of the continuing legacy
of the Soviet past, the obstacles it creates for reformers, and the opportunities it
creates for criminals.
Second, it has implications for the broader theoretical debate over whether
participation in legitimate spheres of social and economic activity is likely to force
criminals to "legitimize" their behavior. Daniel Bell in his famous essay "Crime as
an American Way of Life: A Queer Ladder of Social Mobility" predicted the
"embourgeoisement" of organized crime in America and its decline "[w]ith the
rationalization and absorption of some illicit activities into the structure of the
economy . . . ." 145 This theory has been applied to Russia by those who see
contemporary Russian financial crime as a stage in the development of Russian
capitalism, analogous to the robber baron era in U.S. history.146 However, this
study highlights the opposite possibility-when criminals enter the legal system,
they are just as likely to corrupt the legal system as the legal system is likely to
force them to behave honestly. Thus, this study suggests that we should not be
sanguine about contemporary Russian financial crime or assume that it is simply a
passing fad. Rather, affirmative measures on the part of governments and
businesses are necessary.
Third, governments and enforcement authorities, both in Russia and in
countries affected by the schemes discussed above, should recognize manipulation
of the legal system as a new and potentially dangerous form of crime.
Investigators should be prepared to investigate the legal aspects of such schemes
and to trace the origins of judicial decisions and other legal documents used therein
in the same way that they investigate financial machinations and the origins of
144. Interview by L.M. Karnozova and V.S. Merkulova with Russian Jurors (on file with author).
145. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE
FIFTIES 148-50 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988) (1960).
146. See e.g., Annelise Anderson, The Red Mafia: A Legacy of Communism, in ECONOMIC
TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM (Edward P. Lazear ed., 1995)
(summarizing arguments that contemporary Russian organized crime is an early stage of capitalism like
the robber baron era); see also DAVID E. HOFFMAN, THE OLIGARCHS: WEALTH AND POWER IN THE
NEW RUSSIA 6 (2003) (comparing techniques of the first Russian financiers to exploitation of banks,
the state, and investors, manipulation of the stock market and acquisition of companies by early 20h
Century American businessmen).
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suspected criminal schemes. Governments should review their relevant legislation
and, where appropriate, consider heightening civil and/or criminal penalties for bad
faith litigation, falsification of documents and abuse of process.
Fourth, this study has implications for the provision of rule of law technical
assistance to developing countries. Specifically, it highlights the danger that law
enforcement tools that have proven effective in combating organized crime in the
West, such as criminal penalties for money laundering, can become perverted
when transported to foreign soil and can sometimes enhance, rather than reduce,
organized crime if they are not carefully adapted to local conditions and
accompanied by appropriate guarantees of transparency. Thus, technical
assistance providers should carefully study local conditions and, rather than
automatically basing legislative recommendations on what has worked in the
United States, 147 should support efforts to adopt legislation addressing receiving
countries' specific crime problems. In the case of Russia, legislation establishing
criminal liability for such practices as commissioned prosecutions, trademark
squatting, and collusive litigation, as well as legislation removing criminal liability
for patent infringement, could prove as important in combating organized crime as
the adoption of legislation based on U.S. experience.
Finally, while good legal counsel is essential in any business in any country,
the prevalence of legal abuse in Russia means that it is especially important for
businesses operating there. Quality legal counsel can ensure that contracts are
drafted tightly, with minimal opportunity for abuse; that corporate books and
records are subject to minimum risk of falsification; and that patents and
trademarks are maintained and are not vulnerable to squatting. Although such
measures are not a guarantee of protection, they can help to reduce the risks.
Complete protection will be possible only after more significant changes in the law
and the societal mindset.
147. A previous article by the author provides a good example of this mistake. See Thomas
Firestone, What Russia Must Do to Fight Organized Crime, 14 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA: J. POST-SOVIET
DEMOCRATIZATION 59 (2006).
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TOWARDS HOLISTIC TRANSNATIONAL PROTECTION: AN
OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW
APPROACHES To KIDNAPPING
CECILIA M. BAILLIET
This article assesses dilemmas presented by the global phenomenon of kidnapping.
It highlights the challenge presented by failed or semi-failed states, the current
reliance on private actors to provide assistance in the face of non-state violence,
protection gaps in the transnational egalframework, and the pursuit of asylum as
a remedy. It describes the evolution of civil society reclamations for cosmopolitan
justice in past situations of state directed enforced disappearance in the Americas
to current appeals for communitarian justice in non-state actor kidnapping
epidemics. The conclusion calls for innovation in legal institutions and norms
addressing the protection needs of victims, as well as broader strategies to tackle
the root causes of inequality, poverty, and corruption which have enabled
kidnapping to escalate as an industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
[P]ublic security is the duty and exclusive obligation of the State, strengthens
the rule of law, and is intended to safeguard the well-being and security ofpersons
and protect the enjoyment of all their rights.
- Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas, October 20081
The global criminal phenomenon of kidnapping is on the rise around the
world, increasing at alarming rates in countries such as Algeria, Argentina, China,
Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala,
Honduras, Afghanistan, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel & Palestine, Kenya,
Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
and Yemen.2 The states with the highest kidnapping rates correlate with the
. Professor, Deputy Director of the Department of Public and International Law and Director of the
Masters Program in Public International Law at University of Oslo. She would like to extend warm
thanks to Robert Wai, Robert Currie, Ole Kristian Fauchald, Katja Franko Aas, Nils Christie, Malcolm
Langford, Simon O'Connor, and the Editors of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy for
their comments and suggestions.
1. First Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Safety in the Americas, Mexico City, Mex.,
Oct. 7-8, 2008, Commitment to Public Security in the Americas, at 1, OEA/Ser.K/XLIX. 1, (Oct. 29,
2008), available at http://www.oas.org/CSHenglish/documents/RM00028EO8.doc.
2. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Crime Prevention and Crim. J.,
International Cooperation in the Prevention, Combating and Elimination of Kidnapping and in
Providing Assistance to Victims:Report of the Sec'y-Gen., U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2003/7 (Mar. 5, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping]; see Kate Goldberg, Kidnapping Becomes Growth
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characterization of "failed/failing state": in which the rule of law and civic trust is
deemed to be extremely weak, corruption is endemic, and governance is
fragmented. In addition, these states demonstrate high levels of poverty,
unemployment, income inequality, stratified social classes, and lower development
resulting in the deprivation of a guarantee of basic human security to citizens. 4 At
the root of insecurity is a foundation of a failure to fulfill social and economic
rights. Essentially, it may be argued that, in part, kidnapping epidemics are the
fruit of social injustice. From Weber's perspective, the state has lost its
monopolization of organized violence, and civil society has lost enjoyment of a
domestic zone of peace.6 Indeed, the Preamble of Brazil's National Plans of
Actions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights sets forth:
"Kidnapping... may not be considered normal or even tolerated in a state and in a
society that claims to be modem and democratic."7 The notion of the rule of law is
rendered opaque, as judicial systems prove ineffective in penalizing those involved
in kidnapping. While private security companies grapple with securing release of
hostages, individuals and families are frustrated with the inability of states to
Industry, BBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2000) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/914448.stm. See also
eGlobalHealth Insurers Agency, LLC, http://www.eglobalhealth.com/kidnap-ransom-extortion-
insurance.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (listing high risk kidnapping countries); CLAYTON
CONSULTANTS, INC., 2009 KIDNAP RISK BRIEF (2009), available at http://www.claytonconsultants.
com/en/download/CCKRB-EN-0409.pdf (listing high risk kidnapping countries); CLAYTON
CONSULTANTS, INC., 2008 KIDNAP RISK BRIEF (2008), available at http://www.claytonconsultants.
conVen/assets/pdf/Clayton2008KidnapRiskBrief.pdf (listing high risk kidnapping countries); PAX
CHRISTI NETHERLANDS, THE KIDNAP INDUSTRY IN COLOMBIA: OUR BUSINESS? 9 (2001), available at
www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/catalogus/uploaded file.aspx?id=167 (estimating that almost one country in four
around the world is affected by kidnappings).
3. Compare 2008 KIDNAP RISK BRIEF, supra note 2 (listing all the major countries in the world
where kidnappings regularly occur and the rates of frequency), with The Fund for Peace, Failed States
Index 2009, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com content&task-view&id=99&
Itemid=140 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) (listing all the failed, failing, and at risk states in the world)
[hereinafter The Fund for Peace].
4. See The Fund for Peace, supra note 3 (listing twelve indicators of a failed state with pop-up
windows that describe these indicators in-depth). GINI coefficients are used to measure income
inequality, which often indicates failed or failing states. For more information on GINI coefficients, see
The World Bank, Measuring Inequality, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/
EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK: 148956~piPK:216618~
theSitePK:430367,00.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). See also Elias Carranza, Speaker at Curso
Internacional de Capacitaci6n en Reformas al Sistema de Justicia Penal en America Latina, San Jose,
Costa Rica, (July 26-Aug. 4 2005), Vision Empirica de la Justicia Penal, (on file with author)
(explaining that many of these countries have high numbers of urban, male youths with limited
employment possibilities, as well as significant numbers of demobilized or active armed actors with
expertise to apply in criminal networks).
5. See Rodanthi Tzanelli, Capitalizing on Value: Towards a Sociological Understanding of
Kidnapping, 40-5 SOCIOLOGY 929, 935-36 (2006).
6. Mary Kaldor, Reconceptualizing Organized Violence, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL CMTY:
STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 91, 92 (Daniele Archibugi, David Held & Martin KOhler eds.
1998).
7. U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, National Plans of Action for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights - Brazil, Preamble (1996), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/issues/plan actions/brazil.htm.
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prevent abductions. Some pursue cosmopolitan preventive/responsive measures by
seeking asylum on the basis of high risk of kidnapping. 8 Others choose to stay in
pursuit of communitarian aspirations to reclaim the nation from criminal gangs and
assist the state by participating in restoration of the rule of law and non-violence. 9
This article highlights civil society reclamations for justice in response to
kidnapping, reviews accountability gaps within transnational law, and calls for the
evolution of normative protection responses to the global kidnapping market in
which private actors form part of both the cause and solution. Part II provides an
overview of kidnapping as a transnational criminal activity, identifies the elements
of the crime, reviews its connection to human rights violations by identifying cases
and reports from UN and regional human rights bodies, and presents humanitarian
and international criminal law dimensions. Part III gives an historic overview of
kidnapping as state terrorism and the identification of the international crime of
enforced disappearance. Part IV discusses the emergence of kidnapping, first by
non-State actors, highlighting Latin America and the impact of two particular
cases, Marti and Blumberg, and second, by underscoring the role of private
companies in providing solutions. Part V assesses the provision of asylum as an
important but often neglected aspect of international protection, reviewing select
cases to highlight the need for increased attention. Part VI concludes by calling for
improved harmonization among transnational actors as well as closer analysis of
the public/private dimensions of the causes and solutions to the global kidnapping
crisis.
II. KIDNAPPING AS TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Kidnapping has evolved from constituting a means/weapon of warring
gangsters, tribes, family feuds, or other groups to forming an actual profession/end
in itself. The principal consequence of this change is the shift from targeting
persons affiliated with these groups to civilians chosen on account of perceived
wealth. To paraphrase Boaventura de Sousa Santos, there has been a "conversion
of the human body into the ultimate commodity."a
8. See infra Part 5. As a clarification, this paper will not address the contemporaneous
phenomenon of the kidnapping of refugees or asylum-seekers by state actors in order to return them to
their country of origin. Nor will it address the dilemma of kidnapping of persons by states for the
purpose of detention, prosecution, or extraordinary rendition. These cases often involve persons with
political affiliations that are considered a threat to the government. See generally R. v. Barak, [1985] 7
Crim. App. 404, (appeal taken from England & Wales) (addressing the sentencing of four men who
kidnapped a Nigerian refugee in order to enforce his return); Abdul Ghafuhr Hamid (a.k.a. Khin Maung
Sein), Jurisdiction over a Person Abducted From a Foreign Country: Alvarez Machain Case Revisited,
J. Malay. & Comp. L. (2000) (discussing jurisdiction of national courts concerning extraditions and
abductions by state actors); Agiza v. Swed., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 20, 2005),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/233-2003.html (determining that a State is in
violation of the non-refoulement obligation under Article 3 of UN Convention Against Torture on
account of resorting to diplomatic assurances in an expulsion case.); David Weissbrodt & Amy
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46 Va. J. Int'l L. 585 (2006)
(discussing extraordinary rendition policies).
9. See infra Part 4.1.
10. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW,
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Although kidnapping now affects the middle and working classes, victims are
often characterized as belonging to upper classes or having imagined wealth."
Kidnappers also target less wealthy younger persons because they lack the
protection of body guards and armoured cars. 12 Furthermore, specific targeting of
persons who have family members who have relocated abroad is common, given
the assumption that they will have access to economic resources to pay higher
ransoms. The payment of high ransoms can completely wipe out family savings,
leaving the victimized family destitute. To make matters worse, governments
rarely provide full restitution of economic loss to these victims.13
Invisible criminal networks transcend borders. In Resolution 2002/16 of 24
July 2002, the UN Economic and Social Council indicated concern for the growing
tendency of organized criminal groups to resort to kidnapping. 14 At the base is the
purpose of extortion as a method of accumulating capital with a view to
consolidating criminal operations and carrying out other illegal activities." The
UN Economic and Social Council strongly condemned the world-wide practice of
kidnapping. Kidnapping is an element of the evolution of transnational crime as a
business threatening local, national, regional and global security. 16 It is conducted
by professional kidnappers;1 7 gangs also dealing in narco-trafficking, illicit trade in
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 9 (2d ed. 2002).
11. Shannon O'Neil, The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy can Defeat the Drug Cartels, 88
FOREIGN AFF. 63, 68 (2009) ("The fear of kidnapping plagues the upper, middle, and working classes
alike."). The U.S. Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Mexico 2008 noted that "kidnapping
remained a serious problem for persons of all socioeconomic levels." U.S. Dep't of State, 2008 Human
Rights Report: Mex. (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119166.htm.
12. Ranko Shiraki Oliver, In the Twelve Years of NAFTA, the Treaty Gave to Me . . . What
Exactly? An Assessment of Economic, Social, and Political Developments in Mexico Since 1994 and
Their Impact on Mexican Immigration into the United States 10 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 53, 110
(Spring, 2007).
13. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 99 (2003) (explaining
that even where rights to reparation exist, receiving actual victim compensation is another matter).
Honduras is an example of a state which does not offer victim restitution. See Embassy of the United
States, Honduras, Help for Victims of Crime in Honduras (Feb. 25, 2010), http://honduras.
usembassy.gov/victcrime.html.
14. ECOSOC Res. 2002/16 (July 24, 2002).
15. Id. This includes illicit trafficking in firearms, money-laundering, drug trafficking, illicit
trafficking in human beings, and terrorist crimes.
16. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 18th Sess. of the Comm'n on Crime Prevention and
Crim. J. The Global Crime Threat- We Must Stop It, Vienna, Austria (Apr. 16, 2009) (given by Antonio
Maria Costa, Exec. Dir. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/about-unodc/speeches/2009-16-04.html. According to the Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime, Article 3, a crime may be considered transnational if:
(a) It is committed in more than one State;
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning,
direction or control takes place in another State;
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal groupthat
engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in anotherState.
U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime art. 3, T 2, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
17. Tzanelli, supra note 5, at 939.
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firearms, money-laundering, trafficking of persons;18 insurgents/rebels (FARC in
Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq);19 state security forces;20 terrorist groups (Russia,
Peru, Philippines);21 common criminals (Haiti, Mexico, Iraq);22 and other actors,
such as those engaged in bride kidnapping (Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia,
China, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia).23
In 2008 it was reported that organized crime gangs had exported the
"kidnapping industry" to California, abducting Mexicans living in San Francisco
and holding them in Tijuana, Mexico. 24 Spain reported that Moroccan immigrants
were being kidnapped and ransom demanded from their family members in
Morocco.25
Furthermore, the targeting of innocent civilians by groups engaged in the
pursuit of violence has resulted in characterization of these acts as "terrorism", or
in the alternative that kidnapping is used to finance and facilitate terrorism, thereby
escalating crime fighting initiatives to anti-terrorist strategies which are subject to
international support and attention.2 6 Nevertheless, common concepts of terrorism
refer to the use of violence to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, in
18. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 2002/16, supra note 14.
19. Tzanelli, supra note 5, at 929, 938; Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Events of 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87390 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
20. See Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Mexico, http://travel.state.gov/travel/
cis_pa tw/cis/cis 970.html (last visited April 17, 2010) ("Mexican authorities have failed to prosecute
numerous crimes committed against U.S. citizens, including murders and kidnappings. . . . In some
cases, assailants were wearing full or partial police uniforms and have vehicles that resemble police
vehicles, indicating that some elements of the police may have been involved.").
21. 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, T 22.
22. See Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Haiti, Country Specific Information,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa tw/cis/cis_1134.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010); O'Neil, supra
note 11, at 67; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, 2005 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, Iraq (March 8, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt
/2005/61689.htm.
23. U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Expert Group Meeting on Good practices in
Legislation to Address Harmful Practices Against Women, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 25-28, 2009,
Forced and Early Marriage: A Focus on Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union
Countries With Selected Laws From Other Countries, at 7, U.N. Doc. EGM/GPLHP/2009/EP.08 (June
19, 2009) (prepared by Cheryl Thomas) (discussing bride kidnapping in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan); Martin Adler, China, Mongolia: Kidnapped Wives, Insight News TV,
http://www.insightnewstv.com/d08/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (discussing bride kidnapping in China);
IRIN, ETHOPIA: SURVIVING FORCED MARRIAGE (2007), http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?
Reportld=69993 (discussing bride kidnapping in Ethopia); Hundred Young Girls Abducted in Uganda,
AFROL NEWS (June 25), http://www.afrol.com/articles/11089 (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (discussing
bride kidnappings in Uganda).
24. Julieta Martinez, Mexican Kidnappers are Operating in the United States, MEXIDATA, May,
26 2008 (on file with author); see also Joel Millman, Immigrants Become Hostages as Gangs Prey on
Mexicans, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 10, 2009, ("gangs that smuggle people in from Mexico are
increasingly holding the migrants captive for ransom in rental houses").
25. 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, T 27.
26. See Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 58/174, 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/174 (Mar. 10,
2004). Increasingly, terrorist acts are defined as constituting violations of human rights, and may
constitute crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide.
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order to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.27 At times
kidnapping may fall into this framework, but most often the motive is sheer greed.
A. Elements ofKidnapping
The UN Economic and Social Council has characterized kidnapping as the
unlawful detention of a person against his will for the purpose of demanding illicit
gain, economic gain, or other material benefit; or in order to oblige someone to do
or not do something in exchange for liberation of the victim.28 Kidnapping is a
criminal offence in national systems, however its motive is increasingly for private
economic gain, incidentally spreading fear among the public.
The common elements of kidnapping as a crime are:
1. The illegal seizing, carrying off or deprivation of liberty of an
individual without consent.
2. The use of violence, the threat of violence and/or fraud and
deception in the commission of the offence.
3. The holding of the victim in a place that could not be found.
4. [With] the specific objective of economic or financial gain
and/or political or other influence, including through the practice of
extortion. 29
Escalation to characterization as an aggravated crime occurs in circumstances
in which kidnappers seek ransom or profit, engage in a conspiracy, use force or
arms, result in death or injury (or threat therefore), torture, cruel mistreatment,
psychological harm, or endangerment of the moral development of the victim (this
is generally understood to be exposure of minors to drugs, alcohol, sexual acts,
etc.). 30  Aggravated classification is also present in cases involving
misrepresentation as a state authority, combination with assault on public or
private mode of transportation, commission by a state official, commission by
persons in security or insurance business, detention for a set period of time, sexual
exploitation or forcible marriage, or coercion of the state to release a detainee, and
so forth.31 Domestic penalties range from imprisonment of between 1-10 years, and
27. See Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60
at 1 3 ("Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that
may be invoked to justify them.").
28. ECOSOC Res. 2002/16, supra notel4, T 1.
29. 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, T 4. The types of kidnapping include: a) For
extortion, to demand ransom, influence business decisions or obtain commercial advantage, b) For debt
recovery between criminal groups or securing an advantage in a criminal market; c) For sexual
exploitation of women and children and subsequent trafficking, d) Domestic and family disputes, e) For
political or ideological purpose, f) In the course of carrying out another criminal act, such as robbery,
and g) Feigned or fraudulent kidnapping. Id. at T 16.
30. See, e.g., C6digo Penal, [C6D. PEN.] [Penal Code of Colombia] No. 599/2000 arts. 168-172
(codifying the punishment for kidnapping).
3 1. Id.
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in the event of aggravated circumstances 10-20 years.32 An unfortunate negative
consequence of states' improved crime fighting against professional kidnapping
rings is that that it allows smaller, more unprofessional criminals to take over the
field. Indeed, this is the case in Mexico and Italy.33 These groups are described as
being more violent towards victims. 34
B. Kidnapping as a Violation of Human Rights, Humanitarian, and International
Criminal Law
1. Human Rights
According to the UN Secretary-General the act of kidnapping is considered a
gross violation of international human rights and humanitarian law.35 The UN
Economic and Social Council notes that kidnapping is also associated with various
other human rights violations. 36 In general, kidnapping as a phenomenon may be
considered a violation of Article 1 of the UN Charter because it does not encourage
respect for human rights. Specifically, kidnapping is defined as composing an
unlawful deprivation of personal freedom/liberty. It may also be considered to
include violation of physical integrity and personal security, 39 a threat to life, and
in the event of death of the victim, a violation of the right to life.40 Kidnapping
32. Id.; 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, 1 7. In the realm of criminal law, within
the U.S., the most significant reforms occurred when wealthy or powerful families were victimized.
ERNEST KAHLAR ALIX, RANSOM KIDNAPPING IN AMERICA 1874-1974 at 174-178 (1978). In Mexico,
express kidnapping is classified as a serious crime of which 15-40 years of incarceration is possible.
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, MEXICO: KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, INCLUDING
COMPLICITY OF POLICE OFFICERS, TYPES OF KIDNAPPING, EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIALS AND PROTECTION AVAILABLE TO VICTIMS (2004 - 2005) (Oct. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/440ed728a.html [hereinafter MEXICO: KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM].
33. GERMAN-MEXICAN CHAMBER OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, SECURITY IN MEXICO: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR COMPANIES, EXPATRIATES, AND TOURISTS 33 (2007), available at
http://mexiko.ahk.de/fileadmin/user upload/Dokumente/SECURITY IN MEXICO.pdf (explaining
that "express kidnappings" are performed by less professional criminals) [hereinafter SECURITY IN
MEXICO]; See 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, 128.
34. SECURITY IN MEXICO, supra note 32, at 33.
35. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Welcomes Release of Six Hostages by
Colombian Rebel Group, Stresses Kidnapping 'Unjustifiable Crime,' Gross Human Rights Violation,
U.N. Doc. SG/SM/12088 (Feb. 6, 2009).
36. 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, T 2 ("Reiterating that the kidnapping of
persons under any circumstances and for any purpose constitutes a serious crime and a violation of
individual freedom and undermines human rights"). See also ECOSOC Res. 2006/19, supra note 14,
2.
37. U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI) art. 2, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976); European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1948, Europ. T.S. 5;
American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 1, 9, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 (stating that state parties must respect and ensure rights to all individuals; affirmative action to
secure the right from intervention).
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art. 9.
39. Id. art. 9.
40. Id. art. 6.
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41 42
often involves arbitrary detention,41 torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, as
well as interference with family life.43 As an example, the amputation of fingers as
a means of extorting a higher ransom from the family may be characterized as both
a violation of physical integrity and torture." In addition, women are often
exposed to rape and other forms of sexual violence.45
The temporal scope of kidnapping varies. In Mexico, kidnapping may be long
term (lasting weeks or months) or "express" (resulting in release after a few days
or hours).46 In Colombia, the FARC has retained hostages for several years,
including the famous case involving Ingrid Bentancourt.47 Additionally, there is
kidnapping extortion in which persons are forced to pay money in order to
guarantee that they will not be kidnapped in the future.48
Given the relevant human rights violations linked to kidnapping, the
following UN bodies would be appropriate forums for presentation of complaints
or reports, as appropriate: the Human Rights Committee, Committee Against
Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, the
Special Rapporteur on Trafficking, the Working Group on Enforced
Disappearance, and the Special Rapporteur on Torture.
41. Id. art. 9.
42. Id. art. 7.
43. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, U.N. Doc A/810
(Dec. 12, 1948).
44. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art. 7.
45. See Dep't of Econ. And Soc. Affairs [DESA] U.N. Comm. On the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Report on Mexico, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (Jan.
27, 2005) [hereinafter Report on Mexico] (noting that kidnappings of women in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico
represent structural violence within the society). See also Case of Gonzalez et al. v. Mexico, 2009 Iner-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 133 (Nov. 16, 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec 205_ing.pdf (noting sexual violence in conjunction with kidnapping). See
generally U.N. News Centre, Haiti: U.N. Mission Alarmed as Another Child Kidnapping Victim is
Killed, U.N. News Centre, Aug. 19, 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID
=27756&Cr-minustah&Crl =kidnap (stating that in Haiti, in 2008 half of all kidnapping victims were
composed of children, and they were frequently subject to torture, rape, sexual abuse, and murder).
46. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, MEXICO: KIDNAPPINGS FOR RANSOM,
INCLUDING THE TYPES OF KIDNAPPING, PROTECTION AVAILABLE TO VICTIMS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
ANTI-KIDNAPPING MEASURES, AND THE COMPLICITY OF SOME POLICE OFFICERS (2007 - April 2009)
MEX103154.FE, (2009), available at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIRRDI/RIR RDI.aspx?id=452
423&1=e.
47. See generally Simon Romero, Colombia Plucks Hostages From Rebels' Grasp, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/03/world/americas/03colombia.html
(reporting Ms. Betancourt was held for six years).
48. See generally Juan Forrero, Kidnappers in Colombia Branch Out To Venezuela, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/16/world/kidnappers-in-colombia-branch-
out-to-venezuela.html?pagewanted=all (noting Venezuelan ranchers pay a "vacuna" (vaccine) to avoid
kidnapping by criminal gangs).
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a. Concluding Observations to State Reports Filed with UN Treaty Bodies
In general, the UN Committees' discussion of non-state kidnapping is largely
focused on specific vulnerable groups, such as women, children, and migrants.4
Although it is positive that that these persons are given particular attention, the
trend of kidnapping epidemics is such that the threat also applies across socio-
economic, gender, ethnic, or other lines. What is missing is recognition of
kidnapping as a broader symptom of state failure. The Committee conclusions
indicate a truncated discussion of state responsibility to provide security to the
citizenry, as it focuses on specific categories.o The U.N. Committee on the Rights
of the Child issued Conclusions in response to Kyrgyzstan's Periodic report which
highlighted the right of non-discrimination as requiring State action against bride
kidnapping:
The Committee recommends that the State party increase its efforts to
ensure implementation of existing laws guaranteeing the principle of
non-discrimination and full compliance with article 2 of the Convention,
and adopt a proactive and comprehensive strategy to eliminate
discrimination on any grounds and against all vulnerable groups. The
Committee urges the State party to pay particular attention to the
situation of the girl child, in particular girls living in rural areas, in order
to halt the practices of forced marriage and bridal kidnapping, which
prevent the girl child from fully enjoying the rights enshrined in the
Convention.5 1
It also linked kidnapping to trafficking of children in India and called for
penal reform: "In order to combat trafficking in children, including for commercial
sexual purposes, the Penal Code should contain provisions against kidnapping and
abduction."52 Similarly, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights advised Kyrgyzstan to eliminate discrimination against women and
specifically counter gender based violence against women by continuing to more
actively implement the law with regard to the practice of polygamy and bride
kidnapping.5 3 In like manner, the UN Human Rights Committee called upon the
government of Uzbekistan to "combat the practice of forced marriages of
kidnapped women."54 In relation to Georgia, the Human Rights Committee
49. See Report on Mexico, supra note 45; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25,
art. 35 U.N. GAOR 44th Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Sept. 2, 1990); Press Release, General
Assembly, Third Committee Approves Draft Resolutions On Human Trafficking, Literacy, Ageing,
Crime Prevention, Kidnapping; Continues Consideration of Human Rights Issues, U.N. Doc.
GA/SHC/3858 (Oct. 19, 2006).
50. See Report on Mexico, supra note 45.
51. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights, U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan, 127, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.244 (Nov. 3, 2004).
52. U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: India, 75, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.115 (Feb. 23, 2000).
53. ECOSOC, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan, T 30, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.49 (Sept. 1,
2000).
54. U.N. Human Rights Comm'n., Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan, 1 24, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/83/UZB (Apr. 26, 2005) (citing violation of Articles 3, 23, and 26).
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instructed the state to: "(P)romptly investigate complaints related to domestic
violence and other acts of violence against women, as bride-kidnapping and rape,
and institute criminal proceedings against perpetrators." It also addressed the
kidnapping of women in Venezuela:
The Committee is concerned about the level of violence against women,
including the many reported cases of kidnapping and murder that have
not resulted in arrests or prosecution of those responsible.... All the
foregoing gives rise to serious concerns in the light of articles 6 and 7 of
the Covenant. The State party should take effective measures to
guarantee women's safety, ensure that no pressure is put on them to
dissuade them from reporting such violations, that all allegations of
abuses are investigated and that those committing such acts are brought
to justice.56
Of interest, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
highlighted the importance of addressing the socio-economic root causes of
kidnapping epidemics affecting non-nationals:
The Committee is concerned about the recent incidents of tension
between Lesotho nationals and Asian and South African white factory
owners which resulted in kidnapping, violence and the flight of about
100 Asian nationals from the country for fear of persecution. The
Committee recommends that the State party take measures to resolve the
underlying socio-economic causes of these events. In this context, the
Committee draws the attention of the State party to General
Recommendation XI on non-citizens and the obligation to report fully
on legislation concerning foreigners and its implementation. It therefore
requests that more detailed information be included in the State party's
next report on the situation and rights of non-nationals residing in the
country.57
These reports highlight the protection duty of the state vis-A-vis vulnerable
groups, but it is important to highlight the general protection duty which applies to
all persons within the state.
b. Obligation of State to Protect Individuals from Kidnapping and Provide
Remedies
Pursuant to Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
States have duties to respect and ensure human rights. 8 A state of impunity is
55. U.N. Human Rights Comm'n., Concluding Observations: Georgia, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/GEO/CO/3 (Nov. 15, 2007).
56. U.N. Human Rights Comm'n., Concluding Observations: Venezuela, 17, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/71/YEN (Apr. 26, 2001).
57. U.N. Comm'n. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations:
Lesotho, 5, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.99 (Apr, 19 2000).
58. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 36, art 2. See also
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, 993
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considered to promote the violation of human rights.59 The UN Human Rights
Committee General Comment 31 highlights the protection duty of the state to
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by
such acts by private persons or entities or otherwise be in breach of the Covenant.60
The Committee also sets forth the importance to bringing to justice the perpetrators
of violations, as impunity for violations may contribute to the recurrence of
violations.61 In like manner, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the
European Convention and its Protocols identify a duty of the State to secure rights
and freedoms by taking positive action to ensure respect for those rights and
freedoms between private actors.62 The UN Convention Against Torture, Article 2
sets forth that "[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction." 63 Further, Article 16 states that
[e]ach State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when
such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. 64
In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall
apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.65
As emphasized by Clapham, there is no requirement of attribution of the state
to the violation, but rather failure of the state to react to the act.66 In order to ensure
respect for human rights, the state must take affirmative action to prevent
U.N.T.S. 3.
59. See Ed Bates, State Immunity for Torture, 7:4 HuM. RTs. L. REv. 651 (2007) for a
commentary on the extent to which State immunity acts as a barrier to international legal actions for
torture.
60. U.N. Human Rights Comm'n., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 1 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13,
(May, 26 2004) [hereinafter Obligation Imposed on States] (commenting on article 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
61. Id.
62. See Case of X. & Y. v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 235, 235-36 (1986)
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight
=8978/80&sessionid=51432633&skin=hudoc-en (finding a violation of article 8 of the European
Convention; a mentally handicapped girl was raped but unable to institute criminal proceedings against
the alleged perpetrator in the crime due to a gap in domestic law). See also A. v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 25599/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1998) (finding domestic law did not provide adequate protection
for a child who had been beaten by his stepfather, the failure to provide adequate protection was
violation of article 3 of the European Convention).
63. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (June 26, 1987).
64. Id. art. 16.
65. Id. arts. 10-13.
66. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 426-27 (2006).
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kidnapping by non-state actors.67 The failure to prevent or adequately investigate,
punish and redress the kidnapping would entail violation of the state's duty to
exercise due diligence in ensuring enjoyment of the rights infringed upon in the
context of kidnapping.68 Clapham advocates flexibility in recognizing human
rights violations involving non state actors where the human dignity of the person
is at stake. In other words, he calls for dismantling of a hierarchical application of
human rights that effectively excludes victims from protection.69
In short, whereas kidnapping inherently involves violation of the autonomy of
the person and inhuman treatment, it is difficult not to argue in favour of
recognition as a human rights violation. The issue is not the motive of the act, but
rather the interest/right of the victim that defines the status of the act. The global
kidnapping epidemic is not primarily based on political ideology, but more based
on economic incentive. Nevertheless, the atrocious effect of the act upon the
individual and the family is as devastating as that within the context of state
terrorism. This effect is the central aspect to the consideration of kidnapping in
relation to protection. The gravity of abduction is rooted in the premise of the basic
human dignity of each individual and in the primacy of family. When a kidnapping
of an individual occurs, it has been noted that the family is virtually kidnapped as
well. 70 Because of the severity of the violations involved in kidnapping, the State's
failure to attempt kidnapping prevention, or respond to kidnapping as it occurs,
would signify abandonment of the rule of law.
At the regional level, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that
the duty to provide access to justice in cases involving forced disappearance
constitutes jus cogens. Hence, it may be argued that similar weight to should be
given to kidnapping cases.72 The Court issued a provisional order in the Matter of
67. See Obligations Imposed on States, supra note 60, 8. International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res A/RES/61/177, art. 3,U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/2006/1 (Dec. 20, 2006) ("each State Party shall take appropriate measures to investigate
acts defined in article 2 committed by persons or groups of persons acting without the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State and to bring those responsible to justice"). See also Declaration on
the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm. 53d Sess.,
Annex, 85th plen. mtg. art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144 (Mar. 10, 1999) ( "[n]o one shall participate,
by act or by failure to act where required, in violating human rights and fundamental freedoms and no
one shall be subjected to punishment or adverse action of any kind for refusing to do so").
68. See Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 22/86 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 7920 (Jul. 29,
1988) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 04_ing.pdf. (finding the state
in violation of articles 1,4 (life), 5 (humane treatment), and 7 (personal liberty) of the American
Convention on account of its responsibility for enforced disappearance of the victim,); "Street Children
" (Villagran-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala Case 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 77 (Nov. 19, 1999)
(finding the state in violation of article 1 for failure of the state to identify or penalize the persons who
abducted and killed street children).
69. CLAPHAM, supra note 66, at 546.
70. See Case of Goiburfi et al. v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, T 103 (Sep.
22, 2006) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_153_ing.pdf.
71. Id. T 84.
72. See Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, 1 157 (Nov. 29,
2006) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_162 ing.pdf.
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the Communities of Jiguamiand6 and Curbarad6, calling for State investigation,
identification of perpetrators and punishment in the case of kidnapping and murder
of a man allegedly via complicity by police and paramilitary. It also issued a
provisional order in the Matter of the United States of Mexico Digna Ochoa y
Pldcido et al. case, calling upon the state to protect the lives of human rights
activists who had been subject to kidnapping. 74 Indeed, the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights has repeatedly condemned kidnapping by non state
actors in Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil, and others.
In like manner, the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Avsar v.
Turkey held Turkey to be in violation of Articles 2 (right to life) and 13 (effective
remedy) for failing to carry out adequate and effective investigation in a case
involving the kidnapping and killing of a man by village guards with complicity by
76the state. In the cases of Elmurzayev and Others v. Russia, Khadzhialiyev and
Others v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights held Russia liable for
violation of the same articles in cases involving kidnapping "unidentified armed
men" and subsequent delays by the state in investigation and proceedings pursuant
to the crimes.
73. Matter of the Communities of Jiquamiand6 and Curbarad6 Regarding Colombia, 2006 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Provisional Measures) at 14 (Feb. 7, 2006) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs
/medidas/jiguamiando se 04 ing.pdf.
74. Digna Ochoa y Plcido et al. Case, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Provisional Measures) at 3 (Nov.
17, 1999) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/dignaochoa se 01 ing.pdf.
75. See, e.g., Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., No. 2/99 (Feb. 4, 1999) (calling upon the
Colombian State to find victims kidnapped by AUC and fully investigate and prosecute those
responsible); Press Release Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., The IACHR Condemns Kidnapping of Antioquia
Governor, No. 18/02 (Apr. 25, 2002) (condemning kidnapping by the FARC); Press Release Inter-Am.
Comm'n H. R., IACHR Requests Information from Guatemala, No. 14/09 (Mar. 27, 2009) (calling
upon the State of Guatemala to provide information on kidnapping victims). See also INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNTRY REPORT ON COLOMBIA ch. V (D) (1993) (addressing the
national kidnapping epidemic spawned by guerilla organizations seeking bankroll of their activities and
the emergence of a powerful criminal machinery within the society and kidnapping as a violation of
personal liberty).
76. Avsar v. Turkey, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1014, 1106-07, 1110-11 (2001) available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action-html&highlight-25657/94&
sessionid=51438273&skin=hudoc-en.
77. Khadzhialiyev and Others v. Russia, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 109, 137-39 available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action-html&highlight-Khadzhialiy
ev&sessionid=51425976&skin=hudoc-en; Elmurzayev and Others v. Russia, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R.
111, 138-40 available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight-3019/04&sessionid=51426218&skin=hudoc-en. See generally Buldan v. Turkey, 2004
Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 90 available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/ view.asp?item=1&
portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight-28298/95&sessionid=51426284&skin=hudoc-en;Selim Yildirim
and Others v. Turkey, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. TT 71, 72 available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp
197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight-56154/00&sessionid=51426408&skin=h
udoc-en (finding state responsibility for the kidnapping and death was not proven, but state
responsibility for failing to effectively investigate and process the crime was established). See also
Magomadova and Others v. Russia, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 100, 108 available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action-html&highlight-33933/05&
sessionid=51426553&skin=hudoc-en; Sangariyeva and Others v. Russia, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. T 69
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
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In contrast, the African Commission of Human Rights has addressed
kidnapping topically within reports discussing the context of repression of freedom
of expression and also as relating to forced marriage.
In sum, it is conceivable that kidnapping victims may seek to attain justice at
the international or regional level by filing a human rights complaint alleging the
State's acquiescence or its failure to take measures to prevent the kidnapping or to
investigate violations, identify those responsible, impose punishment and ensure
redress/compensation to the victim. Nevertheless, attainment of actual remedy in
individual cases may be difficult. This is even more evident when remedy is sought
at the level of international and transnational criminal law.
C. Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law & Transnational Criminal Law
1. Kidnapping as a War Crime
According to Kaldor the evolution of armed conflict has resulted in parties
engaging in kidnapping, as well as other forms of organized crime, in order to
finance their missions (such as the FARC in Colombia), or the contrary situation in
which actors engage in warfare in order to support their criminal activities. 79 In the
context of warfare, hostage taking is illegal under international humanitarian law in
any circumstances in both international and non-international armed conflicts."
light-1839/04&sessionid=51426687&skin hudoc-en (addressing kidnapping by servicemen, also
resulting in violation of the rights to life and effective remedy).
The European Court of Human Rights has also issued decisions addressing state responsibility for
enforced disappearance, where the abduction is directly carried out by state actors. These cases apply a
flexible standard- where applicants establish a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the state to
prove it is not responsible. See Betayev and Beayeva v. Russia, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 113 available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action-html&highlight-37315/03&
sessionid=51426847&skin hudoc-en; Akhmadova and Akhmadov v. Russia, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light-20755/04&sessionid=51427106&skin hudoc-en; Gekhayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 88, 93 available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm
&action=html&highlight-1755/04&sessionid=51428289&skin=hudoc-en; Shakhgiriyeva and Others v.
Russia, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. 152 available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkpl97/view.asp?
item 1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight-27251/03&sessionid=51428494&skin=hudoc-en;
Imakayeva v. Russia, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. 142 available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.
asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action html&highlight-Imakayeva&sessionid=51428767&skin=hudoc-en;
Utsayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 126 available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action html&highlight=29133/03&sessionid=514
28909&skin hudoc-en; Takhayeva and Others v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 186, 121-23 available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight-23286/04&
sessionid=51512533&skin=hudoc-en (equally finding violations of the right to life and effective
remedy).
78. African Commission of Human Rights, Activity Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, T 25, presented to the 45th session of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (May 12-27, 2009) (prepared by Pansy Tlakula); African
Commission of Human Rights, Report of a Promotion Mission of the Commissioner to Burkina Faso, T
36, delivered to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (March 26-30, 2007)
(prepared by Rezag Bara).
79. KALDOR, supra note 6, at 98.
80. See generally Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the
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Hans-Peter Gasser states "[t]he term 'hostages' applies to persons who are held in
the power of the adversary, whether voluntarily or by force, in order thereby to
obtain specific actions (such as release of prisoners, cancellation of military
operations, etc.) from the other party to the conflict of from particular
individuals."81 ICRC Guidelines suggest that "hostage-taking" occurs where:
* A person has been captured and detained illegally.
* A third party is being pressured, explicitly or implicitly, to do or
refrain from doing something as a condition for releasing the hostage
or for not taking his life or otherwise harming him physically.82
At present, many armed groups engage in kidnapping purely for ransom,83 so
it may be questionable whether the international humanitarian law standards would
be applicable. Instead, reliance on domestic criminal law pertaining to kidnapping
would more likely prevail. Of primary importance, within international
humanitarian law, non-state actors have an absolute obligation not to engage in
Time of War, art. 34, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3585, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 ("The taking of hostages is
prohibited"); Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3(b), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
II for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, art. 3(b), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention III Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3(b), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3(b), Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (prohibiting combatants from making civilians hostages); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, art. 75(2)(c), 4(2)(c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting the
taking of hostages). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(a)(viii), (c)(iii), July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) (including hostage taking in the
definition of war crimes); ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 334-36 (Henckaerts &
Doswald-Beck eds.) (2005), (noting that the taking of hostages is prohibited under customary
international law and is considered a war crime in both international and non-international armed
conflicts); Press Release, Colombia Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
Expresses Deep Satisfaction for Liberation (Jul. 2, 2008) ("kidnapping is cruel, inhumane and
degrading act which under no circumstances can be justified or excused. . . this act constitutes a grave
violation of international humanitarian law."). See the Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian
Standards, art. 3(c)(d) reprinted in Comm'n on Human Rights Report of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its Forty-sixth Session, Provisional
Agenda Item 19, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/116 for an analysis of situations of internal violence,
disturbances, tensions and public emergency which highlights principles governing behaviour of all
persons, groups and authorities. The Turku Declaration also prohibits the taking of hostages as well as
practising, permitting or tolerating the involuntary disappearance of individuals, including their
abduction or unacknowledged detention. See also International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 34th Sess., 105th mtg, Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc.
A/34/819 (1979) entered into force June 3, 1983 ("the taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern
to the international community and that, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, any
person committing an act of hostage taking shall either be prosecuted or extradited").
81. Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 220 508 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
82. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC Position on Hostage Taking, 846 INT'L REV. RED CROSS,
467,467 (2002).
83. Meadow Clendenin, Comment, "No Concessions" with No Teeth: How Kidnap and Ransom
Insurers and Insureds are Undermining US. Counterterrorism Policy, EMORY L.J. 741, 746-47 (2006).
2010 595
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
hostage-taking of civilians and persons hors de combat.84 The taking of hostages
may include related violations of humiliating, degrading, cruel, inhuman,
treatment, torture, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, rape, sexual violence, and
murder with the passage of time.85 If widespread enough, the taking of hostages
may amount to a crime against humanity. Such characterization not only points to
the state's duty to prosecute, but also potentially a prevention duty in the form of
identification of a responsibility to protect.86
2. Kidnapping as a Crime Against Humanity
It should be noted that the Rome Statute of the ICC does not refer to
kidnapping, instead referring to the category of hostage taking (discussed in the
previous section) and the category of enforced disappearance which requires state
attribution/acquiescence. On the other hand the Rome Statute also includes
reference to the related violations of murder, torture, rape, deprivation of liberty, or
"other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health" as components of a crime
against humanity." These acts must be committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack to be considered a crime against humanity.89 States are not usually held
responsible for a failure to prevent crime, but as the ICJ in the Genocide case
recognized a duty to prevent genocide, it may be argued that similar reasoning may
support a finding of responsibility in the situation of a crime against humanity. 90 It
is possible to design a complaint linking kidnapping to these categories. A national
84. See ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 80, at 327.
85. Id. at 306-327.
86. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form
of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance (1971), Article
1, highlights the state's duty to prevent and punish acts of terrorism, especially kidnapping, murder, and
other assaults against the life or physical integrity of those persons whom the state has a duty according
to international law to give special protection, as well as extortion in connection with those crimes.
(Referring specifically to diplomats and other official actors). Organization of American States
Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons
and Related Extortions that are of International Significance, art. 1, February 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949.
See also 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, TT 138, 139 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 ("Each
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.").
87. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 80, art. 7(2)(i) ("'Enforced
disappearance of persons' means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.").
88. Id. art. 7(1)(a),(e),(f),(g),(k). See also Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, The
Situation of the Rights of Women in Ciudad Juarez Mexico: the Right to be Free from Violence and
Discrimination Chapter II Violence Against Women, an Overview of the Problem (2003) (describing
their serial disappearances and murders).
89. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 80, art. 7(1)(i).
90. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 153-55 (Feb. 26, 2007).
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kidnapping epidemic may meet the "widespread" component of a crime against
humanity, rather than systematic. Since the terms are disjunctive, this would be
sufficient. Nevertheless, as the definition also refers to the requirement of an
"attack". According to Cryer, this implies some degree of scale and organization,
although cumulative acts may amount to an attack.91
Cryer notes that a crime wave in and of itself may not constitute a crime
against humanity, as there is a requirement of connection between the acts of
individuals in order to constitute an "attack" directed against a civilian
population.92 Because the criminal actors engaged in kidnapping vary widely, this
may prove difficult. Yet, the accusation of state involvement in the form of corrupt
police, judges, and legal officers may indicate a degree of connection in the form
of encouragement, instigation, or direction by sections of the state.93 In many
cases, ex-military or police/security personnel join gangs. This compounds the
problem of corruption/coercion of a law enforcement system. Such phenomenon
renders the division between state and non-state actor responsibility for
kidnappings fuzzy as there appear to be varying degrees of complicity. 94 The most
symbolic image of this state of affairs is when non-state actors utilize police or
military uniforms and vehicles in order to block cars and abduct their victims. 95
Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to prove acquiescence of the state, and when
blame is assigned within the state it is often assigned to low ranking officials
within police or security services (such as Iraq or Mexico). 96 This prevents
identification and prosecution of powerful actors who expand their territorial
command over extortion & kidnapping in part by permeating the state institutions.
3. Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms for Transnational Criminal Law
At the international level, it has been noted by Schloenhardt that:
[T]he great majority of transnational organised crimes are outside the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.... perhaps the greatest
failure of the existing regime is that it leaves enforcement, prosecution,
and punishment of the offences to individual nations. The current
system has failed to establish mechanisms that ensure that suspected
offenders are indeed arrested, properly charged, investigated,
prosecuted, and punished fairly and adequately.... The opportunities
offered by globalisation have enabled sophisticated criminal
91. ROBERT CRYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
194 (2007).
92. Id. at 195.
93. See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 16, art. 5
(calling upon states to prohibit participation in an organized criminal group and states that participation
may be inferred).
94. See id. arts. 8-9 (calling upon states to criminalize corruption and take legislative,
administrative, and effective measures in order to prevent, detect, and punish corruption among public
officials).
95. See Bureau of Consular Affairs, supra note 20.
96. Id.; see also Houses Raided after Iraq Kidnap, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/6703055.stm.
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organisations to take advantage of the discrepancies in different legal
systems and the non-cooperative attitude expressed by many nations.97
Schloenhardt advocates the establishment of an international agency to
investigate, prosecute, and punish transnational organised crime when national
authorities are unable, incapable or unwilling to intervene. 98 Kaldor states that the
aftermath of the Cold War resulted in the "emergence of horizontal transnational
global networks, both civil and uncivil. What one might call zones of civility and
zones of incivility exist side by side in the same territorial space." 99 Indeed, the UN
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, cited concern for the battle between civil and
uncivil society as grounding for the adoption of the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime to advance cosmopolitan ideals relating to the right
of all individuals to be free from violence. 100
In spite of this convention, there is no permanent institutional mechanism for
parties to review its implementation.101 In September 2009, the Open-ended
Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts discussed possible mechanisms to review
implementation of the convention in a "transparent, efficient, non-intrusive,
impartial, non-adversarial, non-punitive and flexible manner" (via peer review or
committee of experts procedure) that would respect the sovereignty of states. 102
The goal is to share good practices as well as challenges, and complement existing
international and regional review bodies. Specifically in relation to kidnapping, the
Anti-Organized Crime and Law Enforcement Unit published a United Nations
97. Andreas Schloenhardt, Transnational Organised Crime and the International Criminal Court-
Towards Global Criminal Justice, 24 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 1 (2005). ("The establishment of the
International Criminal Court as it exists today, goes back to an initiative of the year 1989 in which
Trinidad and Tobago made a request to the UN General Assembly to explore the possibility of
establishing an international court with jurisdiction over drug trafficking offences.").
98. Id. at 2.
99. KALDOR, supra note 6, at 6-12. She cites societas civilis as expressing the goal of public
security, of a civilized, i.e. non-violent society. Civil society has a relationship to markets which secure
economic autonomy and the rule of law which provides security. It may be suggested that the criminal
markets thrive on the absence of the rule of law and insecurity. She points to negative aspects of
globalization, e.g. growing inequality and insecurity and new forms of violence.
100. Kofi Annan, Secretary General, United Nations, Statement Marking the Opening for Signature
of the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Dec. 13, 2000) available at
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2000/cp382.html.
101. See Antonio Maria Costa, supra note 15 (noting that none of the major arms producing states
have ratified the Firearms Protocol and that a hand-gun is cheaper than a cellular phone). The G8 2009
Declaration on Counter-Terrorism stated that "abductions and the taking of hostages are repugnant
practices." G8 Statement on Counter Terrorism, Members Call for a New Era of International
Cooperation (July 8, 2009) available at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/
July/20090709123904emffen0.3825342.html.
102. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 16, art. 4.
1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a
manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial
integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other
States.
2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of
another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are
reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law.
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Counter - Kidnap Manual to include best practices for law enforcement
authorities.10 3 In short, the approach is multilevel governance, combining
international and national institutional cooperation, rather than establishment of an
international court or other institution.
Similarly, the European Council issued Recommendation 2007/562/EC of 12
June 2007104 which requires states to share information in all terrorist kidnappings.
At the Inter-American level, the need for international cooperation to address
crime (including kidnapping) has been promoted by the OAS Permanent Council's
Special Committee on Transnational Organized Crime and the Ministers
Responsible for Public Security. 10 In large part, these initiatives include assistance
in border control, intelligence-sharing, police training and management (seeking
transparency, accountability, and professionalization), telecommunication
interception, assistance in legislative amendments, extradition, and overview of
106financial transactions. Furthermore, they highlight the need for strengthened
citizen and community participation in the implementation of security plans, as
well as improved citizen trust in the public security institutions. Hence, the
international community's response to the global threat of kidnapping is reflected
in the innovative institutional trend towards horizontal and vertical cooperation
across the public-private divide. 10 7 The concept of political community is not
inimical to protection of the human community. Pursuant to this perspective, the
state is not an obstacle to the fulfillment of human rights, it is central institution
necessary for enjoyment of rights. At the same time, it is implicitly understood that
a state undergoing a kidnapping epidemic should demonstrate openness to
assistance from regional and international entities, as well as other states, in order
to fulfill protection duties related to sovereignty.
III. HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF KIDNAPPING AS STATE TERRORISM AND THE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE CRIME OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE
Kidnapping and enforced disappearance by the state originated in the USSR
and became formalized within Nazi Germany in a 1941 decree titled Nacht und
Nebel (Night and Fog) which resulted in the secret transfer of thousands of persons
from occupied territories to Germany. 108 It was later adopted by the military
dictatorship in Argentina during the Dirty War (1976-1983).109 Systematic
103. See 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping supra note 2, Addendum 7/1.
104. Council Recommendation of 12 June 2007 art. 1(a)(b), 2007 O.J. (L 214).
105. See Permanent Council of the Org. of Am. States, Special Committee on Transnational
Organized Crime, Summary of the Meeting of December 14, 2005 OEA/Ser.G/CE/DOT/SA (Jan. 4,
2006); Ministers of Public Security in the Americas, "Commitment to Public Security in the Americas,"
OEA/Ser. K/XLIX.1 (Oct. 29, 2008).
106. Id. See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MERIDA INITIATIVE (2009) http://www.state.gov/p
/inl/merida/.
107. G8 Statement on Counter Terrorism, supra note 101 ("abductions and the taking of hostages
are repugnant practices.").
108. TULLIO SCOVAZZI & GABRIELLA CITRONI, THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCE AND THE 2007 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 4 (2007).
109. See Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Disappeared, but Not
Forgotten, Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, May 22, 2008,
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kidnapping was a form of state terror. Marguerite Feitlowitz notes that the military
referred to kidnapping as an "operation" conducted against persons believed to
hold ideas contrary to the Western, Christian fatherland.110 The concept of an
operation implies removal of a malignant mass or repair of an organ in order to
save the body at large. Within the Argentine society, persons deemed to embody
the "cancer of subversion" were hooded and spirited off to detention centers in
order to "heal the nation" and defend the regime.111 Abductions were carried out in
full impunity, often with acquiescence by the police and passivity by civil society
(due to fear, denial, or justification).1 12 The disappearances were characterized as
"a true form of torture for the victim's family and friends, because of the
uncertainty they experience as to the fate of the victim and because they feel
powerless to provide legal, moral and material assistance."1 13 Resistance to the
wave of disappearances was headed by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo who sought information about their abducted
children and grand-children. 114 It is notable that few fathers chose to participate
due to the risk of arrest or assassination for unpatriotic, oppositional action.115 The
peaceful demonstrations in the Plaza de Mayo and international lobbying efforts
produced a transnational reclamation of conscience. This was a primary example
http://www.wunrn.com/news/2008/07_08/07_21 08/072108_argetina.htm for a discussion of the Dirty
War.
110. MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA AND THE LEGACIES OF
TERROR 24, 56 (1998).
111. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights published a report on Argentina in 1980
which described the phenomenon of kidnapping:
"The operations, for the most part, are carried out by groups whose number
varies from 6 to 20 persons which arrive at the home or place of work of the
victim in several unmarked cars without license plates, and equipped with radios
that allow them to communicate with each other. In some cases they are
accompanied by additional support forces in vans, in which, after the mission is
completed, they transport the household goods that are taken from the homes of
the victims.
It has also been denounced that when relatives, witnesses or building supervisors
reported the occurrences to the local police, the response was usually, after
admitting knowledge of the fact, to say that they were unable to intervene. In the
few cases where police did arrive at the scene, they withdraw shortly after having
spoken to the persons directly involved in the operation. This situation has been
called "free zone", in favor of the intervening parties."
INTER AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Chapter III The Problem of the Disappeared, in
ANNUAL REPORT 1976 (1977) available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Argentina80eng/
chap.3.htm.
112. CONADEP reported that 62% were abducted in their own homes, 24% on the street, 7% at
work, and 6% at place of study. NATIONAL COMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS, NUNCA
MAS (1984), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20031013222855/nuncamas.org/english/ library/
nevagain/nevagain 005.htm.
113. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON ARGENTINA (1980) in
THOMAS C. WRIGHT, STATE TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA, CHILE, ARGENTINA AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (2007).
114. Marie Trigona, Argentina's Mothers ofPlaza de Mayo Pass on a Legacy ofDefending Human
Rights (March 9, 2006) available at http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/769/54/.
115. Id.
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of sub-altem cosmopolitanism from below. The civil society and international
community cooperated to bring an end to the gross human rights violations
promulgated in the name of patriotism.1 1 6 Specifically, their efforts to attain justice
led to the normative recognition of the crime of "enforced disappearance",
culminating in the creation of the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 117 Instead of top-down, this was a
bottom up evolution of protection norms.
As noted by Seibert-Fohr:
The international protection of human rights is occasionally viewed as a
legal basis for filing the gaps which still exist in international criminal
law and also to complement international criminal law. This not only
encompasses torture and genocide-for which the respective conventions
already provide criminal sanctions-but serious human rights violations
in general. Human rights law is now also used to enhance the
enforcement of international criminal law at the domestic level. Since
international criminal tribunals can only supplement and not replace
national prosecution, domestic criminal proceedings remain pivotal for
the effective implementation of international criminal law. The question
of whether there is a comprehensive duty on States to criminalize
serious human rights violations has therefore become particularly
relevant. 118
A. Enforced Disappearance
Enforced disappearance is considered to constitute an international crime for
which individuals can be prosecuted. The key criterion is state attribution, which
complicates application to modem kidnapping scenarios. The UN Convention on
Enforced Disappearance Article 2 provides the following definition:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law. 119
116. There was a boomerang effect in which domestic actors turned to transnational network to
force change at the national level. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS 104 (1998) (describing how domestic human rights organizations, political exiles, Amnesty
International, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, and the governments of the United
States, France, Italy and Sweden placed pressure on the military junta to end the repression).
117. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
supra note 67.
118. ANJA SEIBERT-FOHR, PROSECUTING SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 3-4 (2009).
119. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
supra note 67, art. 2.
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In like manner, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance
Article 2 also refers to acts supported, authorized or acquiesced to by the State:
For the purposes of this Convention, forced disappearance is considered to be
the act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever way,
perpetrated by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by an absence of
information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her
recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees.120
According to the 1998 Rome Statute's Elements of Crime, Article 7 (1) (i)
Enforced Disappearance may also be part of a crime against humanity. 12 1 Under
the principle of complimentarity, victims would have to demonstrate that
prosecution at the national level is impossible. 122 Given the crisis in the national
justice systems of countries experiencing kidnapping epidemics it is possible to
envision such claim being made. Yet, at present it is non-state actors that most
directly engage in kidnapping, hence the above definitions relating to enforced
disappearance may prove difficult to apply as proving state complicity or
acquiescence is often convoluted in situations involving corrupt state actors.
B. Kidnapping by Non-State Actors and Classification as Enforced Disappearance
The Colombian State sought to respond to the changing nature of kidnapping
by amending its criminal law in order to characterize an act as enforced
disappearance even when committed by non-State actors without the support,
consent or acquiescence of the State. 123 The UN Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances criticized this reform:
120. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappeance of Persons art. 2, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1529.
121. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 80, art. 7(1)(i).
122. See United Nations Department of Public Information, International Criminal Court Fact
Sheet (2002) http://www.un.org/News/facts/iccfact.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
123. C6digo Penal, [C6D. PEN.] [Penal Code of Colombia] No. 599/2000 arts. 165-166 (codifying
the punishment for forced disappearance); id. arts. 168- 172 (codifying the punishment for kidnapping).
Forced Disappearance carries a penalty of 20-30 years imprisonments, as well as financial penalties.
Aggravated Forced Disappearance carries a penalty of 30-40 years imprisonment, financial penalties. It
involves commission by a person in a position of authority or jurisdiction, when committed against an
incapacitated person, when committed against persons engaged in public service, communication,
human rights, political candidates, religious, political or union leaders who have witnessed punitive
acts, justices of the peace, or any other person subject to discrimination or intolerance on account of his
political or religious beliefs; when committed against relatives of such person (to the second degree of
consanguinity), when committed using government property, when the victim is subject to cruel,
inhuman or degrading conduct, when the victim dies or suffers physical or psychological harm, when
the corpse is subject to destruction in order to prevent identification or harm third parties. See also
ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances Addendum Mission to Colombia (5-13 July 2005) TT 26-27, 46 U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/56/Add. 1 (Jan. 17 2006) (noting that both the U.N. Declaration on the Protection of all
Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons refer to acts perpetrated by officials of government or individuals or groups acting on behalf of,
or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the government) [hereinafter Mission
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Although the inclusion of non-State actors acting without the support or
consent of the Government may at first glance look like an advancement
of the law, in the sense that it protects more than the limited definition
of the Declaration, it is the opinion of the Working Group that enforced
disappearance is a "State Crime" (as opposed to kidnapping). Although
in other cases of violations of human rights the inclusion of non-State
actors indeed offers more protection to the victims, (i.e. in the case of
discrimination or labour or environmental human rights), in the case of
enforced disappearance such inclusion dilutes the responsibility of the
State.
For that same reason, the Working Group resists accepting the official
Colombian attitude to 'disappearances', linking the definition of the
phenomenon to or even equating it with 'kidnappings'. To accept this
definition would amount to diluting or even ousting State responsibility
for acts of 'disappearances'. The Working Group made it a point to
emphasize that 'disappearances' are a State responsibility, while
'kidnappings' are things one attributes to non-State individuals, gangs,
or criminal networks. The Working Group also took pains to condemn
both acts of "disappearances" and "kidnappings", irrespective of their
perpetrators, as reprehensible.124
The Working Group's rejection of Colombia's statutory attempt to recognize
a private duty not to engage in kidnapping is based on the concern that the
government would use this as a pretext to avoid responsibility. The dilemma is that
by not including kidnapping by non-state actors within the concept of enforced
disappearance, victims and their families may be denied the benefits related to
recourse to an international human rights tribunal, committee, or complaint
mechanism related to it. The alternative is to demonstrate state responsibility for
failure to protect the victim from kidnapping or provide effective
investigation/remedy.
It is disquieting that the UN Working Group failed to fulfill the cosmopolitan
expectation of expanding the possibility for transnational justice in its narrow
interpretation of its mandate and resulting opposition to the national legal reform.
The UN Working Group's view appears conservative and unfair in the context, as
well as not in keeping with the evolution in human rights theory regarding non-
state accountability for violations. In practice, it heavily criticized a state which
actually had been quite successful in diminishing the level of kidnappings via a
comprehensive program which combined increased legislative penalties, improved
institutional capacity, cooperation with the public, and provision of legal aid and
financial assistance to victimS. 125 In short, this example reflects that de facto
to Colombia].
124. Mission to Colombia, supra note 123, 48-49.
125. According to the Colombian Foundation Pais Libre, there has been a decrease in kidnappings
from a high of 3572 in 2000 to 242 in 2008. Fundacion Pais Libre reports that in the period 1996-2008,
a total of 23,908 persons have been kidnapped in Colombia. The majority were kidnapped by FARC or
ELN. In the same time period, 13927 were liberated (843 liberated under pressure), 4555 were rescued,
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bias/exclusionary perspectives can taint the international institution, calling into
question the cosmopolitan notion of subordination of the state to the international
legal order. In this case, it is the state, rather than the UN body, that appears most
open to providing impartial, universal justice to kidnapping victims, demonstrating
a significant gap in the cosmopolitan legal order.
IV. NON-STATE KIDNAPPING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE PLEA FOR
COMMUNITARIAN JUSTICE
Latin America is considered to have the highest rate of kidnappings in the
world. 126 Although Colombia once had the highest percentage of cases, it has since
been overtaken by Mexico. 127 In 2007, Mexico experienced 3,000 kidnappings and
the ransom market has been calculated at over USD 100 million. 128 The escalation
of violence has manifested itself in the targeting of civilians as opposed to
members of the drug cartels. The Gulf, Sinaloa, La Familia, and Juarez cartels
engage in acts of violence (including acts of torture, dismemberment,
decapitations, arbitrary executions) against society, as well as the army and
security services. This has resulted in astounding bloodshed, calculated at 16,000
homicides from 2000 to 2008.129 New groups emerged which were not engaged in
drug trafficking, but rather extortion and kidnapping of citizens.130 The
proliferation of smaller, less "professional" gangs meant that the profile of the
criminal altered. Victims are more often murdered, in spite of payment of ransoms-
indicating a worsening of brutality involved in this act. 131 In contrast to the fact
that drug trafficking does not directly affect the well-being of the elites of Mexico,
extortion and kidnapping specifically targets their members.
388 escaped, 2820 remained captive, and 1314 died. FUNDACION PAIS LIBRE, ESTADISTICAS JANUARY
1996 - JUNE 2008. See also MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL & FONDE LIBERTAD, AVANCES EN
DEFENSA DE LA LIBERTAD (2009).
126. Although Latin America only consists of eight percent of the world population, 75 percent of
all kidnappings take place in the region. See Tomas Ayuso, Latin America's Response to Narco-Fueled
Transnational Crime COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Nov. 18, 2008 available at
http://www.coha.orglatin-america's-response-to-narco-fueled-transnational-crime.
127. See generally Kidnappers Inject Acid Into Boys Heart, CBS NEWS WORLD, Nov. 4, 2008
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/04/world/main4571385.shtml?source=RSSattr
=World_4571385 (blaming the increase on a growing web of drug cartels, current and former police
officers and informants who point out potentially lucrative victims).
128. Clayton Consultants, supra note 2, powerpoint presentation available at http://www.author
stream.com/Presentation/BAWare-32521-tues-RMI-cloonan-valuable-assets-Definition-Kidnapping-
Types-Kidnappings-Political-Religious-as-Entertainment-ppt-powerpoint/. Mexico has long been
subject to comparative study in relation to its level of democratic transition, see AREND LIJPHART,
PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT AND FORMS OF PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES
(1999).
129. Dr. Carlos Flores, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia Social,
Lecture at the University of Oslo, The Drug Violence in Mexico: Implications for Democracy, Peace
and Security (April 20, 2009) (on file with author).
130. Emilio Godoy, Mexico Kidnapping - A Growing Risk for Central American Migrants, INTER
PRESS SERVICE NEWS SOCIETY (Mar. 19, 2010) available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?
idnews=50725.
131. See Kidnappers Inject Acid Into Boys Heart, supra note 127.
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At present, the consolidation of democracy in Latin America is threatened by
a new wave of kidnappings, and the call for an end to impunity is being led by the
fathers of the victims. 132 The current wave of kidnapping is pursued by non-state
actors and fathers are assuming the forefront of the public discourse, calling for
domestic penal law reform and often presenting themselves as defenders of the
state which is under attack by the crime spree. Instead of assuming a cosmopolitan
perspective, there approach is communitarian. They achieve societal resonance in
attaining civic engagement to battle corruption and inefficiency within state
institutions in an effort to restore the domestic rule of law. 133
Nevertheless, identification of criminal responsibility is difficult because it is
diffuse within different elements of society. As noted by Dr. Carlos Flores, at
present in Mexico, even housewives pursue kidnapping as a means of income; they
provide food to the hostages and are remunerated for their services.134 There are
invisible criminal networks infusing the state and society, challenging governance.
The design of a crime fighting strategy is necessary but complex because the state
of "unrule" of law is grounded in the citizenry.
A. The Marti Case
The abduction of children belonging to affluent (real or perceived) families
has provoked societal outrage in both the US and Mexico, resulting in normative
consequences via the adoption of the highest criminal penalty, the death penalty, as
well as legalization of firearms.13 5 The most symbolic case is that of the 2008
kidnapping and murder of 14 year old Fernando Marti, son of a prominent
Mexican businessman, Alejandro Marti. 136 The kidnappers used the uniforms of
the Federal Investigations Agency (AFIS), indicating that they were either police
or disguised as police.137 Alejandro Marti explained that he did not contact the
police initially after the kidnapping because "[t]hose who grabbed him were police
officers, and the last thing we wanted was for the police to be involved."1 38
President Calderon remarked that there was a need to purge the police of
132. See infra Part 4.1.
133. See Palma Joy Strand, Law as a Story: A Civic Concept of Law (with Constitutional
Illustrations), 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 603, 635-636 (2009).
134. Dr. Carlos Flores, supra note 129.
135. In the United States, the 1932 kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh's toddler son
devastated the society and resulted in kidnapping receiving status as a federal crime and the application
of the death penalty. See The Supreme Court: No Death for Kidnapers, TIME, April 19, 1968, available
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,838260,00.html. Similarly, in Mexico, the 2008
kidnapping and murder of 14 year old Fernando Marti prompted street demonstrations and calls for
reforms of the penal code to apply the death penalty. Marc Lacey & Antonio Betancourt, A Boy's
Killing Prods a City to Stand Up to Kidnappers, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at A8.
136. See Duncan Kennedy, Mexican Fury Grows at Kidnappings, BBC NEWS, Aug. 11, 2008,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7553633.stm.
137. See Laurence Iliff, Calderdn Proposes Life Sentence for Police Involved in Kidnappings in
Mexico, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8,2008, at 1A.
138. Marc Lacey & Antonio Betancourt, supra note 135.
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infiltration by criminal elements and put an end to "the conspiracy between
criminals and authorities." 139
The heinous crime galvanized massive demonstrations on the street, in which
the society demanded an end to impunity and new legislation to impose the death
penalty in kidnapping cases. 140 Alejandro Marti became a spokesperson for the
Mexican society. 141 He lamented the state of evil and degradation of morality
within the society, noting that the country was undergoing the worst security and
moral crisis. 142 He remarked that the country was at a critical point- that the
government and civil society had to make an immediate decision to repair the
country or if not, suffer the consequence that it will be emptied out, leaving only
the wicked. 143
Marti cited the state of impunity within Mexico and blamed the civil society
for the existential offence of failing to hold state actors accountable.144 The
passivity of the society in the face of increased corruption and violence resulted in
the complete loss of liberty. Marti characterized the inhibition of freedom of
movement as escalating to the level of a nation-wide psychosis, in which Mexicans
are afraid to engage in normal activity, such as walk on the street, take the children
to the playground, go to work, and so forth.145 Specifically, he cited the case of
police (or persons dressed as police) entering schools to kidnap children; the result
being that parents are actually afraid to send children to school and some children
refuse to go. 146 The irony is that in the age of globalization, the wave of
139. Id. Marti further explained that he was accustomed to utilizing a private security firm.
140. Id.
141. Interview by Joaquin L6pez-D6riga with Alejandro Marti (Aug. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-ogztRT8EJ14.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Marti cited the case of a man who purchased a taxi and was stabbed in the first week on the
job as result of the theft of his vehicle, indicating that the taxi driver had nearly lost his life for trying to
work, and the criminal had gained the profit of the vehicle at no cost whatsoever to his well-being or
freedom.
146. Id. Indeed, one may refer to the UN Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, Principle 36:
"States must take all necessary measures, including legislative and administrative
reforms, to ensure that public institutions are organized in a manner that ensures
respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights. At a minimum, States
should undertake the following measures:
(a) Public officials and employees who are personally responsible for gross
violations of human rights, in particular those involved in military, security,
police, intelligence and judicial sectors, shall not continue to serve in State
institutions. Their removal shall comply with the requirements of due process of
law and the principle of non-discrimination. Persons formally charged with
individual responsibility for serious crimes under international law shall be
suspended from official duties during the criminal or disciplinary proceedings".
ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Updated Set of
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity,
Principle 36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005). Principle 35 sets forth: "States shall
ensure that victims do not again have to endure violations of their rights. To this end, States must
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kidnappings results in the de facto detention of civil society within their homes and
relegation of the public spaces to the criminals.
Marti assumed a communitarian perspective in his explanation as to why he
chose to stay in Mexico to fight impunity, in spite of the fact that many Mexicans
are leaving the country in search of a cosmopolitan solution to their plight in the
form of asylum. When he saw the vast demonstrations mourning his son's death,
he said he realized that the loss of his son had an importance which transcended
the family. 147 He noted that he lost a son, but that Mexico had gained one. 148 In his
view, his son managed to awaken the conscience of the society. The great evil had
provided a great message - that the society shared responsibility for the level of
impunity and hence it was essential to repudiate corruption within the state. For
Marti, this implies resisting the impetus to migrate abroad, placing the love of the
country above the cosmopolitan search for an international haven for his family. 149
In keeping with the principles of the OAS Commitment to Public Security in the
Americas, he committed his family to strengthening community participation in
the implementation of public security and engendering a culture of social
responsibility towards the prevention of crime.5 o Hence, he articulates recognition
of greater involvement by the community in buttressing the state in order to secure
the rule of law and restore public freedom and societal morality. Indeed, it is
ironic that President Calderon noted that while the country celebrated the
bicentennial of its independence, the government was confronted by the challenge
of establishing the rule of law. 5
B. The Blumberg Case
Similarly, the kidnapping and murder of 23 year old Axel Blumberg in
Argentina in 2004 also resulted in allegations of police involvement. 152 This
prompted marches including hundreds of thousands of persons who responded to
his father's call to rally for increased security and penalization of kidnapping.153
The people sang the national anthem,154 of which it is notable that the lyrics
undertake institutional reforms and other measures necessary to ensure respect for the rule of law, foster
and sustain a culture of respect for human rights, and restore or establish public trust in government
institutions." Id.
147. Interview by Ldpez-D6riga with Alejandro Marti, supra note 141.
148. Id.
149. Id. The State enacted reforms to the penal code to increase penalties for kidnapping based on
popular demand. See SERIO GARCIA RAMiREZ ET AL., LA REFORMA A LA JUSTICIAL PENAL: QUINTAS
JORNADAS SOBRE JUSTICIA PENAL (2006) available at http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/
libro.htm?l=2142 for a series of articles on penal reforms.
150. Interview by Ldpez-D6riga with Alejandro Marti, supra note 141.
151. President Calderon, President of Mexico, Address to the Joint Meeting of Congress (May 20,
2010) available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/293616-2.
152. It was alleged that neighbors saw Axel being beaten as he tried to escape; they called the
police who chose not to respond. Larry Rohter, Police Corruption Plagues Argentines and President,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,2004, at A6.
153. Elliott Gotkine, Could a Kidnapping Change Argentina?, BBC NEWS, July 22, 2004,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3887805.stm.
154. MARIEKE DENISSEN, WINNING SMALL BATTLES, LOSING THE WAR: POLICE VIOLENCE, THE
MOVIMIENTO DEL DOLOR AND DEMOCRACY IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINA 125 (2008).
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include the emphatic call for "Libertad, Libertad, Libertad!" The 1813 anthem was
originally penned as a stinging cry for independence from the colonial kingdom of
Spain and now was being directed at the non-state actors that exploited the
citizenry via extortion. Axel Blumberg's father, Juan Carlos Blumberg, gathered
5.2 million signatures on a petition urging for judicial and police reform, lamenting
the low levels of conviction rates in criminal cases.15 5 He cited concern for
corruption within the police and reclamation of the restoration of justice. 156 He
sought efficient processing of cases, complete investigation, gathering of evidence,
and prosecution. 157 The wave of support for reform of the Penal Code was deemed
the "Blumberg Phenomenon" as the Congress passed increased heavy penalties for
carrying weapons, homicide, kidnapping, and rape.1 58 Once again, the approach is
communitarian rather than cosmopolitan, a call for the restoration of the national
rule of law and the enjoyment of democratic peace. Instead of seeking to raise the
transnational conscience, as was done by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the
objective is to influence domestic institutions and their output. The Argentine
government responded with a national security plan and new agency, as well as a
strategy to battle corruption within the police. 159 Criticism arose that it was
unfortunate that the phenomenon did not place pressure on the government in the
area of social needs which are among the root causes of delinquency. 160 Indeed,
155. See Elliott Gotkine, supra note 153.
156. See Elliott Gotkine, Argentine Crime Sparks Protest, BBC NEWS, Apr. 2, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3592005.stm.
157. See SouthAmericano.com, The Kidnapping that (Almost) Changed Argentina,
http://www.southamericano.com/article.aspx?idArticle=75# (last visited April 11, 2010).
158. See 15 EuR. J. CRIM. POL'Y. & RES. 121, 130-35 (Feb. 13,2009).
159. See generally ADRIAN MARCISIO, EL SEQUESTRO EXTORSIVO EN LA REPUBLICA
ARGENTINA, (2006) available at http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/libro.htm?l=2233 (outling the
legislative reform and review of other Latin American countries).
160. Horacio Cecchi, "Un Ahlo de Discurso de Exclusion", PAGINA, Apr. 1, 2005, at 12. Indeed, the
OAS Secretary-General noted that:
It is also necessary to attack the roots of the crime problem. The OAS is
convinced that there is a link between poverty, exclusion, marginalization,
inequality, and citizens' security. Poverty and social exclusion are key issues that
should be addressed in order to eliminate the true causes of the problem. Others
include a culture of lawlessness, impunity, and the absence of respect for
government institutions in several urban areas in which criminal groups replace
the legal authorities. Additional factors include the breakdown of the family with
a proliferation of single parent homes, and the increased number of youth in
Latin America who are unable to go to school or work. Also, flaws in the prison
system have produced some of the biggest human rights violations due to a
precarious infrastructure, the sub-human conditions in which the prisoners are
kept, and overcrowding. These factors often make prisons places to learn more
advanced criminal behavior.
Org. of Am. States, Rapporteur's Report - First Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Security
in the Americas, at 3, OEA/Ser.K/XLIX.1, (Oct 7-8, 2008), available at http://www.oas.org/seguridad
hemisferica/documents/Informe%20Relatoriao20MLSPA Rev%201 RM00033EO8.doc; The Ministers
Responsible for Public Security in the Americas' 2008 document: "Commitment to Public Security in
the Americas" sets forth, "[t]hat conditions for public security are improved through full respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as through the promotion of education, health, and
economic and social development," Org. of Am. States, First Meeting of Ministers Responsible for
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given the gravity of the situation, there is a clear need for a holistic approach which
would confront severe inequality and inequity within the region and pursues
restorative justice initiatives to rehabilitate marginalized individuals who turn to
crime as a means of survival or for a lack of viable options.
C. The Role ofPrivate Companies
The fundamental characteristic of the kidnapping epidemic is that the private
market is both part of its origin and solution. Inequitable enjoyment of socio-
economic resources and exclusion from participation in formal markets prompts
marginalized individuals to pursue the criminal market of kidnapping as a means
of survival. The customary practice of private security and insurance companies
paying ransoms in the majority of cases1 61 stimulates the significant growth of the
market; the benefit being the increased chance of reunion of the victim to his/her
family. The kidnapping market clearly benefits private actors on both sides. A
point of interest, in the context of kidnapping at sea (for example the kidnapping of
shipping crews by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden), is that it has been noted that
costs of negotiation services can supersede the actual ransom itself. 162 Maritime
companies are unwilling to sacrifice their crews in order to break the market
because it would contravene the code of honor at sea.163 Further, in spite of the fact
that the costs incurred as a result of a hostage-taking may be high, the shipping
industry has vast economic resources that can afford it. On land, families of
victims are understandably unwilling to sacrifice their family members, hence
many lose entire life savings in order to rescue their loved ones. As an example of
the growth of the industry, middle-class Mexicans can purchase transmitter chips
from a security company to be inserted into their bodies so as to allow tracking by
satellite in the event of a kidnapping. The chips cost $4,000 plus an annual fee of
$2,200.164
A salient issue is that because families will often negotiate directly with the
kidnappers via use of private security firms (to the exclusion of state authorities),
official oversight of the scale of the problem is rendered vague. 165 The reasons why
the families of victims of kidnapping may eschew the state when seeking
resolution include: instruction and fear of reprisal by the kidnappers should they
Public Security in the Americas: Commitment to Public Security in the Americas, at 1, MISPA/doc.
7/08 rev. 4 (Oct. 8, 2008) available at http://www.oas.org/CSH/english/documents/RM00028EO8.doc.
161. Insurance: Hedge Against Ransom, TIME, Mar. 18, 1974, available at http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911137,00.html.
162. Trine-Lise Wilhelmsen, Prof, University of Oslo, Conference Comment on Piracy in
Maritime Law, Institute for Maritime Law, (Apr. 29, 2009) (on file with author).
163. Id.
164. Mica Rosenberg, Satellites Track Mexico Kidnap Victims with Chips, REUTERS, Aug. 21,
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2041333820080821. See, eGlobalHealth
Insurers Agency, LLC, http://www.eglobalhealth.com/kidnap-ransom-extortion-insurance.html (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010 (for an overview of the kidnap insurance industry).
165. Barnard R. Thompson, Kidnappings are Out of Control in Mexico, MEXIDATA, June 14, 2004,
http://mexidata.info/id217.html (stating that the National Autonomous University of Mexico estimated
that over 90% of kidnappings in Mexico go unreported due to lack of faith in the police and
government).
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contact the police, distrust in the police due to corruption allegations, or concern
regarding the state's lack of effectiveness in actually obtaining the release of
victims. Private companies offering services in handling kidnapping fill a niche by
solving individual cases but do not provide a holistic solution for the transnational
criminal pathology as a whole.
Hence, the distrust of the state appears similar to that in situations of direct
state terrorism. Protection is directly contingent on victims' financial ability to pay
the private actors that have assumed dominance in this arena. This service industry
previously concentrated on multinational company executives or political actors.
Now the market is significantly broadened. The emergence of hundreds of citizens
around the world seeking basic protection to simply walk down the street, go to
work, go to school, and so forth confirms the significant growth of the private
business of anti-kidnapping.
The recession of state police as guarantors of security in accordance with their
basic protection duty to citizens is remarkable. A particular irony is that whereas
the Mexican state often had problems collecting taxes from its citizens, 166 the
extortion groups proved remarkably effective in collecting "taxes".167
Given the lack of effective national protection mechanisms, victims and
potential victims of kidnapping go abroad in search of asylum. The following
section reviews cases and reports from the United States, Canada, and France. It
should be noted that the provision of asylum to past victims or potential victims of
kidnapping may be deemed less urgent than the adoption of policies designed to
strengthen strategies to defeat gangs and other non-state actors engaged in
kidnapping. This is particularly salient when the same groups are also involved in
narco-trafficking and support of terrorist acts, such as the FARC, in Colombia.
Furthermore, although international attention responds to kidnapping of foreigners,
the wave of kidnapping of locals is largely unreported.
V. REFUGEE LAW AS AN ASPECT OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
A. Background
De Sousa Santos describes modem Western thinking and, in turn, modem
law, as dividing societies between existent (legal) and non-existent (illegal) groups,
the latter of which are denied recognition and protection by the State. 168 In modem
states, citizens enjoy the benefit of the social contract; in countries undergoing
kidnapping epidemics, governments are unable to guarantee their citizens basic
security against violence by non-state actors. At present, citizens are deprived the
benefits of citizenship and turn to the international community for protection in the
166. See Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico Moves to Cut Back Tax Loopholes for Businesses, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2007, at C4.
167. See Alfredo Corchado, Drug Gangs Extort Money from Nuevo Laredo Business Owners,
DALLAS NEWS, Oct. 17, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws /news/
nationworld/stories/10 1707dnintmobsters.37202a7.html.
168. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of
Knowledge, EUROZINE, June 29, 2007, available at http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-06-29-
santos-en.htmil.
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form of asylum. De Sousa Santos asserts that modem states refuse to recognize the
state of inequity, thereby resulting in "global cognitive injustice."1 69 Furthermore,
he asserts that "the logic of appropriation/violence has been gaining strength to the
detriment of the logic of regulation/emancipation. This has occurred to such an
extent that the domain of regulation/emancipation is not only shrinking but
becoming internally contaminated by the logic of appropriation/violence."o
Hence, Western states, fearing an opening of floodgates, in turn, adopt restrictive
policies to deny protection and return asylum seekers to their countries of origin
(thereby engaging in refoulement). This is accompanied by additional human
rights violations, including arbitrary detention. 172 Indeed, the most evocative image
of this epoch is the erection of walls or fences (such as the one between Mexico
and the United States) to separate the "civilized" and "savage" zones which
produce refugees and migrants. 173 This counters de Sousa Santos' advocacy of a
"sub-altem cosmopolitanism" which would guarantee inclusion of those excluded
from protection by their own governments.
B. Asylum
A consequence of the rise in kidnapping is an escalation in migration. 174 The
problem that arises when considering transnational responses to kidnapping is that
there is an inherent conflict between the individual's desire to attain immediate
protection for himself and his family via the filing of an asylum claim and the
traditional state-centered interpretation of cooperation as implicating measures
designed to facilitate arrest and prosecution of offenders.
Indeed, the UN Economic and Social Council Resolution on International
Cooperation in the Prevention, Combating and Elimination of Kidnapping and in
Providing Assistance to Victims (2003/28) primarily highlights the importance of
amendment of national penal legislation to abide by the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, further addressing the need for extradition and
international cooperation in the freezing of assets. 175 In terms of fulfilling
protection duties towards victims and their families, only general reference is made
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. JESSICA RODGER, DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF THE NON-REFOULEMENT PRINCIPLE,
(2001), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/JessicaR.htm.
172. Human Rights First, Background Briefing Note, The Detention of Asylum Seekers in the
United States: Arbitrary under the ICCPR, (2007), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/
pdf/061206-asy-bac-un-arb-det-asy-us.pdf.
173. Within the United States, the increase in asylum applications by Mexicans is resulting in
increased investment in border patrol and a large scale policy to reject cases at the administrative level.
Indeed, the U.S. has constructed various fences on the border of Mexico, and the recent execution of
Mexican prisoners resulted in a critical decision by the ICJ. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Req. for Interpretation) (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING ASYLUM, FINDING PRISON (2009), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf.
174. See Sam Dillon, Kidnappings in Mexico Send Shivers Across Border, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2009, at Al.
175. 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, TT 35, 45.
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to the need to review domestic measures (not transnational measures).1 7 6 In UN
Economic and Social Council Resolution 2004/20 on International Cooperation in
the Prevention, Combating and Elimination of Kidnapping and in Providing
Assistance to Victims, noting "the considerable psychological, social and
economic damage associated with kidnapping," member States are urged to adopt
legislative, administrative and other measures to provide appropriate support and
assistance to victims and their families.17 7 From a trans-national perspective one
may argue that this may be interpreted to include the provision of asylum where
appropriate; however this is not explicit in the resolution.
Of concern is that the Colombian response to the UN Economic and Social
Council 2003 report indicated that "from a psychological standpoint, people never
fully recovered from the experience of kidnapping."17 Kidnapping severely affects
family relations and the payment of ransom may lead to bankruptcy. Furthermore,
in cases where persons have experienced repeated kidnappings or threat of
repeated kidnapping, pursuit of asylum is increasingly considered an option for
pursuing a durable solution.
On the other hand, when kidnapping becomes endemic, societies may
undergo mass flight of entire groups, such as medical professionals, businessmen,
university professors, and other professionals. 179 The impact of this loss is
particularly detrimental in states undergoing internal conflict that have an acute
need for such professionals, for example, Iraq or Afghanistan. Similarly, in
Colombia the FARC established the practice of miraculous catches ("pescas
milagrosas") in which they set up roadblocks in order to identify targets for
kidnapping.o This strategy proved effective as the state was unable to police the
vast national transportation infrastructure. This phenomenon prompted over 1
million Colombians to leave the country in order to avoid kidnapping or
extortion."' Ironically, the process of migration in itself may actually lead to
kidnapping as the Mexican Human Rights Commission reported that an estimated
9,758 migrants were allegedly kidnapped by gangs or authorities while en route to
the US in a period of six months in 2009.182
176. See id. I 1, 36.
177. ECOSOC Res. 2004/20, 6, U.N. Doc. E/2004/INF/2/Add.2 (July 21, 2004).
178. 2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, T 53.
179. See Sumedha Senanayake, Iraq: Brain Drain Poses Threat to Future, RADIO FREE EUROPE
RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1072793.html (explaining how
mass kidnappings in Iraq caused engineers, doctors, lawyers, and professors to flee the country).
180. U.S. BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., COL.00001.OGC, COLOMBIA:
KIDNAPPING AND EXTORTION BY ARMED GROUPS IN URBAN AND SUBURBAN AREAS (2000); see also
2003 U.N. Report on Kidnapping, supra note 2, T 15 (discussing kidnappings conducted by guerrillas in
Colombia by means of illegal roadblocks).
181. Juan Forero, Prosperous Colombians Flee, Many to U.S., to Escape War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 2001, at Al.
182. The ransoms ranged from USD $1,500 to $5,000 totaling USD $25 million in the six-month
period. Rights Commission: Almost 10,000 Migrants Passing Through Mexico Kidnapped in 6 Months,
BREAKING NEWS 24/7, June 16, 2009, http:/Iblog.taragana.com/n/rights-commission-almost-10000-
migrants-passing-through-mexico-kidnapped-in-6-months-82421/.
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Dilemmas arise in determining the legitimacy of applying asylum as a
solution to kidnapping. For example, there is the concern as to whether provision
of asylum to those belonging (imputed or not) to higher classes indicates a bias
towards protection of affluent members of society. Kidnapping victims are
normally viewed to be wealthy. Nevertheless, due to kidnapping, they also belong
to the global community of victims and hence would appear to have equal claim to
seek protection. Furthermore, a common consequence of chronic state dysfunction
is that acts that appear extraordinary in modern, well-functioning democracies
become routine, breeding familiarity and resignation within both society and state
actors. This in turn may hamper recognition of a persecution risk by immigration
officers, given that the individual may not be able to prove an additional risk over
that of persons of the same socio-economic background or nationality. A case in
point is revealed by the fact that in the United States the majority of Mexican
asylum claims are transferred directly to the judge for deportation processing,
irrespective of the kidnapping epidemic that is ongoing. 183 Refugee law is
fragmented as there is great variance among states in interpreting the refugee
definition. The cases addressed below confirm a lack of harmonized approach to
the issue, some resulting in asylum, others are granted secondary protection or are
subject to rejection. The essential consideration is that various cases indicate actual
adoption of cosmopolitan values by national immigration authorities who are
willing to recognize modem forms of persecution in order to grant protection,
while other cases reflect conflict and contradiction in protection assessments
conducted by different state institutions (e.g. protection criteria contained national
penal law in the country of origin versus negative protection determination by
immigration authority in the country of asylum). The presentation of select cases
seeks to demonstrate how asylum may form part of a transnational solution for
kidnapping epidemics.
1. Kidnapping as Persecution
According to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the definition of
a refugee is:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it 184
The concept of persecution is central to the definition and generally implies
serious violation of human rights by nature or repetition, or amounting to a severe
183. See Todd Bensman, Attorneys Speak Out on Mexican Deportations, GLOBALPOST, July 14,
2009, available athttp://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/mexico/us-asylum-cases-mexico.
184. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, TA2, adopted July 28, 1951,189
U.N.T.S. 137.
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violation via accumulation.1 8 5 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam provide the following
definition:
Persecution within the Convention thus comprehends measures, taken
on the basis of one or more of the stated grounds, which threaten
deprivation of life or liberty; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment; subjection to slavery or servitude; non-recognition as a
person (particularly where the consequences of such non-recognition
impinge directly on an individual's life, liberty, livelihood, security, or
integrity); and oppression, discrimination, or harassment of a person in
his or her private, home, or family life. 186
It may be argued that kidnapping can be considered to constitute persecution
as it constitutes a deprivation of liberty, often involves harassment or coercion of
the person and his/her family in the home, and also commonly include acts of
violence or inhuman treatment (cf. human rights listed in II B 1, pages 107-108).
In the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the
cumulative effect of the FARC's threatening phone calls, beatings, and kidnapping
of a Colombian man who was active in the Colombian Liberal Party constituted
past persecution on account of political opinion.1 7 The Court noted that the
applicant's provision of records documenting the medical treatment he received for
injuries suffered during the kidnapping supported a rebuttable presumption that his
life or freedom would be threatened upon removal to Colombia.18s The Court
confirmed that "[w]e have no difficulty in concluding that this kidnapping, coupled
with the beatings before and during the kidnapping, and the threatening phone
calls, cumulatively amount to persecution."l8 9 It may be suggested that cases in
which asylum is denied will generally be a result of other criteria within the
refugee definition. 190
2. Well-founded Fear of Persecution
185. See Council Directive 2004/83/EC, art. 9, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 16 (EU).
186. GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (3d ed.
2007).
187. Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 766 (11th Cit. 2007).
188. Id.
189. The applicant was held in the jungle for eighteen days. The applicant also provided a police
report describing the kidnapping and beatings, as well as the death certificate of his friend who was
kidnapped with him and eventually shot and buried in a common grave. Id. at 764.
190. Although UNHCR has yet to produce a Background Note or Guideline on the issue, it
consistently reports on kidnapping in its country reports, as does the Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada when considering the security situation in the country of origin. See U.N. High Comm'r for
Refugees [UNHR] Refworld database, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page
=search&skip=0&query=kidnapping (last visited Apr. 8, 2010); Responses to Information Requests
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2009), available at http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIRRDI/RIR RDI.aspx?id-452423&l=e. Review of asylum cases involving
kidnapping at the appeal level in Norway revealed majority rejection on account of lack of nexus to a
protection category, low credibility, low risk of persecution, and/or application of internal flight
alternative. See Utlendingsnemnda Cases, http://www.une.no (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
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Asylum officers evaluate the risk of persecution faced by the applicant. 191
This is often complicated because entire societies in countries undergoing
kidnapping epidemics may often be described as subject to a generalized level of
risk. As pertaining to risk, a negative conclusion was formulated by the Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Board in a case involving a Haitian woman who was
victim of an attempted kidnapping, telephone threats, intervention of her home,
and murder of her sister in 2005.192 The Board noted that "in Haiti, kidnapping or
attempted kidnappings have reached epidemic proportions."193 The Board
concluded that she did not suffer a particular risk; rather she was subject to a risk
faced generally by other individuals in Haiti. 194 Hence, asylum was denied. Canada
applies two different tests. The first is the comparative approach "which involves
comparing the claimant's predicament with the circumstances of other persons in
the same country, and requiring that the claimant's predicament be worse than the
predicaments of other people." 195 The second is the non-comparative approach
(preferred):
The issue is not a comparison between the claimant's risk and the risk
faced by other individuals or groups at risk for a Convention reason, but
whether the claimant's risk is a risk of sufficiently serious harm and is
linked to a Convention reason as opposed to the general, indiscriminate
consequences of civil war.196
The case reflects the problem that the non-comparative approach can be just
as problematic as the comparative approach. By describing the risk of kidnapping
as general, the Board denied the need for individual protection, which appears
astounding given the case history.
a. The State's Ability to Protect
Non-prosecution of offenders in kidnapping cases is common and damages
victims and the society as a whole, solidifying a culture of impunity and prompting
many people to migrate. Where a state is unable or unwilling to protect persons
from persecution by non-state actors, grounds for asylum may exist. In Canada, the
191. See, e.g., ASYLUM Div., OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL 53, 123 (2003).
192. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada [Refugee Division], MA5-04427, MA5-0440,
7-10 (May 29, 2006).
193. Id. T 19.
194. Id. T 27-28.
195. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA LEGAL SERVICES, INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONVENTION REFUGEE DEFINITION IN THE CASE LAW 9-3 (2005), available at http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/Eng/brdcom/references/legjur/rpdspr/def/Documents/crdef e.pdf. The Board points out that
"[r]equiring a worse predicament might mean any one of several things. To succeed, a claimant might
have to establish: (i) that the claimant's level of risk is greater than the risk level of persons in other
groups, or (ii) that the claimant's risk level is greater than the risk level of other persons in the
claimant's own group; or (iii) that the claimant is at risk of suffering harm greater than that which
threatens others." Id. at 9-3 n.10 (analyzing Salibian v. Canada, [1990] 3 F.C. 250 (Can.); Rizkallah v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 156 N.R. 1 (Can. F.C.A., May 6, 1992)).
196. Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 235 N.R. 316, T 4 (Can. F.C.A.
Jan. 12, 1999).
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Immigration Authorities look for evidence demonstrating a complete breakdown of
state apparatus, that similarly situated individuals were let down by state protection
facilities, or past personal incidents in which state protection did not materialize. 197
Where the state retains effective control of its territory and makes serious efforts to
protect its citizens, the fact that it is not always successful will not be enough to
justify protection. 198 Where applicants have experience many incidents of
violations without receiving state protection, protection may be offered.199 In
Australia, a finding of adequate state protection is founded on evidence that the
country has effective judicial and law enforcement agencies, is governed by the
rule of law and has an infrastructure of laws to protect its nationals against the
harm feared.200
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board granted recognition of refugee
status to a Kyrgyzstani man (of mixed nationality- Ukranian/Tartar) who claimed
that ethnic Kyrgyzs kidnapped his daughter to attain his assets. 20 1 The Board held
that "even though this may be interpreted as a purely criminal act and not make the
claimant a refugee, the lack of will on the part of the authorities, i.e. the police, to
intervene and protect the claimant is, in our view, persecutory."202
In another case, France's Commission des Recours des Reffigids (CRR)
granted asylum to a Russian woman whose husband was an officer in the Army
who had objected to the war in Chechnya.203 As a result both were kidnapped and
she was held for three months in cave where she was interrogated about the
location of documents her husband had hidden.204 The Commission granted asylum
given the passivity of the Russian states to respond to the disappearance of the
officer (he was released only after a non-state organization pursued the case),
which the Commission interpreted to indicate state tolerance of the kidnapping.
One of the most interesting cases involved an Albino member of the Bambara
ethnicity in Mali who was subject to several kidnapping attempts and was granted
197. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 194, at 6-6.
198. Id. at K-10 (citing Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca, [1992]
99 D.L.R. (4th) 334 (Can.)).
199. Id. at 6-10 (citing Bobrik v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 85
F.T.R. 13 (Can. F.C.T.D. Sept. 16, 1994)); but see Smirnov v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1995] 1
F.C. 780, 11 (Can.) (noting that where random assaults are conducted by unknown assailants and
there are no independent witnesses, it is difficult for the state to effectively investigate and provide
protection).
200. Svecs v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) F.C.A. 1507, 11 (Nov. 2,
1999).
201. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Refugee Division), M99-01930 (Feb. 10, 2000),
available at http://www.iijcan.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2000/2000canlii21358/2000canlii21358.html.
202. Id.
203. Commission des Recours des Refrgids [CRR] [Refugee Appeal Comm'n], Jul. 16, 1999, Oct.
22, 2004, Case no. 340095 (Fr.). The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy expresses no
opinion as to the accuracy of the source, citation, reference or translation of this document.
204. Id.
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asylum due to the state's inability to protect Albinos from kidnapping and
205
assassination.
b. Internal Flight Alternative
After considering refugee status, immigration authorities often consider
alternatives to asylum, including whether protection may reasonably be sought
elsewhere in the country of origin, establishing an internal flight alternative.206 The
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board addressed the harrowing case of a
Mexican family that experienced the kidnapping of their son in 2006.207 The
mother was forced to pay 100,000 Mexican pesos (thereby forced to sell her car
and use up her savings). 208 The kidnappers cut the son's arm with a knife and
eventually released him.2 09 They called the mother and threatened that she would
eventually have to pay ransom for her other son.210 She filed a complaint with the
police and changed phones. 2 11 The kidnappers called her on the new phone and
accused her of contacting the police.212 The Immigration and Refugee Board held
that they were subject to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.213 The Board noted country reports citing the current
trends in Mexico in terms of spread of kidnapping to popular social classes, the
proliferation of more ruthless gangs, and increased police collusion in cases. 2 14 It
expressed concern for the kidnappers' knowledge about the victims, violent
threats, past exhibition of violence, and plausible ties to the police.215 It found a
serious possibility that kidnappers would target them if they returned.216 The Board
recognized that given police implication in the case, the requirement to exhaust
domestic remedies when seeking protection was inappropriate given the danger
involved. 17 The Board stated that there was no possibility of internal flight
alternative, given possible use of the national documentation system in Mexico to
205. Commission des Recours des Refrigids [CRR] [Refugee Appeal Comm'n], June 10, 2005,
Nov. 23, 2005, Case no. 514926 (Fr.) available at http://www.cnda.fr/ta-caa/media/document/recueil
2005 anonymise.pdf.
206. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: "Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative"
within the Context ofArticle 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/04 (July 23, 2003) (setting forth an analysis framework which
addresses whether the area of relocation is practically, safely, and legally accessible to the individual;
whether the persecutor is likely to pursue to the claimant to the area; whether state protection is
available; would there be a new form of persecution or harm; and would he or she experience undue
hardship).
207. Immigration and Refugee Board Refugee Protection Division, 2007 CanLII 64580 (I.R.B.),
Oct. 17, 2007, MA6-05154, MA6-05155, MA6-05190, available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc
/2007/2007canlii64580/2007canlii64580.html.
208. Id
209. Id.
210. Id
211. Id
212. Id.
213. Id
214. Id
215. Id.
216. Id
217. Id
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identify citizens. 218 This is important, because application of the internal flight
alternative is often used in cases in which the administrative agencies fear the
opening of floodgates, such as those originating from Mexico. 219 In this case, the
family was granted refugee status. However, in other cases in which there is less
evident linkage to the State, immigration authorities may be inclined to indicate the
existence of an Internal Flight Alternative. Hence, it is essential to demonstrate the
State's inability to provide protection throughout the nation.
3. Nexus to Protection Category
Another criteria for recognition as a refugee is the nexus to the protection
categories: race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or social group.220 At times,
kidnapping is conducted to attain a political objective, such as change of state
policy towards an alleged repressed minority group, or exchange for political
prisoners. Kidnapping by groups with political agendas are considered high-risk in
terms of threat of serious harm or death to the victim.221 In such cases, the victims
may themselves be political actors or merely persons considered to belong to a
prosperous family with connections/influence upon the state. In these cases, the
category of the political opinion may be relevant, also in combination with social
group, as often the victim and the family deem themselves to oppose corruption
among state actors involved in the crime or unable to prevent the crimes.222
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the case of a
Colombian woman who was kidnapped and held for three days in order to set up a
computer network for the FARC.223 As there was a delay in arrival of the
equipment, she was released and informed that she would be contacted again to
perform the service. She fled and sought asylum. Of interest, she claimed risk of
persecution on account of her political opinion against the FARC and her
membership in a particular social group (experts in computer science). The Court
held that the BIA had erred by failing to consider that her refusal to provide further
technological assistance to the FARC could be regarded as imputed political
opinion (opposition to the FARC).224 The Court also found that the BIA had erred
in assuming that kidnapping could not constitute persecution. The Court indicated
that kidnapping is considered to be a very serious offence and when a case presents
a credible fear of such act, the issue is whether the motive for the kidnapping is
218. Id.
219. See Reinhard Marx, The Criteria of Applying the "Internal Flight Alternative" Test in Nat'1
Refugee Status Determination Procedures, 14 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE LAW 179, 180 (2002).
220. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 184, art. 1.
221. Telephone Interview with Leslie Edwards, Clayton Consultants (May 5, 2009) (on file with
author).
222. The New Zealand Appeals Authority granted asylum to an Iraqi man who claimed fear of
kidnapping on account of his profession and targeting for imputed political opinion. New Zealand
Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal No. 75900, 2 (Nov. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,NZL RSAA,,IRQ,,477cfbc80,0.html.
223. Maria Del Pilar Delgado v. Michael B. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 704 (2nd Cir. 2007).
224. Id. (citing Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2nd Cir. 1994)) (noting that the conclusion that
a cause of persecution is economic does not necessarily imply that there cannot exist other causes of
persecution. This addresses mixed motives of persecution).
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225indicative of persecution.22 The failure to do so, in particular in this cases in which
the fear of kidnapping was accompanied by an objectively reasonable fear of death
was considered to be an error.226
A contrary example is provided in another case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the immigration judge's conclusion that a single
kidnapping incident by the FARC of another Colombian member of the Liberal
Party (lasting a short period of time within an evening, including the use of
hooding but no apparent beatings) amounted to one isolated incident of politically-
based harassment and intimidation which ended when the applicant ceased his
political dissemination activities.227 The Court found that "although the cumulative
effects of a kidnapping, threatening phone calls, and attempted murder can
certainly constitute persecution, it is not sufficient to show past persecution when
motivated only by FARC's political opinion and (the applicant's) refusal to
cooperate with them." 228 The Court held that after the initial kidnapping incident,
FARC harassed the applicant only because of his refusal to cooperate with them,
which the Court held was not grounds for protection.
Asylum is also available to other forms of social groups. The Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Board granted asylum to a Somali member of the
Galgalo minority tribe who was subject to a risk of kidnapping, among other acts,
on account of his membership in the particular social group consisting of the
clan.229
In relation to establishing a nexus to protection category, one may suggest
that it may be appropriate to advocate recognition of a particular social group
composed of the "family".230 In Albanian cases involving kidnapping as a result of
a family feud, UNHCR confirms that social group would be applicable:
225. Id. (citing Matter of V-T-S, 211. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (B.I.A. 1997); Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales,
464 F.3d 163, 167 (2nd Cit. 2006)).
226. Id. The Court noted State Department reports confirming the FARC's use of murder of
civilians and deserters. See also Commission des Recours des Reffigi6s, [CRR] [Refugee Appeal
Comm'n], May 22, 2000, Nov. 11, 2004, Case No. 347838 (Fr.). A case in which CRR granted asylum
to a woman from Bangladesh who founded a women's branch of a political movement which engaged
on behalf of women's rights. She was subject to an attempted kidnapping by militant Islamicists of the
Jamat-E-Islam party. Two of her companions were killed by them. She was later subject to attack by a
firearm and condemned to 7 years imprisonment on false charges of trafficking of weapons. She was
subject to an attempted kidnapping by militant Islamicists of the Jamat-E-Islam party. Two of her
companions were killed by them. She was later subject to attack by a firearm and condemned to 7 years
imprisonment on false charges of trafficking of weapons. The Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of the source, citation, reference or translation of this
document.
227. Julio Cesar Diaz v. U.S. Attorney General, 275 Fed. App'x. 856, 863 (11th Cir. 2008).
228. Id. at 864.
229. Immigration and Refugee Board Refugee Protection Division, 2008 CanLII 76304 (I.R.B.),
Nov. 17, 2008, TA7-02698, available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2008/2008canlii76304
/2008canlii76304.html.
230. UNHCR, UNHCR Position on Claims for Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees Based on a Fear of Persecution Due to an Individual's Membership of a
Family or clan Engaged in a Blood Feud, T 18, ("In applying the definition of a particular social group
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In blood feud cases, it would be possible to define the particular social
group, for instance, as "family members involved in a blood feud" or
"family members targeted because of an ancient code", or "male
members of a family targeted under a traditional blood feud canon" or,
more specifically still, "male members of the XXX family threatened
with death as a result of a blood feud with the YYY family". In this
way, the group is not defined solely by the persecution feared as a result
of the blood feud but also by its kinship ties.231
In this author's opinion, the identification of "family" as a social group is also
applicable in kidnapping cases outside of the feud scenario. Asylum has been
granted to family members of victims, usually in cases involving mixed motives of
persecution. For example, the French Commission for Refugees granted asylum to
a Belorussian doctor who denounced political corruption involving deviation of
humanitarian aid intended for children in Chernobyl and whose son was kidnapped
and beaten for a period of 24 hours.232
On the other hand, the Federal Court of Canada rejected asylum in the case of
a Colombian businessman who claimed risk of kidnapping and extortion by the
FARC on account of the family's wealth.233 The applicant demonstrated prior
kidnapping of the applicant's father (released after paying a ransom of USD
50,000), kidnapping of other family members, and threat of kidnapping of the
applicant.234 The applicant argued mixed motives of persecution (imputed political
opinion and membership in a particular social group comprised of the wealthy
family/businessmen), but the Court rejected the establishment of a nexus to a
protection category. 35
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also rejected a case
involving a Colombian family of which the sister of the applicant had been
kidnapped, held for three days, and interrogated by the FARC on account of her
employment as a government engineer.236 The applicant claimed to have hired a
woman as a maid who allegedly turned out to belong to the FARC.237 She claimed
that she feared the maid would kidnap her school age daughters and fired her.238
Afterwards, she received anonymous threatening phone calls.239 The Court held
that the applicant had failed to establish a specific threat against the family as a
provided in these Guidelines, it is UNHCR's view that a family unit represents a classic example of a
'particular social group'. A family is a socially cognizable group in society and individuals are
perceived by society on the basis of their family membership.").
231. Id. 20.
232. Commission des Recours des Reffgis [CRR] [Refugee Appeal Comm'n], Oct. 5, 1995, Sept.
11, 2004, Case no. 258877 (Fr.). The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy expresses no
opinion as to the accuracy of the source, citation, reference or translation of this document.
233. Montoya v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2002] F.C.T. 63, (Can.).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2005).
237. Id. at 880.
238. Id. at 879-80.
239. Id. at 879.
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social group, especially when the extended family continued to leave peacefully in
the region.240 The Court found that the kidnapping of the applicant's sister was due
to her particular employment and did not appear to be connected to the family.241
This case may be the result of deficient counsel as the Court points out that the
applicant failed to discuss her political opinion or indicate how it differed from
FARC.
In short this case indicates how difficult it is to take preventive action in the
form of seeking asylum prior to experiencing severe harm. It is understandable that
a mother would not want to wait until her daughters were kidnapped. It should be
noted the Colombian Penal Code recognizes the status of aggravated forced
disappearance in cases in which a person is detained and abducted on account of
his/her status as a public servant.242 The same status is given in cases involving the
forced disappearance of a relative (up to the second degree of consanguinity,
second degree of affinity and first degree of civil bond).243 The Colombian Penal
Code appears to recognize a risk of kidnapping of family members of government
employees that was neglected by the U.S. court, thereby indicating a lack of
harmonization of law at the transnational level that inhibits the pursuit of sub-
altem cosmopolitan protection values.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, review of the phenomenon of kidnapping by non-state actors as
a cause of flight from failed or failing states to modem states indicates that
increased harmonization of transnational law (human rights, criminal law, and
asylum law) is necessary in order to provide a holistic response to kidnapping; one
that provides a protection perspective beyond the immediate goal of rescue of a
victim towards prevention of other kidnappings and durable solutions for former
victims as individuals. This study has demonstrated how public and private sectors
merge creating new forms of insecurity/security and justice/injustice within formal
and informal sectors. Immigration administrative agencies are exploring ways
providing a transnational legal response to the criminal phenomenon of kidnapping
via asylum. From a legal perspective, attainment of a humane asylum policy is
contingent on dismantling policies which limit application of the refugee definition
to modem form of harms. Asylum is not a panacea for the majority of kidnapping
victims; it may be the solution for the minority who are compelled to leave their
states of origin.
Adoption of a cosmopolitan approach to protection would complement the
substantive measures being pursued by states in crime fighting and prosecution on
behalf of the communitarian public interest. The weakness of the nation states is
worsened by the limitations of the international system in cooperating and
responding to or preventing the spread of kidnapping. Long term solutions require
transnational state building initiatives- the strengthening of national judiciaries and
240. Id. at 881 (citing In re A-E-M-, 211. & N. Dec. 1157 (1998)).
241. Id.
242. C6digo Penal, [COD. PEN.] [Penal Code of Colombia] No. 599/2000 arts. 165-166(4).
243. Id. art. 166 (5).
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reduction of corruption in police and security institutions in order to ensure that
states meet their duties to provide basic security for their citizens. Such initiatives
would also need to be supplemented by poverty reduction and social justice
programs in order to tackle the root causes of kidnapping epidemics in stratified,
unequal societies.
THE PLIGHT OF ZIMBABWEAN
UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE MINORS IN SOUTH AFRICA:
A CALL FOR COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE ACTION
CERISE FRITSCH, ELISSA JOHNSON, AND AURELIJA JUSKA *
Since the economic and social breakdown in Zimbabwe, hundreds of thousands of
people have fled the country for South Africa, including thousands of
unaccompanied refugee minors. An unaccompanied refugee minor, or a "URA,"
is a person under the age of eighteen who has either crossed the border alone or
with another child, or who has found himself or herself living in a foreign country
without an adult caregiver. Zimbabwean URMs come to South Africa in search of
education, shelter, or jobs to support family back in Zimbabwe. Unaccompanied
refugee minors who travel to South Africa face a myriad of challenges, including
physical safety, life without a parent or guardian, legal and social discrimination,
and a constant struggle to find food, shelter, education, health care, and
employment. Although these children have rights under international and
domestic law, political and other factors combined have denied children the
protection and support to which they are legally entitled.
While South Africa has been somewhat responsive to the needs of Zimbabwean
adults, it has largely ignored those of unaccompanied refugee minors. This paper
shifts that focus and argues that South Africa must immediately turn its attention to
the plight of the thousands of unaccompanied minors who have entered the country
from Zimbabwe. Specifically, it advocates for the adoption and implementation of
comprehensive and carefully tailored legislation to protect unaccompanied minors
who enter the country primarily for economic and educational reasons. Enactment
and enforcement of such laws would respond to the immediate crisis of
Zimbabwean URMs, while providing a sustainable approach for dealing with
similar refugee populations in the future.
INTRODUCTION
Moses Re Muleya,**a fourteen-year-old Zimbabwean boy, lives in an
overcrowded shelter in the South African border town of Musina. His father died
approximately one year ago, a victim of political violence; his mother suffers from
HIV. Given Zimbabwe's crippled economy, Moses' mother encouraged him to
* Cerise Fritsch graduated from Loyola University Chicago School of Law in May 2010 with a dual
degree in law and social work. Elissa Johnson is expected to graduate from Loyola University Chicago
School of Law in February 2010 with a dual degree in law and social work. Aurelija Juska graduated
from Loyola University Chicago School of Law in May 2010.
** Due to his age and legal status in South Africa, Moses' name has been changed to protect his identity.
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travel to South Africa to earn money to help support her and his four younger
brothers. In December 2008, he and a friend boarded a train and made the 538-
mile journey to the border. Since arriving, he has been forced to beg and run
errands to survive. He has been unable to enroll in school, find steady work, or
travel safely to Zimbabwe to visit his family, nor has he had access to a social
worker to help him with these problems, something to which he is theoretically
entitled to under South African law.
Unfortunately, Moses' experience is not unique. In recent years, thousands of
children have traveled alone from Zimbabwe to South Africa to seek a better life
for themselves and their families. Currently, almost the entire unaccompanied
refugee minor ("URM") population in South Africa is Zimbabwean, with
approximately 1,500 URMs living in the Musina area alone.1 Most children came
with a sibling or a friend, but about 25% traveled alone.2 The majority are between
the ages of twelve and eighteen, with the largest percentage between the ages of
fifteen and seventeen.3 Approximately 70% of the children are boys.4 It is likely
that there are a greater number of girls, but the girls tend to work as domestic
laborers or sex workers and thus remain unseen.5 Some of the girls are young
6
mothers, coming with children of their own.
Unaccompanied refugee minors who travel to South Africa face a myriad of
challenges, including physical safety, life without a parent or guardian, legal and
social discrimination, and a constant struggle to find food, shelter, education,
health care, and employment. Although these children have rights under
international and domestic law, political and other factors deny children like Moses
the protection and support to which they are legally entitled. Some suggest that
South Africa has been reluctant to move aggressively towards protecting
Zimbabwean refugees because to do so might threaten the country's self-assumed
1. Interview with Bruno Geddo, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in Musina, S.
Afr. (Feb. 25, 2009). Non-governmental organizations have difficulty assessing the actual number of
URMs living in South Africa and Musina, in particular, because URMs tend to be "invisible," by virtue
of their means of entry into the country and their attempts to evade the authorities. Girls are particularly
invisible since many of them take on domestic or sex labor. No shelters in the Musina-area provide
services to girls, and few girls were present at the Showgrounds.
2. Id.
3. Id.; Interview with Vera Chrobok, UNICEF, in Musina, S. Afr. (Feb. 25, 2009).
4. Interview with Shyamol Choudhury, Emergency Response Worker, Save the Children UK, in
Musina, S. Afr. (Feb. 25, 2009).
5. Chrobok, supra note 3.
6. Choudhury, supra note 4.
7. An unaccompanied refugee minor ("URM") is a person under the age of eighteen who has
either crossed the border alone or with another child, or who has found himself or herself living in a
foreign country without an adult caregiver. Trafficked children are not synonymous with URMs, but
rather are a subset of URMs. Children on the Move: Protecting Unaccompanied Migrant Children in
South Africa and the Region, SAVE THE CHILDREN UK, 2007, at 8. Throughout this paper, minors from
Zimbabwe who have come to South Africa will be referred to as URMs although, as discussed later,
these minors arguably may not qualify as refugees under international and South African law and may
be more appropriately classified as migrants.
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role as international mediator in the Zimbabwean conflict. Others explain that the
South African government is concerned that increased efforts to recognize and
assist Zimbabwean refugees would strain the country's already overburdened
infrastructure, encourage even more migration to South Africa, and exacerbate
internal tensions around the refugee situation. 9
To the extent that South Africa has responded to the refugee crisis, its focus
has been on the needs of Zimbabwean adults. 10 This article shifts that focus and
argues that South Africa must immediately turn its attention to the plight of the
thousands of unaccompanied minors who have entered the country from
Zimbabwe. Specifically, it advocates for the adoption and implementation of
comprehensive and carefully tailored legislation to protect unaccompanied minors
who enter the country primarily for economic and educational reasons. Enactment
and enforcement of such laws would respond to the immediate crisis of
Zimbabwean unaccompanied minors while providing a sustainable approach for
dealing with similar refugee populations in the future.
Part I of this article provides background information on the circumstances
that have led to the mass migration of unaccompanied minors from Zimbabwe.
Part II examines the life of URMs in South Africa, including barriers and
challenges that prevent them from taking advantage of their rights. Part III
discusses the numerous international and African treaties that apply to URMs. Part
IV focuses on South African domestic law and how it has been interpreted to apply
to political rather than economic refugees. Lastly, Part V offers recommendations
for addressing the plight of Zimbabwean URMs, including proposed legislation
and additional humanitarian aid.
I. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS: WHY DO ZIMBABWEAN URMS COME TO SOUTH
AFRICA?
In 1980, when Zimbabwe gained independence from Great Britain, the
Zimbabwe African National Unity Party ("ZANU-PF") came into power, led by
former political prisoner Robert Mugabe." Mugabe was the Prime Minister until
1987, when he became President after merging the two offices. 12 Despite being a
one-party state, Zimbabwe prospered, benefiting from its long legacy of public
education and commercial farming. In the 1990s, Zimbabwe had the highest
literacy rate in Africa.13
8. FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAMME, RESPONDING TO ZIMBABWEAN MIGRATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA-EVALUATING OPTIONS (2007), available at http://migration.org.za/wp-content/up
loads/2008/03/zimresponses07-11-27.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Interview with Motlalepule Nathane, Social Work Doctoral Candidate, University of
Witswatersrand, School of Human and Community Development: Social Work, in Johannesburg
(March 4, 2009).
11. OneWorld.net, http://uk.oneworld.net/guides/zimbabwe/development.
12. Id.
13. Id; Schools Close as Hordes of Teachers Resign, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=74698.
2010 625
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
In 2000, the Mugabe-led government embarked on a controversial land
reform policy which redistributed over 4,000 white-owned commercial farms to
non-land owners. 14  The land redistribution program led to a collapse of the
fertilizer industry, disruptions in transportation and irrigation systems and a
massive decline in foreign currency, all of which contributed to the current
economic crisis.1 5 The Zimbabwean economy has contracted by 35% since 2005,
while unemployment has soared past 80%.16 Annual inflation rates of 1,700%17
and a serious food shortage make simple household items, such as milk and bread,
too expensive for many families to afford. 1
Zimbabwe's previously vaunted school system has essentially collapsed.
Teacher salaries have fallen to Z$5 million, the equivalent of ten American dollars
per month. 19 These meager salaries have not kept up with inflation, causing many
teachers to seek employment in neighboring countries.20 By the beginning of
2007, over 15,200 teachers had migrated to countries such as South Africa,
Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland. 21  Efforts to replace them with untrained
recruits have failed.22 The combined lack of resources, competent teachers, and
students has resulted in the closing of virtually all public schools.23 Because they
are unable to receive a proper education in Zimbabwe, many children travel to
South Africa for better opportunities. They believe that the school system is the
"best thing" about South Africa, and they want to benefit from it.24
Zimbabwe also lacks the resources to provide its citizens with basic sanitation
and health care. There is a severe lack of clean water for drinking, bathing,
ablution, and food preparation.25 Many people are forced to relieve themselves
outdoors, rather than using the toilets in their homes, thereby contaminating the
existing water supply and leading to serious diarrhea and cholera outbreaks in large
26
portions of the country. Like much of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe is also
afflicted with an HIV and AIDS pandemic. In the country of 13.1 million,
14. Small Scale Farmers Seen as Backbone of Food Security, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (May 15, 2008), http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?
Reportld=78222.
15. Id.
16. OneWorld.net, supra note 11; It Is a Sorry Sight for Zimbabwe but We Pray That Freedom
Will Come', ONEWORLD.NET (March 27, 2007), http://us.oneworld.net/node/147051.
17. OneWorld.net, supra note 11.
18. Id.
19. Schools Close as Hordes of Teachers Resign, supra note 13.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id
23. Id.
24. Children on the Move: Protecting Unaccompanied Migrant Children in South Africa and the
Region, supra note 7, at 18.
25. OneWorld.net, supra note 11.
26. Illness Rises as Desperate Residents Seek Safe Water in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, UNICEF (Nov.
14, 2007), http://www.uniceforg/infobycountry/zimbabwe_41788.html?q-printme.
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approximately 2 million people or 15.6% of the population has HIV or AIDS. 27
While the AIDS population has decreased since 200 1,28 the vastly underfunded
government cannot provide those who still struggle with the disease with the
antiretroviral drugs necessary to keep them healthy.29 Thus, the average life
expectancy in Zimbabwe has dropped below forty years old.30
The land redistribution program marked a change in the reasons that
Zimbabweans travel to South Africa. Previously, they came to visit family,
vacation, and shop and most returned to Zimbabwe voluntarily. 31 Only a small
32fraction crossed the border without official documentation. Unlike today, many
Zimbabweans felt that their country was safer and a better place to raise a family.33
However, since 2000, the majority of Zimbabweans, including unaccompanied
minors, come to South Africa for reasons tied to the economy. Many URMs, like
Moses, come in search of work in order to earn money to send home to their
families.34 Some have lost parents or other caregivers to political violence,
starvation, AIDS, or abandonment.35 Without someone to provide for them in the
chaotic environment of Zimbabwe, they migrate to South Africa where they may
have family and friends to support them3 6 or where they imagine they will have a
"better life."3 7 While some children want to stay in South Africa, many others
want to travel legally and safely to and from Zimbabwe. 38
II. LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR ZIMBABWEAN URMS
Many URMs have lofty expectations of South Africa, but they face many
hardships both crossing the border and surviving in South Africa. The journey
across the Zimbabwe-South Africa border is dangerous for any person, but it is
especially dangerous for URMs. Some children migrate to South Africa by train or
minibus, but the vast majority of URMs walk at least a portion of their journey. 39
While the risk of wild animals and exposure to the elements is undoubtedly a
concern, the greater danger is the risk of exploitation.40 To make themselves less
27. Id.
28. In 2001, 2 6 .1% of the country had AIDS. The decrease in the AIDS population has been
attributed to both mortality and increased public health education. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. David A. McDonald, et al., Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: Migration from Lesotho,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe to South Africa, 34 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 813, 822 (2000).
32. Id. at 824-25.
33. Id. at 826.
34. Chrobok, supra note 3.
35. Interview with Temdai Simom, Resident, Concerned Zimbabwe Campbell Shelter, in Musina,
S. Afr. (Feb. 25, 2009).
36. Choudhury, supra note 4.
37. Interview with Forster Kwangwori, Pastor, Concerned Zimbabwe Citizens Campbell Shelter,
in Musina, S. Afr. (Feb. 25, 2009).
38. Interview with Duncan Breen, Advocacy Officer, Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in
South Africa, in Johannesburg (CoRMSA), S. Afr. (March 6, 2009).
39. Kwangwori, supra note 37.
40. Chrobok, supra note 3.
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visible to the authorities, many URMs use irregular channels of border crossing,41
which makes them more vulnerable to physical or sexual violence, theft, and
muggings. Gumagumas ("scavengers") often wait in the bushes for unsuspecting
travelers.42 The gumagumas will take money in return for guiding URMs across
the border, but then often steal larger sums of money and assault the children.43
On the South African side of the border, "border jumper" gangs may attack the
children and steal whatever cash or valuables they have left.44 In an attempt to
avoid the gumagumas, some children must trade money or sex to malaishas
("human smugglers" or "truck drivers") to assist in their passage into South
Africa.45 Approximately 10% of URMs paid off border guards or police to gain
entry into the country.46 Overall, approximately 40% of children gave some form
of payment to enter South Africa and over one third of URMs experienced some
sort of violence on their way to South Africa.47 The girls are especially vulnerable
to sexual exploitation, whereas the boys are at risk for physical brutality.48
Because the children are undocumented, they rarely report these occurrences to the
authorities for fear of deportation.4
Migrants most often enter from Zimbabwe at Beitbridge, Maroyi, and Dite,
small border towns near Musina, South Africa.o Musina also borders Botswana
and Mozambique.51  Because of its location, it has a history of being a city of
migrant workers.52 The recent instability in Zimbabwe, however, has led to a
dramatic increase in Zimbabwean migrants, overburdening the municipality's
resources.
Once they reach South Africa, URMs encounter a serious shortage of
humanitarian services, employment, and educational opportunity. The South
African government is largely unable and unwilling to provide services for URMs,
and the few locally run shelters lack the capacity to handle the volume of children
41. Migrants' Needs and Vulnerabilities in the Limpopo Province, Republic of South Africa,
International Organization for Migration, Nov.- Dec. 2008, at 3.
42. Id. at 19-20; Children on the Move: Protecting Unaccompanied Migrant Children in South
Africa and the Region, supra note 1, at 15; Kwangwori, supra note 37.
43. Migrants' Needs and Vulnerabilities in the Limpopo Province, Republic of South Africa, supra
note 41, at 19; Children on the Move: Protecting Unaccompanied Migrant Children in South Africa and
the Region, supra note 7, at 15.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 19-20.
48. Kwangwori, supra note 37.
49. Migrants'Needs and Vulnerabilities in the Limpopo Province, Republic ofSouth Africa, supra
note 41, at 20.
50. Kwangwori, supra note 37. Musina is a city of 40,000, located about 17 kilometers from the
Zimbabwe-South Africa border. Zosa De Sas Kropiwnicki, Child Protection Research and Policy
Advisor, Save the Children UK South Africa Programme, World Congress on Sexual Exploitation
(Nov. 25-28, 2008).
51. Zosa De Sas Kropiwnicki, supra note 50.
52. Id.
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who need their services. Moreover, the URMs face hostility not only from the
South African authorities but also from South African citizens.54
One of the constant worries for URMs and other refugees is the risk of
deportation. Even though deportation of unaccompanied minors is illegal under
South African law, 5 overburdened government agencies see no alternative but to
send children back to their native country. In practice, the experience of detention
is most acutely felt by migrants between thirteen and eighteen years old.56 Some
children are arrested when they cross the border or are trying to reach Musina.
The majority, however, are arrested and deported after authorities stop them on the
street and ask for documentation, which they cannot produce.
Lindela, near Johannesburg, and Soutpansberg Military Grounds ("SMG"),
near Musina, are the two most prominent deportation centers in South Africa.59
The conditions at these facilities are substandard, with insufficient toilets and
sleeping quarters to meet the needs of detainees.60 Contrary to South African law,
children are held with adults, further increasing their vulnerability to being
harmed. 61 Despite the time and resources spent on the deportation of minors, the
process is counterproductive; once the children are dropped on the Zimbabwe side
of the border they simply reenter South Africa.62
Although many URMs come to South Africa in the hope of finding work, the
reality is that employment opportunities for minors are very limited because South
African law makes it illegal to employ undocumented workers and/or workers
under the age of eighteen.63 Additionally, South Africa has a 40% unemployment
rate, resulting in fierce competition for the jobs the URMs are seeking. While some
businesses are willing to take the risk of employing URMs, many are not.64
Because the children who obtain a job do so in contravention of South African law,
employers exploit minors by paying them less than market wages.65 A significant
number of URMs take seasonal employment on farms.66 Many of the girls take on
domestic labor, where they are at additional risk for exploitation and sexual
53. Kwangwori, supra note 37; Interview with Georgina Matsaung, Church Mother, Uniting
Reformed Church, in Musina, S. Afr. (Feb. 25, 2009).
54. Kwangwori, supra note 37.
55. See infra note 99.
56. Migrants'Needs and Vulnerabilities in the Limpopo Province, Republic of South Africa, supra
note 41, at 19.
57. Chrobok, supra note 3.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Breen, supra note 38.
61. Id.
62. Chrobok, supra note 3.
63. Breen, supra note 38.
64. Id.
65. Matsaung, supra note 53.
66. Chrobok, supra note 3.
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abuse.67 Because farm and domestic labor are largely out of the public eye, it is
impossible to determine exactly how many URMs are employed in these jobs.68
Some children earn subsistence money through informal means: selling fruits and
vegetables, washing cars, running errands, doing housework, and engaging in the
sex trade. 69 These types of jobs not only compromise children's rights, but expose
them to sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. 0 While most children
want to save money in order to provide for family back home, the majority are
unable to do so because they are barely surviving on their wages.
For many of the children who enter South Africa through Musina, it is not
their intended final destination. The majority hope to make their way to
Johannesburg to find work, but the cost and logistics of travel make that difficult. 72
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") does make an
effort to help URMs contact family members in other parts of South Africa and
provides transportation in an attempt to re-connect families.73 Nevertheless,
UNHCR cannot provide this service to all URMs who need it.
Although URMs list education as the main reason they come to South Africa,
many are disappointed when they arrive.74 Despite a constitutional mandate to
provide education to all children residing in South Africa, school administrators
often impose superficial roadblocks to providing education to Zimbabwean
children. Some principals, for example, require official documentation to enroll in
school-papers which the children do not possess. 76 Others turn away children
because they cannot afford school fees or uniforms. Additionally, South African
schools are already overcrowded, especially in the border areas surrounding
Musina, and therefore are not accepting additional students.' Although some
international organizations, such as the United Nations Children's Fund
("UNICEF"), are planning to erect temporary schools and bringing in additional
teachers, it is a time-consuming and costly enterprise that leaves children without
access to education in the interim. 79 The lucky students who are able to complete
67. Id.
68. Kwangwori, supra note 37.
69. Children on the Move: Protecting Unaccompanied Migrant Children in South Africa and the
Region, supra note 7, at 15-16.
70. Id. at 15.
71. Id. at 16. Only ~50% of URMs who can find work earn R1,000 (approximately $100) per
month; the majority live off of less than R500 per month. Migrants' Needs and Vulnerabilities in the
Limpopo Province, Republic of South Africa, supra note 41, at 19; Children on the Move: Protecting
Unaccompanied Migrant Children in South Africa and the Region, supra note 7, at 13.
72. Nathane, supra note 10.
73. Geddo, supra note 1.
74. Id.
75. S. Aft. Const. Ch. 2, § 29.
76. Matsaung, supra note 53.
77. Id. Children on the Move: Protecting Unaccompanied Migrant Children in South Africa and
the Region, supra, note 7, at 18.
78. Matsaung, supra note 53.
79. Id.; Geddo, supra, note 1.
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secondary school are often unable to continue to the university level because one
must be a South African citizen to be eligible for higher education student loans.s 0
Moreover, many URMs are afraid to enroll in school for fear of making themselves
more visible and thus more vulnerable to deportation.
In 2008, South Africa was hit by a wave of xenophobic attacks against
Zimbabwean refugees, particularly in Johannesburg and Tschwane.8 2 These were
largely targeted at adults and are believed to have been caused by tensions over
competition for jobs and scarce government aid resources.83 Some children have
also experienced xenophobic attacks, especially in the form of arbitrary arrest and
beatings by police officers.84 Zimbabwean URMs additionally confront
xenophobia in the school setting, where they are made to feel different and
unwanted due to language differences and their inability to afford school
uniforms.85 Fortunately, this type of national prejudice has declined as South
Africans grow accustomed to the increased number of Zimbabwean refugees, 6 and
as schools have begun to implement a curriculum on tolerance. 7 Additionally,
Zimbabweans' ability to speak English and Zulu has made them less conspicuous
than other refugee populations and better suited to assimilate into South African
culture.
The plight of children entering South Africa from Zimbabwe has recently
become even more dire. From July 2008 to April 2009, the Musina Showgrounds
served as an informal refugee settlement or camp where Zimbabwean refugees
congregated to sleep, receive minimal services, apply for asylum, and meet others
in a similar position.8 9 The South African government did not sanction the use of
the Showgrounds for this purpose and prohibited the construction of "permanent
structures" such as tents or portable toilets. 90 The government resisted creating a
formal refugee camp because it believed such a facility would attract additional
Zimbabweans to the country.91 As a result, refugees staying at the Showgrounds
slept under the open sky or in makeshift tents created from plastic bags and barbed
80. Nathane, supra note 10.
81. Children on the Move: Protecting Unaccompanied Migrant Children in South Africa and the
Region, supra note 7, at 18.
82. UNICEF Responds to Emergency Needs of Children and Women Affected by Xenophobic
Violence in South Africa, UNICEF (May 27, 2008), http://www.unicef.org/inforbycountrymedia_441
81.html.
83. Many Zimbabweans come with technical and language skills to qualify for coveted positions.
Additionally, because they are in South Africa illegally, they are willing to work for lower wages than
South African workers. Nathane, supra note 10.
84. Chrobok, supra note 3.
8 5. Id.
86. Matsaung, supra note 53.
87. Breen, supra note 38.
88. Interview with Dr. Zosa De Sas Kropiwnicki, Child Protection Research and Policy Advisor,
Save the Children UK, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (March 3, 2009).
89. Chrobok, supra note 3; Choudhury, supra note 4.
90. Choudhury, supra note 4.
91. Breen, supra note 38.
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wire fences and relieved themselves in the bushes. Because there was no formal
policing of the Showgrounds, women and children were especially vulnerable to
sexual violence. The situation became so serious that in November 2008, Save
the Children-United Kingdom ("SCUK") declared Musina an emergency zone.93
Although the government did not provide any humanitarian services to the
Showgrounds, international organizations provided minimal assistance. For
example, Doctors Without Borders provided medical treatment and SCUK
distributed food.94 In response to the dangers of the Showgrounds, SCUK created
"child-friendly spaces" to help serve the needs of mothers and young children.95
These "child-friendly spaces" provided protection from adult males, food, informal
education (with an emphasis on health and life skills), recreational activities, and
assistance in filing asylum papers for the mothers.96 Unfortunately, the spaces
were only open for limited hours from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. and thus did not protect
women and children during the night, when they were most vulnerable.97
Moreover, the Showgrounds were relatively unclean and exposed to the elements.
On March 2, 2009, the South African Department of Home Affairs ("DHA")
ordered the Showgrounds closed and disassembled all semi-permanent structures
without a realistic alternative plan for the refugees. 98 The govermment declared
that those people already in possession of documents would have fourteen days to
travel to the Refugee Reception Office ("RRO") in Johannesburg to renew their
temporary asylum permit or they would face deportation.99 The government
required those without asylum documents, including all URMs, to return to
Zimbabwe to apply for asylum. 00 Even those with documentation lacked the
resources to make the 520-kilometer trek from Musina to Johannesburg, and if
they do make it, it may take several days to reach the front of the queue at the
Johannesburg RRO.o0 Additionally, one cannot apply for asylum from one's
home country, thus asking the refugees to return to Zimbabwe is futile. 102
Therefore, this plan effectively prevents any lawful means of seeking asylum. 103
Without the minimal amount of protection from the Showgrounds, local resources
and shelters are even more strained than previously.
There are currently only two functioning shelters in the Musina area that
provide services to unaccompanied minors, the Uniting Reform Church Shelter1 04
92. Chrobok, supra note 3.
93. Id.
94. Choudhury, supra note 4; Chrobok, supra note 3.
95. Choudhury, supra note 4.
96. Id.
97. Chrobok, supra note 3
98. Breen, supra note 38.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Matsaung, supra note 53.
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and the Concerned Zimbabwe Citizens Campbell Shelter.1 05 While providing ad
hoc support, they are insufficient to provide for all those in need of their services;
the shelters only accept boys and have a limited capacity. 106 Both shelters were
formed by local churches and are funded almost entirely by donations from
congregants. o7 They do not receive government money, and international
organizations only sporadically supply them with items such as blankets and
hygiene products.os The accommodations are sparse: children sleep on dirt floors
and in tents and converted garages. However, this is more protection than they
would be receiving otherwise, and they are also provided food, clothing, and
informal education. Moreover, the shelters are in a double-bind with the
government: they cannot be licensed (and therefore cannot receive money) because
they are substandard, but they cannot receive funds to meet regulations until they
are licensed. 109  Despite their best efforts, those who run the shelters are
consistently on the brink of collapse due to insufficient funding.
The problems minors face is further exacerbated by the fact that the provincial
and municipal governments, the organizations bearing the brunt of the financial
burden of attending to the refugees, are severely overextended and underfunded.
Musina, the city most severely impacted by the influx of Zimbabwean refugees,
only has five social workers to help provide services and documentation for the
refugees and adult-asylum seekers. 110 Any attempt to provide food or shelter is
taken on by international relief organizations or local privately-run shelters. These
services are irregular and do not provide for all of those in need nor a sustainable
solution to the problem.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL AND AFRICAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR URMs
South Africa has signed numerous international treaties pertaining to the
rights of URMs. The current situation of URMs living in South Africa, however,
demonstrates that these laws are not being enforced in a way that affords children
the broad spectrum of rights to which they are entitled.
South Africa is a signatory to four key international and continental treaties
that affect URMs: the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("UN Refugee Convention"), the Organization of African Unity
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa ("OAU
Convention on Refugees"), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child ("UNCRC"), and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
105. Kwangwori, supra note 37.
106. The Uniting Reform Church Shelter has a maximum capacity of 150. Matsaung, supra note
53. The Concerned Zimbabwe Citizens Campbell Shelter has a capacity of 20. Kwangwori, supra note
37.
107. Matsaung, supra note 53; Kwangwori, supra note 37.
108. Matsaung, supra note 53.
109. Geddo, supra note 1. In order to be licensed, shelters must demonstrate adequate measures of
safety and inhabitability. Once the government licenses a shelter, the government provides funding to
the shelter, to be used for food, bedding, hygiene, and other necessary services.
110. Id.
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("ACRWC").
The traditional definition of "refugee" under international law is contained in
the UN Refugee Convention. According to that instrument, a person must meet
four criteria to be considered a refugee: the person (1) must be outside his or her
country of origin, (2) must have a well-founded fear of persecution, (3) based on
either race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group or
political opinion, and (4) must be unwilling or unable to avail himself or herself to
the protection of the country of origin for fear of persecution.111 An additional
provision is that one would lose his or her refugee status upon return to the country
of origin.112
A critique of the UN Refugee Convention is that its narrow definition of
refugee does not capture the situation faced by many African refugees, whose
circumstances are a product of ethnic or tribal conflicts, socioeconomic
breakdown, and natural disasters such as famine.113 For that reason, the drafters of
the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugees chose to define refugee in broader terms
and gave African refugees greater rights than those provided by the UN Refugee
Convention. 114 The OAU Convention on Refugees defines a refugee as any person
compelled to leave his or her country "owing to external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either a part or
the whole of his country of origin or nationality."15 The OAU Convention on
Refugees also provides a general right to asylum,1 16 a right to be housed in a
refugee settlement,' 17 and a right to mandatory issuance of travel documents."
Additionally, it states that refugees will not lose their refugee or asylum status by
merely returning to their country of origin.119
Although the OAU Convention on Refugees provides a broader definition to
account for the African context, it lacks some of the important provisions
contained in the UN Convention on Refugees. For example, the OAU Convention
on Refugees does not provide a right to education, housing, and health care. 120 The
drafters of the OAU Convention on Refugees recognized that many African
countries lack the resources to even provide their own citizens with such services
let alone refugees from other countries.121
111. Emmanuel Opoku, Refugee Movements in Africa and the OAU Convention on Refugees, 39 J.
OF AFR. L. 79, 80 (1995). South Africa acceded to the OAU Convention in 1994. Id.
112. Id. at 82.
113. Id., at 79.
114. Id. at 80.
115. Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa art. 1(2), Sept. 6-10, 1969 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at art. II.
117. Id.
118. Id. at art. VI.
119. Id. at art. V(4).
120. Opoku, supra note 111, at 84.
121. Id.
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The UNCRC also contains general and specific provisions that are relevant to
the situation of URMs in South Africa. 122 First, the UNCRC's provisions apply to
all children, not just children who are citizens of the country where they are
physically located.123 The UNCRC provides that the best interests of the child
must be the primary consideration "in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies."124 Other provisions guarantee a
child's right of identity and documentation1 25 and a right to "special protections
and assistance by the state for any child temporarily or permanently deprived of his
or her family environment." 126
Article 22 of the UNCRC applies specifically to refugee children, including
unaccompanied minors. 12 7  It states that unaccompanied minors shall "receive
appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance,"1 28 and that unaccompanied
refugee children "shall be accorded the same protections as any other child
temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family." 129 Those rights include
the right to an adequate standard of living, 130 the right to a free, compulsory
primary education, 13 1 the right to be protected from economic exploitation and
child labor,132 the right to protection against sexual exploitation,13 3 and the freedom
from arbitrary arrest and detention. 13 4
Much like the UNCRC, the ACRWC enumerates a broad spectrum of rights
to which unaccompanied children are entitled without regard to citizenship,135 and
mandates that "in all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or
authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration." 3 6 The
ACRWC entitles children to virtually the same rights as the UNCRC, namely the
right to an identity, 13 7 the right to free, compulsory education,138 the right to health
services,13 9 the right to protection against economic exploitation, 14 0 and the right to
122. The UNCRC was adopted in 1989 and put into force in 1990. South Africa acceded to the
CRC in 1996. Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Children's Rights in the South African Courts: An Overview Since
Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 137 (2002).
123. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. II, Nov. 20, 1989.
124. Id. at art. III.
125. Id. at art. VIII(1).
126. Id. at art. XX(1).
127. Id. at art. XXII(1).
128. Id.
129. Id. at art. XXII(2).
130. Id. at art. XXVII.
131. Id. at art. XXVIII.
132. Id. at art. XXXII.
133. Id. at art. XXXIV.
134. Id. at art. XXXVII.
135. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. III, 1990.
136. Id. at art. IV.
137. Id. at art. VI.
138. Id. at art. XI.
139. Id. at art. XIV.
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protection against physical and sexual abuse or exploitation. 141 Article 23 of
ACRWC specifically addresses the rights of refugee children, including
unaccompanied minors, and uses the same phraseology as the UNCRC; refugee
children shall "receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance,"1 42 and
an unaccompanied refugee minor "shall be accorded the same protections as any
other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his family environment for any
reason." 143 The ACRWC goes further than the UNCRC, however, by specifying
that children may be considered refugees if they are displaced "through natural
disaster, internal armed conflicts, civil strife, breakdown of economic and social
order or howsoever caused."1 44  Due to the current chaos in Zimbabwe, the
"breakdown of economic and social order" provision includes the Zimbabwean
URMs within ACRWC's definition of refugees entitled to specific rightS. 145
IV. DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR URMS IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa's domestic legal framework provides various avenues by which
Zimbabwean unaccompanied minors can achieve legal status, be protected from
abuse and exploitation, and receive humanitarian assistance and services.
Specifically, the South African Constitution, Immigration Act, 13 of 2002 (as
amended by Act 19 of 2004), the Refugees Act, 130 of 1998 (as amended by Act
33 of 2008), and the Children's Act, 38 of 2005 (as amended by Act 41 of 2007)
all contain provisions that would allow for the protection of Zimbabwean URMs
within South Africa. 146
A. South African Constitution
After the end of apartheid in South Africa, the drafters of South Africa's new
Constitution deliberately provided for a broad range of human and civil rights.
The Preamble of the South African Constitution states, "We, the people of South
Africa . . . believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our
diversity."14 7 Moreover, Article 9 of the Constitution states, "Everyone is equal
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law." 148 The
word "citizen" is notably absent, thereby providing a strong argument that non-
citizens, including URMs, are entitled to the protections and rights provided in the
Constitution. These rights include the right to adequate housing, 14 9 the right to
140. Id. at art. XV.
141. Id. at art. XVI.
142. Id. at art. XXVIII(1).
143. Id. at art. XXVIII(2).
144. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. XXVIII(4).
145. Id.
146. Immigration Act 13 of 2002; Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004; Refugees Act 130 of
1998; Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008; Children's Act 38 of 2005; Children's Amendment Act 41
of 2007.
147. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, Preamble.
148. Id. at ch. 2, art. IX, § 1.
149. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, art. XXVI, § 1.
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health services and social assistance, 150 the right to education,1 5 1 and the freedom
from arbitrary arrest and detention. 152 These provisions imply that the South
African government will provide humanitarian services for those in need.153
Drafters of South Africa's Constitution took the provisions of the UNCRC
into special account, including many of the same rights set out in international law.
Section 28 constitutionalized nine of the UNCRC's most important provisions,
including the mandate that the child's best interests be of primary importance in
every matter concerning the child. 154 Moreover, Sections 39(1) and 39(2) require
that South African courts and legal forums to consider international law, including
treaties, when interpreting the Bill of Rights.1 5
B. Other Domestic Laws Impacting URMs
In addition to the South African Constitution, the Immigration Act, Refugees
Act, and Children's Act provide provisions for the protection of URMs. On first
review, the Immigration Act takes a restrictive approach to addressing the issue of
foreigners within the borders of South Africa by laying out its purpose of securing
the country's borders. In contrast, the Refugees Act, on its face, should guarantee
URMs full legal protection under South African law, including adequate housing,
education, access to health care, public relief, and assistance. The Refugees Act
references the Children's Act, which provides the procedures by which URMs can
recognize the full realization of these rights. However, in practice, the
Immigration Act (not the Refugees and Children's Act) potentially provides the
greatest amount of protection and relief for Zimbabwean URMs in South Africa
under a provision allowing for the grant of permanent residency rights. The
efficacy of this provision to alleviate the current situation in South Africa
necessarily depends on the government's full implementation of it.
1. Immigration Act
The post-apartheid government of South Africa replaced the Aliens Control
Act of 1991 with the Immigration Act of 2002 in order to align the country's
immigration policies and practices with the government's objectives of
tolerance.156 The Act became effective in 2003 and was subsequently amended in
150. Id. at ch. 2, art. XXVII, § 1.
151. Id. at ch. 2, art. XXIX, § 1.
152. Id. at ch. 2, art. XXV. In Lawyers for Human Rights v. Minister of Home Affairs, the
Constitutional Court held that when the South African Constitution limits rights to only citizens, it
clearly expresses that limitation. Therefore, because the Constitution did not specifically reserve the
aforementioned rights for citizens, all those living within South African borders are entitled to them.
Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2003 (8) BCLR 891
(CC) at 13-14 (S. Aft.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/12.html.
153. Breen, supra note 38.
154. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, art. XXVIII; Julia Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 122 at 139.
155. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, art. XXXIX; Sloth-Nielsen, supra, note 122. All of the aforementioned
provisions of the South African Constitution are part of the South African Bill of Rights.
156. Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991; Immigration Act 13 of 2002.
2010 637
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
2004.5 Unlike the Aliens Control Act, the intended purpose of the Immigration
Act of 2002 was to facilitate and encourage temporary skilled labor migration.158
The Immigration Amendment Act of 2004 included the promising goals of
preventing and countering xenophobia, promoting a "human rights based culture of
enforcement," complying with international obligations, and educating civil
society "on the rights of foreigners and refugees."1 59  Nevertheless, the post-
apartheid government maintains a restrictionist and anti-immigration approach to
foreigners due to "the imperatives of nation-building, job protection for South
Africans and rampant intolerance of outsiders, bordering on xenophobia."160
Although the Immigration Amendment Act focuses on controlling and securing
South Africa's borders and providing for the strict regulation of the admission to,
residence in, and departure of foreign persons, the Act does provide protective
provisions, which can be applied to the situation of Zimbabwean URMs.
The Immigration Amendment Act of 2004 defines a "foreigner" as an
individual who is not a citizen, and an "illegal foreigner" as an individual who is in
South Africa in contravention of the Act, or in other words, without a legal
permit. 162  The applicable regulation for asylum seekers is Section 23, which
provides for an asylum transit permit. 163  This section, in theory, provides
protection for up to fourteen days for those who enter the country and qualify for
refugee status, but do not yet have legal documentation in South Africa. 164 Section
23 does not require, but rather allows the Director-General of the DHIA to issue an
asylum permit to a person who "at a port of entry claims to be an asylum
seeker."1 65 If the individual does not report to one of the five RROs to apply for
asylum under Section 21 of the Refugees Act by the expiration of the fourteen day
asylum transit permit, then the individual is automatically classified as an "illegal
157. Due to the 2002 Act being largely inconsistent with stated government goals and policies,
President Thabo Mbeki directed the Ministry of Home Affairs to amend the Act to make it easier for
skilled migrants to enter the country. The Immigration Amendment Act No. 19 of 2004 became
effective on July 1, 2005 with the publication of the new Immigration Regulations. See Jonathan Crush
& Vincent Williams, "International Migration and Development: Dynamics and Challenges in South
and Southern Africa," United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and
Development, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations
Secretariat, New York, July 6-8, 2005, 24; HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KEEP YOUR HEAD DOWN:
UNPROTECTED MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (2007).
158. Crush & Williams, supra note 157. The purpose of the Aliens Control Act No. 95 of 1991
was "to provide for the control of the admission of persons to, their residence in, and their departure
from, the Republic; and for matters connected therewith." Aliens Control Act 95 of 1991.
159. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 Preamble.
160. Crush & Williams, supra note 157.
161. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004.
162. Id. at s. 1.
163. Id. at s. 23.
164. Id. at s. 23(1).
165. Id. The Act in relevant part states that "The Director-General may issue an asylum transit
permit to a person who at a port of entry claims to be an asylum seeker, which permit shall be valid for
a period of 14 days only." Id. (emphasis added).
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foreigner" under the Immigration Act. 166
In order to more efficiently address the number of Zimbabwean nationals
entering South Africa, the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
("CORMSA") along with numerous other non-governmental and humanitarian
organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have called for the implementation
of Section 31(2)(b) of the Immigration Act.167 Section 31(2)(b) allows for a
ministerial exemption from the standard permit requirements under the
Immigration Act. 168  The exemption applies to specific groups of foreigners as
designated by the Minister of Home Affairs and would provide the necessary legal
basis to respond to the situation of URMs and Zimbabwean nationals in South
Africa. 16 9 If "special circumstances" exist, then the Minister of Home Affairs may
"grant a foreigner or a category of foreigners the rights of permanent residence for
a specified or unspecified period" of time. 170 Advocates argue that the unique
situation and push factors for Zimbabwean unaccompanied minors should qualify
as a "special circumstance."171 If granted permanent resident status, Zimbabwean
unaccompanied minors would possess "all the rights, privileges, duties and
obligations of a citizen" except for those which the Constitution or other law
"explicitly ascribes to citizenship."172
The Minister is given substantial discretion under the Act to implement this
provision under his or her own "terms and conditions."1 73  Specifically, the
Minister can:
(i) Exclude one or more identified foreigners from such categories; and
(ii) For good cause, withdraw such rights from a foreigner or a category
of foreigners1 74
Additionally, the Minister has the power to "waive any prescribed
requirement or form" and to "withdraw an exemption granted by him or her" under
166. Id. at s. 23. The five RROs are located in Pretoria, Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and
Crown Mines. The government opened up an additional RRO on July 12, 2008 in Musina to handle the
large influx of Zimbabweans entering the country, but recently in March 2009 announced the closure of
this office. Breen, supra note 38.
167. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 s. 31(2)(b); CONSORTIUM FOR REFUGEES AND
MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA [hereinafter "CORMSA"], REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ON THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN MUSINA, SOUTH AFRICA 12 (2009);
Breen, supra note 38.
168. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 s. 31(2)(b).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Breen, supra note 38.
172. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 s. 25(1). In Lawyers for Human Rights & Another v.
Minister of Home Affairs & Another, the court stressed that illegal foreigners at the port of entry are
entitled to the protections of the Constitution stating "when the Constitution intends to confine rights to
citizens it says so." Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another,
supra note 152.
173. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 s. 31(2).
174. Id. at s. 31(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
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Section 31 provided that he or she can demonstrate good cause.1 7 5
Recognizing the potential for this Section to apply to the current situation of
Zimbabweans in South Africa, DHA has indicated that once it receives funding
from the Treasury it will begin issuing Section 31(2)(b) permits. 176 The permits
will provide legal status for a temporary interim during the humanitarian crisis in
Zimbabwe and will grant similar rights as a Section 22 asylum seeker permit,
including the right to work and study and the right to access health care.1 77 The
permits, however, will not provide Zimbabweans the right to housing or the right
to access social grants.s17  Furthermore, the government will allow the permit to
serve as a travel document for migration between South Africa and Zimbabwe. 179
All Zimbabwean nationals who plan on remaining in South Africa for longer than
one month may apply for the permit, but URMs have yet to be granted the right to
apply on their own without the appointment of a guardian.8 o
Advantages and Drawbacks: Implications of the Immigration Act
Despite advocates' support for the implementation of Section 31(2)(b), the
application of the Immigration Amendment Act may have unintended
ramifications. As the purpose of the Immigration Act is to control and secure the
South African borders, numerous provisions serve to restrict the rights of persons
without legal documentation in South Africa. First, the Act allows for the
automatic deportation of all persons who an Immigration Officer has reasonable
suspicion to believe to be an illegal foreigner. 18 1 This appears to conflict with the
Immigration Regulations of June 2005 which provide that unaccompanied minors
are not subject to detention and make it illegal to deport such minors without
regard to the procedural processes under the Children's Act of 2007.182
The Immigration Amendment Act forbids the employment and education of
persons classified as "illegal foreigners," effectively eliminating the pull factors for
175. Id. at s. 31(2)(c)-(d).
176. Breen, supra note 38.
177. CONSORTIUM FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA [hereinafter "CORMSA"],
SECTION 31(2)(B) PERMITS FOR ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL'S IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 (2009). The Minister
has yet to decide whether to issue the permits for 6 or 12 months from the date of issue. In either
instance, the Minister has the power to extend the length of validity and announce its expiry once he has
determined that the situation in Zimbabwe is sufficiently stable for Zimbabweans to return. Although
providing temporary legal status, the permits will not constitute amnesty. Id. at 1-3.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 s. 34. Lawyers for Human Rights challenged the
constitutionality of parts of Section 34 in the Pretoria High Court and sought confirmation in the
Constitutional Court of the High Court's order with respect to those provisions that the High Court ruled
to be unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court established the reasonable suspicion standard. Lawyers
for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another, supra note 152, at 19; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 157.
182. Children's Amendment Act 41 of 2007; JULIA WILLAND, IMMIGRATION LAWS SOUTH AFRICA
10 (Ritztrade 2005).
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Zimbabwean unaccompanied minors.18 3 Moreover, the Act forbids employers to
hire illegal foreigners, 184 making it an offense, punishable by a fine or
imprisonment.1 85  The Act also prohibits learning institutions from "knowingly"
teaching "illegal foreigners."186 It is a crime to aid and abet "illegal foreigners,"
although South Africans and NGOs can provide humanitarian assistance to
187
undocumented persons. Lastly, the Act encourages the harassment of suspected
persons in the country without legal documentation because it permits police and
immigration officers to request a form of identification on demand and requires
individuals to produce documentation demonstrating they are legally permitted in
the country.188
Although the Minister can issue asylum transit permits under Section 23 of
the Act, this section is essentially inapplicable to unaccompanied minors as it
requires children to have a legal guardian. 189 Additionally, (as discussed above in
Part II) many unaccompanied minors cross and re-cross the South Africa-
Zimbabwe border, and Musina security officials frequently illegally detain and
deport the children.190 Under the Immigration Amendment Act, the children
should therefore be classified as "prohibited persons," disqualifying them from
obtaining a visa or a temporary or permanent residence permit or entering the
country in the future. 191 The Act also grants broad power to the Director-General
of the DIIA to declare a group of persons "undesirable." 192  Classification as
"undesirable persons," which includes "anyone who is or is likely to become a
public charge," also prohibits the group of persons from obtaining a visa or a
temporary or permanent residence permit or entering the country. 193
Despite these restrictive provisions, South African courts have interpreted the
Act in positive light, favoring foreigners. In Lawyers for Human Rights v. Minister
of Home Affairs, the Court dealt with the issue of the detainment and deportation
of persons classified as "illegal foreigners" and their procedural rights under the
Constitution. 19 4 The Court acknowledged that "the very fabric of our society and
the values embodied in our Constitution could be demeaned if the freedom and
dignity of illegal foreigners are violated in the process of preserving our national
integrity." 195 Moreover, the Court recognized that these persons who are not
183. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004.
184. Id. at s. 38(1); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 157.
185. Immigration Act 13 of 2002 s. 49; Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 s. 45; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 157.
186. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 s. 39.
187. Id. at s. 42.
188. Id. at s. 41.
189. Id. at s. 23.
190. Breen, supra note 38.
191. Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 s. 29.
192. Id. at s. 30.
193. Id.
194. Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 157.
195. Id. at 13-14.
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entitled to a "large variety of residence permits" under the Immigration Act are
vulnerable and poor without support systems, family, friends or acquaintances in
South Africa, and they also may have limited knowledge of the South African legal
system, laws, policies, and values. 196
Despite these potential unintended ramifications, the government and
Minister of Home Affairs has recently taken positive steps by stating their intent to
implement Section 31(2)(b). Nonetheless, the government has not yet expressed
its intent to allow URMs to apply for these permits without a guardian, which
substantially limits the utility of the Act and their ability to apply and have access
to the full realization of their rights under South African law.
2. Refugees Act
The Refugees Act, as amended in 2008, seeks to protect children and adults
who have been compelled to leave their countries of origin as a result of a well-
founded fear of persecution, violence, or conflict. 197 The stated purpose of the Act
is:
To give effect within the Republic of South Africa to the relevant
international legal instruments, principles and standards relating to
refugees; to provide for the reception into South Africa of asylum
seekers; to regulate application for and recognition of refugee status; to
provide for the rights and obligations flowing from such status; and to
provide for matters connected therewith. 198
Contrary to the aims of the Immigration Act, the Refugees Act prohibits
persons to be refused entry into South Africa, expelled, extradited or returned to
another country if that individual falls into one of two categories. 199 While many
contend that the Refugees Act is not applicable to unaccompanied minors from
Zimbabwe due to their unique reasons for entering South Africa, arguably, under
Section 2 of the Refugees Act, South Africa should be prohibited from refusing
entry, expelling, extraditing, or returning these minors to their country of origin.200
196. Id. at 14.
197. In reviewing the applicable provisions of the Refugees Amendment Act, it is necessary to
have an understanding of the similarities and differences between a refugee, asylum seeker, and
migrant. Traditionally, the international community has recognized a refugee as a "person facing
political persecution or discrimination on social, racial, religious, and political grounds from his or her
own government." Siobhan Ciara Neveling, Implementing the Immigration Act: A Cause of or
Hindrance to Xenophobia in South Africa (June 2005) (unpublished M.A. in Politics dissertation,
University of Johannesburg) (on file with author). An asylum seeker on the other hand is a refugee
whose asylum claim has not yet been examined to determine whether his or her fear of persecution is
genuine. Id. at 17. Lastly, migrants are persons that move across borders, in and out of a country mainly
for work, and most do not want permanent residency in South Africa. Id. at 18.
198. Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008.
199. Id.
200. Interview with Ingrid Palmary, Coordinator & Senior Researcher, Forced Migration Studies
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The applicable provision states that an individual cannot be returned to his or her
country of origin if it would result in "his or her life, physical safety or freedom
[to] be threatened on account of . . other events seriously disturbing public order
in a part or the whole of that country." 201 Therefore, Zimbabwean unaccompanied
minors qualify for refugee status because "owing to . . . other events seriously
disturbing public order in either a part or the whole" of Zimbabwe has "compelled
[the minors] to leave [their] place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in"
South Africa.202 However, should a URM choose to return to Zimbabwe, his or
her qualification for refugee status ceases.203
Similar to Section 31(2)(b) of the Immigration Act, the Refugees Act grants
the Minister to enact additional regulations "relating to a large scale influx of
asylum seekers into South Africa."204 Therefore, the Minister has the power to
create additional regulations that would more adequately protect the rights of
Zimbabwean URMs.
The Refugees Act outlines general procedures in which asylum seekers can
obtain refugee status and allows for a separate process by which URMs can seek
asylum in South Africa. The general procedures require an application for asylum
to be made in person at a Refugee Reception Office.205 Upon application, a
Refugee Reception Officer will conduct an interview of the applicant, and then the
applicant will be issued with an asylum seeker's permit under Section 22 of the
Act, allowing them to reside in South Africa temporarily.206 The role of the
Refugee Reception Officer is to inspect the forms and assist in accurately filling
them out.20 7  The application will then be referred to a Refugee Reception
Determination Officer who will hold a hearing and make a ruling on the
application.208 Under Section 22 of the Refugees Act, the Refugee Reception
Determination Officer must issue a temporary permit to all asylum seekers
allowing them to remain in the country legally while the decision of their Section
21 refugee application is pending.209 The Act does not enumerate a specified time
period for which the temporary permit is valid; however, it was the practice of the
DHA to issue the permits for 6 months.2 10 Depending on the amount of time
before a decision is made on their application, the Act requires the permit to be
extended "from time to time."211
Programme, University of Witswatersrand, in Pretoria, South Africa (Mar. 4, 2009).
201. Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 s. 2(b) (emphasis added).
202. Id. at s. 3(b)
203. Id. at s. 5.
204. Id. at s. 38.
205. Id. at s. 21.
206. Id. at s. 21-22.
207. Id. at s. 21.
208. Id.
209. Id. at s. 15.
210. Palmary, supra note 200.
211. Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 s. 22(a)(3). In effect, applicants can remain in South
Africa until the Refugee Service Determination Officer has reached a decision in the case. Id.
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a. URM Rights under the Refugees Act
Under the Refugees Act, URMs are guaranteed the full legal protections
including those under Chapter 2 of the Constitution: adequate housing, education,
21
access to health care, public relief, and assistance.212 Furthermore, they are granted
identity documents, the right to employment and education, the right to remain in
the country pending finalization of their refugee application, the right to have
asylum applications adjudicated in a manner that is lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair, which includes the right to appeal a negative decision on an
asylum claim, and the right to freedom of movement and against unlawful arrest or
detainment.213 Specifically with respect to children, detention should be used as a
last resort for the shortest possible period of time taking into consideration family
unity and the best interests of the child.214 Furthermore, when detained, conditions
must be consistent with human dignity, and URMs should be granted legal
representation in refugee proceedings.215 The Refugees Amendment Act restricts
the rights granted to an unaccompanied minor under the Refugees Act. The Act
limits the protections guaranteed under the Constitution to those rights not
exclusively granted to citizens and further eliminated the provision that entitled
refugees to "the same basic health services and basic primary education which the
inhabitants of the Republic receive from time to time."216 As previously stated,
however, these rights are still guaranteed under the South African Bill of Rights. 2 17
b. Reference to the Children's Act
In regards to unaccompanied minors, the Refugees Amendment Act of 2008
requires the government to issue a Section 22 asylum permit to an unaccompanied
child "who is found under circumstances that clearly indicate that he or she is an
asylum seeker and a child in need of care as contemplated in the Children's
Act."218 Furthermore, this child must be brought before the Children's Court and
dealt with under the provisions of the Children's Act.
Under the Refugees Amendment Act, unaccompanied minors should be
granted the same legal mechanisms of protection as national children of South
Africa. In 2005, the Pretoria High Court affirmed the application of the
Constitution and Child Act of 1983 to unaccompanied minors.2 19 The case of
Centre for Child Law and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2005
212. S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
213. Child Rights Information Network, A Legal Analysis of South Africa's Implementation of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRIN, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.crin.
org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=15447.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Refugees Act 130 of 1998 s. 27(g); Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 s. 21-22.
217. S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
218. Id. at s. 21(A).
219. Centre for Child Law & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2005 (6) SA 50 (T) (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.childlawsa.com/case_04.html.
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(6) SA 50 (T) 220 further "entrenched the principle that government departments"
cannot "without due process detain and deport unaccompanied foreign children
from South Africa."221 Judge Annemarie de Vos also noted that the "lofty ideals"
of South Africa's Constitution become "hypocritical nonsense" if the government
fails to make them a reality.222 Although advocates view the importance of this
case as "remov[ing] any doubt that may have existed about the fact that
unaccompanied foreign children should be dealt with under the provisions of the
Child Care Act," the High Court of Pretoria only has jurisdiction over all matters
within its geographical area, the Transvaal Provincial Division, and the case was
decided based on the old Child Act of 1983.223 Nonetheless, the High Court's
ruling served to reaffirm what the Refugees Amendment Act already requires in
the case of unaccompanied minors.224
Thus, if an unaccompanied minor is found in need of care, then, similar to a
South African child, the minor "must be placed in a place of safety, his or her
personal circumstances investigated by a social worker and a Children's Court
221inquiry opened, conducted and finalized" in accordance with the Children's Act.
Chapter 9 of the Children's Act gives the procedures and safeguards required
in dealing with a child in need of care and protection.226 The Act outlines several
circumstances in which a child may be found to be in need of care. With respect to
URMs, they may qualify under a number of circumstances including: being
abandoned or orphaned without visible means of support; living or working on the
streets; being exploited or living in circumstances that expose them to exploitation;
or living in or being exposed to circumstances that may harm their physical,
mental, or social well-being. 27
If the child is suspected to be in need of care, a social worker will be
appointed to the child and the case will be referred to the Children's Court for a
determination of whether the child meets the requirements of Section 150(1).228 In
the interim before the court holds a hearing and makes a ruling, the court may
order that the child:
(i) remain in temporary safe care at the place where the child is kept; (ii)
be transferred to another place in temporary safe care; (iii) remain with
220. Id.
221. Lawyers for Human Rights, Deportation of Foreign Unaccompanied Children from South
Africa, http://www.lhr.org.za/case/deportation-foreign-unaccompanied-children-south-africa.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. The judge also found that the government has a duty to work with one another in order to
enact and implement "practical arrangements for unaccompanied foreign minors in South Africa." Id.
225. Id.
226. Children's Act 38 of 2005.
227. Id. at s. 105(1).
228. Under Section 155, prior to the child being brought before the Children's Court a social
worker must investigate the case and within 90 days complete a report stating whether the child is in
need of care. Id. at s. 155.
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the person under whose control the child is; (iv) be put under the control
of a family member or other relative of the child; or (v) be placed in
temporary safe care.229
If the Court determines that the child is in need of care, then the court can
place the child in foster care, temporary safe care pending adoption, shared care, or
210
a youth care centre.
Under the amended provisions of the Children's Act, alternative care is
defined as a placement in foster care, child and youth care centre, or drop-in
centre.231 Children are prohibited from leaving their placement without permission
and are prohibited from leaving the country.232 This causes conflicts with the goals
of Zimbabwean URMs because of their frequent migration back to Zimbabwe to
visit family or bring money home (as previously discussed in Part II).
c. Advantages and Disadvantages: Implications of the Refugees Act
Despite the legal framework for providing a process by which Zimbabwean
unaccompanied minors can obtain legal status within South Africa, the
implementation of the Refugees Act has had numerous shortcomings which have
left the children unprotected and vulnerable. Unaccompanied minors face
numerous barriers to obtaining asylum including: being prevented from lodging
claims, failing to have their claims fairly adjudicated, failing to have their rights
respected, and continually facing arbitrary arrest, detention, and unlawful
deportation.
The initial hurdle in obtaining asylum involves the lack of knowledge of
South African laws and policies. Unaccompanied minors are not adequately
informed of the laws and do not understand the possible ramifications of obtaining
asylum, non-governmental and humanitarian organizations interpret the laws
inconsistently, and the government has implemented the laws in a piecemeal and
inadequate fashion.233 In addition, under the very narrow interpretation of the
Refugees Act (initially taken by the DHA and government), only a limited
proportion of the children who have experienced individual political persecution
were seen to qualify for asylum.234 Considering the majority of the children from
Zimbabwe come for economic reasons and educational endeavors, their
229. Id. at 155(6)(i)-(v).
230. Id. at s. 156(1)(e).
231. Children's Amendment Act 41 of 2007 ch. 11.
232. Id.
233. Breen, supra note 38.
234. The Refugee Directorate stated that "The influx [in asylum seekers] observed throughout 2006
suggested that a massive population of people seeking asylum might increase in years to come although
the majority are economic migrants as most of their claims are not aligned with the basic principles for
asylum." THE FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAMME [hereinafter "FMSP"], BARRIERS TO
AsYLUM: THE MARABASTAD REFUGEE RECEPTION OFFICE 17 (Darshan Vigneswaran ed., 2008).
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applications would be immediately denied.
However, as a result of the number of Zimbabwean unaccompanied minors in
the border town of Musina and pressure from NGOs, the government did
temporarily allow these minors to apply for refugee status.235 With the help of
UNICEF and UNHCR, Zimbabwean minors were allowed to apply for asylum at
the Showgrounds in Musina. This raised confidentiality and privacy concerns
given the location and the number of asylum seekers seen each day.236
When applying for asylum, unaccompanied minors face the additional barrier
of needing a legally appointed guardian. Although the DHA required the children
to have a guardian, they failed to recognize the Department of Social Development
("DSD") social workers as such, in contravention of the Children's Act.23 7 This
resulted in unaccompanied minors "effectively being denied access to asylum and
documentation."238 In Musina, however, SCUK had stepped in to act as the
guardian for these children, and the government seemed to be accepting this
procedure despite any legal provision allowing a government agency to act as the
guardian. 23 9 This has further implications as to whether SCUK would then be
legally responsible for providing for the care and protection of the child throughout
the process as well as after the child has gained refugee status. 2 40
Additionally, asylum seekers lack access to the RROs, delaying the process of
initiating their claims. In a 2008 study conducted by the Forced Migration Studies
Programme, researchers found the procedural issues at RROs and a lack of
communication between applicants and the DHA were the key barriers for asylum
seekers in obtaining refugee status.24 1 Although all persons have the right to apply
for asylum and have their application fairly considered under the Refugees Act,
gaining physical access to RROs remains an impediment in the process. 242 There
are groups of 5,000 per day at the RRO in Pretoria, which can only handle about
350 applications a day.243 On average, a person would need to return to the
Pretoria RRO three times, waiting approximately twenty-two days, in order to
enter the actual office, and by this time their asylum seeker transit permit would
have expired.2 " Once an individual gains access to an RRO, they face an
indeterminate amount of time before their application will be reviewed and a
decision issued.245 Therefore, even if the minors coming from Zimbabwe are
235. Chrobok, supra note 3; Geddo, supra note 1.
236. SCUK, UNICEF, & INT'L RESCUE COMMITTEE, CHILD PROTECTION RAPID ASSESSMENT
MUSINA MUNICIPALITY LIMPOPO PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA (2008).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Choudhury, supra note 4.
240. Geddo, supra note 1.
241. FMSP, supra note 234, at 2.
242. Palmary, supra note 200.
243. SCUK, UNICEF, & INT'L RESCUE COMMITTEE, supra note 236.
244. FMSP, supra note 234, at 9.
245. Of the 44,000 applications filed in November 2007 only 1,000 were granted and 9,000 were
rejected, resulting in 34,000 applications still pending. FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAMME,
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aware they can apply for refugee status and arrive at an RRO with a guardian, they
are unlikely to actually obtain legal documentation.
If an unaccompanied minor files a refugee claim and obtains a temporary
permit under Section 22 of the Refugees Act, the permit is only valid for six
months.246 Therefore, the child would be required to return to an RRO after five
months with the same legal guardian who accompanied them in the initial
application in order to renew the temporary permit. However, this entire process
could be circumvented if the government implemented the procedures under the
Children's Act, necessitating that a Section 22 permit automatically be issued and
the case be referred to the Children's Court.
There is also a question as to whether refugee status would in fact improve the
situation of Zimbabwean unaccompanied minors in South Africa. While the
minors would be granted legal status, eliminating any "fear of deportation and
allow[ing] them to settle and move freely within the country," and facilitate their
access to services, the Refugees Act disallows the minors to return to Zimbabwe,
which many of them desire to do.247 Additionally, service providers and the DSD
are already underfunded and short-staffed; therefore, the minors' rights and
services may never be realized.2 48  Technically, under the South African
Constitution, these children should have access to health care and education,
however, as discussed above this is not happening. With the government's
changing policies, the recent closure of the Showgrounds and the continual
deportations, any previous effort to document the URMs has become futile and a
waste of resources.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS
Based on the dire situation facing Zimbabwean URMs in South Africa, it is
imperative for there to be action at the systemic and grassroots level. First, the
South African government needs to address the shortfalls of the legislation meant
to protect and provide for URMs. Secondly, there should be collaboration between
the government, schools, and NGOs to provide increased humanitarian aid.
Specifically, more services are needed to ensure that URMs have adequate shelter
and their right to education is realized.
A. Legislative Solutions: Adapting Existing Legislation
RESPONDING TO ZIMBABWEAN MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA-EVALUATING OPTIONS, supra note 8.
The most recent report from CORMSA indicates that over 200,000 Zimbabweans have received Section
22 Asylum permits and subsequently over 90% of their applications for asylum have been denied.
CORMSA, supra note 167.
246. The Act does not enumerate a specified time period for which the temporary permit is valid;
however, it was the practice of DHA to issue the permits for six month periods. The FMSP study found
that at the RRO in Pretoria it was the practice to issue the permits for only two and a half month periods
which adds to the already timely, costly, and burdensome process for the government and applicants.
FMSP, supra note 234, at 15.
247. SCUK, UNICEF, & INT'L RESCUE COMMITTEE, supra note 236.
248. Id.
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There is no doubt that the South African government worked hard to amend
its laws to reflect the new leadership and ideology after apartheid ended, but the
present interpretation and implementation of the laws reveals how the government
fell short of its goal when dealing with refugees.249 When assessing the situation of
Zimbabwean URMs, the government must balance the needs of South African
citizens with those of Zimbabweans. 250 South Africa's hesitation to act is clearly
evidenced by the fact that they have yet to formally recognize Zimbabwe as a
refugee-producing country.251 There is a need for legislative reform to put
structural measures in place to afford Zimbabwean URMs legal status and
adequate protection.
It is critical that the existing laws are interpreted broadly to include
protections and allowances for Zimbabweans, especially URMs. If South Africa
recognized Zimbabwe as a refugee-producing country, it would be forced to
provide extensive humanitarian aid and extend legal status to the thousands of
Zimbabweans in South Africa.252
1. Immigration Act: Reaching its Full Potential
Problem: The government's narrow interpretation of the Immigration Act
prevents Zimbabwean URMs from taking advantage of its protections intended for
economic migration.
Presently, the Immigration Act fails to meet the needs of Zimbabwean URMs
because the South African government has narrowly interpreted the law and has
failed to tailor its implementation to the unique situation of URMs. 253 Section
31(2)(b) gives the Minister of Home Affairs the authority to grant a category of
214foreigners status as a permanent resident. However, the Minister has yet to grant
Zimbabwean URMs permanent residency.
In April 2009, the DHA relied on Section 31(2)(b) of the Immigration Act to
allow all documented Zimbabwean nationals to apply for a six or twelve month
temporary residence permit that would allow them to live, work, and attend school
legally in South Africa.255 However, to date, the DHA has not issued these visas.256
Although there was an announced moratorium on the deportation of documented
Zimbabweans that accompanied the announcement on temporary permits, there are
249. Tara Polzer, South African Government and Civil Society Responses to Zimbabwean
Migration, 22 Southern African Migration Project Policy Brief (2008), available at http://www.queen
su.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/policybriefs/brie22.pdf.
250. FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAMME, supra note 227, at 19.
251. Palmary, supra note 200.
252. Id.
253. Palmary, supra note 200.
254. Immigration Act 31(2)(b)
255. Delia Robertson, South Africa Adopts New Visa Policy for Zimbabweans, Voice of America,
2009, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-04-03-voa22.cfn
256. CORMSA, supra note 167 at 1.
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reports that the police continue to deport Zimbabweans.257 To further complicate
matters, the DHA failed to clarify whether these temporary permits would be
available to URMs.
Solution: The Minister of Home Affairs must implement Section 31(2)(b) of the
Immigration Act and grant Zimbabwean URMs status as permanent residents.
In order for this modified invocation of Section 31(2)(b) of the Immigration
Act to effectuate a sustainable solution for URMs, they must be eligible to take
advantage of these temporary permits.25 9 As it stands, the temporary permits are
for documented Zimbabweans, and many URMs do not possess the requisite
records to qualify.260 Because of the high risk of deportation, URMs often avoid
government officials or lie to NGO personnel about their age in an effort to apply
for asylum as an adult, 261 making it difficult to provide services and humanitarian
aid.262 If URMs were eligible to apply for a temporary residence visa, they would
no longer have to fear deportation and would be able to benefit from the
protections and rights offered by legal status in South Africa. If the government
does not allow URMs to apply for permits under Section 31(2)(b), their only
recourse is under the Refugees Act, which, as discussed below, presents its own set
of challenges. 263
2. Refugees Act: Suggestions to Help URMs Seek Asylum
Problem: The Refugee Act's requirement of a guardian presents two challenges to
URMs: 1) the Act does not explicitly state who can serve as a guardian and 2) the
lengthy application process makes it djfficult for a URM to maintain contact with a
guardian.
Under Section 2 of the Refugees Act, URMs are entitled to asylum protection,
and in some cases children have been granted Section 22 permits, allowing them to
stay in South Africa temporarily.264 As presently interpreted and applied, the
Refugees Act does not adequately protect the majority of URMs seeking
asylum.265 The Refugees Act requires a guardian to apply for asylum on the
URM's behalf.26 6 In theory, the requirement of a guardian would seek to ensure
that an adult helps to protect the best interests of the URM. However, in reality, the
present system creates formidable obstacles for URMs who are trying to seek
asylum. The DHA has been unclear and inconsistent on the question of who
257. Human Rights Watch, South Africa Stop Deporting Zimbabweans available at http://www.hrw
.org/en/news/2009/04/30/south-africa-stop-deporting-zimbabweans
258. CORMSA, supra note 167, at 1.
259. Robertson, supra note 255.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Chrobok, supra note 3.
263. Geddo, supra note 1.
264. Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 s. 5.
265. Geddo, supra note 1.
266. Id.
650 VOL. 3 8:4
ZIMBABWEAN UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE MINORS
qualifies to serve as a URM's guardian.267
Presently, the DHA refuses to allow the five DSD social workers to serve as
guardians, even though, under South African law, these individuals are charged
with the safe placement and care of any child who is deemed a "child in need of
care." 268 All URMs meet the definition of a "child in need of care," and despite the
DSD's limited resources, a URM's social worker has more consistent contact with
him or her and can assist a URM throughout the lengthy asylum application
269
process.
To date, however, South African law does not generally recognize NGO
representatives as guardians.27 0 In limited cases, the DHA has permitted SCUK to
serve as a guardian and present their asylum papers to DHA. 27 1 Generally, it will
take weeks or months for a child to be appointed a guardian by the court in order to
be able to move forward with the asylum application process.272 To address this
issue, the court should allow NGOs such as SCUK and UNHCR to bring groups of
children before the court to appoint guardianship.273
Secondly, even when the court does appoint a guardian, the law requires the
same guardian to appear with the URM at every stage of the asylum process,
274which typically takes over a year. Because of their vulnerability to arrest and
deportation, URMs move frequently and can easily lose contact with their
appointed guardian. Therefore, it is imperative that the DHA find a way to
streamline the application process to ensure that URMs are not waiting in asylum
limbo for months at a time.
Solution: In order to remove the barriers associated with the requirement of a
guardian, the DHA must 1) clarify or eliminate the guardian requirement and 2)
create a special body to review URM asylum applications to ensure a speedy
process.
First, the DHA must explicitly state who can serve as a URM's guardian. An
ideal choice would be the DSD social workers because of their ongoing contact
with the URMs. However, considering that there are only five social workers in the
Limpopo region, the DHA needs to recognize other adults who can act in URMs'
best interests. NGOs are the obvious alternative to serve as guardians for the
purpose of asylum applications. The DHA should accept the international
community's viewpoint that organizations such as UNICEF, SCUK, and other
267. Choudhury, supra note 4.
268. Geddo, supra note 1.
269. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter UNHCR),
Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum
(1997), available at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LGEL-5S5BY7/$file/hcr-children-
93.pdf?openelement.
270. Geddo, supra note 1.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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NGOs should be permitted to represent URMs. It is imperative that if the DHA
allows NGOs to serve as guardians, it makes allowances for URMs to be
represented by a different guardian at their interview than when the minor received
their Section 22 permit. .275 In addition, if a guardian can represent more than one
URM at a time, it could help expedite the process to begin the asylum application
process. To simplify this issue, the DHA could abolish the guardian requirement
for URMs, therefore, allowing them to seek asylum by their own application.
Secondly, the lengthy application process creates another barrier for URMs,
but the DHA could make minor adjustments to remedy this issue. It is imperative
that URMs' applications for asylum receive priority in order to reach a prompt and
fair decision.276 Ideally, DHA would appoint a special committee to review and
conduct interviews concerning URMs' asylum applications because they would be
more familiar with child development, trauma, and their cultural background.
In addition, the DHA could confer refugee status upon all URMs.277 In fact,
the Refugees Act broadly defines refugee as a person who may have been
displaced as a result of "events seriously disturbing public disorder."278 However,
this action seems unlikely considering the viewpoint that recognizing
Zimbabweans as refugees would interfere with South Africa's role as a mediator in
the Zimbabwean conflict.2 79
Problem: URMs do not understand they will lose their refugee status if they return
to Zimbabwe.
Under Section 5 of the Refugees Act, an applicant who chooses to return to a
280country of origin forfeits his or her refugee status. Unlike other refugee
populations, Zimbabweans migrated to South Africa for economic reasons.281
Their migration was not the result of civil war or genocide.282 Zimbabwean URMs
express an interest to stay in South Africa to attend school and find work, but they
also travel home regularly to visit their families and take money to them.2 Many
URMs understand that refugee status gives them the right to live in South Africa
and attend school, but they do not understand that they will lose their refugee
status if they return home.284 Therefore, this provision of the Refugees Act
excludes many URMs who want to maintain contact with their family or take their
275. Id.
276. UNHCR, supra note 269.
277. FMSP, supra note 234.
278. Refugees Amendment Act 33of 2008, s. 35.
279. FMSP, supra note 234.
280. Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 s. 5.
281. Refugees from countries such as Mozambique, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
Somalia came to South Africa because of armed conflict in their own countries. See FORCED
MIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAMME, supra note 227.
282. Kwangwori, supra note 37.
283. Chrobok, supra note 3; Matsaung, supra note 53.
284. Matsaung, supra note 53; Kwangwori, supra note 37.
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earnings home for their families. 28 5
Solution: The DHA should provide special passes that would allow URMs to
travel home to visit their families, without forfeiting their refugee status.
In response to the current situation, the DHA should institute a process
whereby URMs could travel home to see their families if they had a Section 22
permit without forfeiting their refugee status. If the government allowed URMs to
travel between South Africa and Zimbabwe, URMs would have a means to enter
and exit the country legally. This would allow the DHA and DSD to know of their
whereabouts and provide services. In light of the lack of education around this
issue, it would be ideal for URMs to have the opportunity to apply for the
temporary residence permit under the Immigration Act to circumvent any
confusion related to their refugee status.286
3. Disaster Management Act: A Plan for Emergency Response
Problem: The government has failed to utilize the Disaster Management Act as a
means to provide emergency services to URMs.
Ideally, the DHA would adapt the Immigration Act and Refugees Act to meet
the needs of the Zimbabweans migrating for economic reasons. However, an
additional piece of legislation, the Disaster Management Act, could be a valuable
resource in addressing the issue of Zimbabwean migration and providing specific
services for URMs.287 The Disaster Management Act was enacted in 2002 to offer
a legal framework in which the government can provide for the welfare and
protection of all people in South Africa in an emergency situation.288 Under the
Act, an emergency can be declared at the municipal, provincial, or national
level. 28 9 The Act applies to a situation where settlement "causes or threatens to
cause: (1) death, injury, or disease; (2) damage to property, infrastructure or the
environment; or (3) disruption of the life of a community that is of such a
magnitude that exceeds the ability of those affected by the disaster to cope with its
effects using only their own resources." 290 In relation to the current situation,
URMs, do not have the resources to cope with the effects of their problems
associated with living in South Africa.
This framework was employed to create a national disaster management
contingency plan, a Limpopo provincial plan, and a municipal level plan in the
Musina area, but no disaster has ever been declared.291 The fact that the
government had the foresight to formulate a plan to address this growing problem
demonstrates recognition of the problem. However, failure to utilize the plan as
more URMs have entered the country illustrates another example of the
285. Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 s. 5.
286. CORMSA, supra note 167.
287. Polzer, supra note 249, at 7.
288. Id. at 12.
289. See Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002
290. Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, s. 1.
291. Polzer, supra note 249, at 13.
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government's failure to protect the people within its borders.292
Solution: The South African Government needs to develop and implement a plan
to address the mass migration of URMs into South Africa.
Ideally, a disaster plan would recognize the specific concerns regarding
URMs. An important part of the plan would include provisions to provide shelter
for the thousands of URMs who are in the country. In addition, as granted by the
South African Constitution, URMs have the right to health care, social assistance,
education, adequate housing, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and education.293
Declaration of a disaster would allow the national government more oversight
as to the services offered at the provincial and municipal level; as it stands, the
national government has little power to force the provinces and municipalities to
take specific action.294 If the government declared a disaster at the municipal,
provincial, or national level, it would allow the government to partner with
communities and NGOs to implement a plan of action regarding the issue of
Zimbabwean URMs in South Africa.295 Any action taken under the Disaster
Management Act would be a temporary solution that would provide necessary
services and resources to URMs, while the government puts measures in place to
ensure a sustainable solution that will provide for the safety and well being of
Zimbabwean URMs.
B. Improving Humanitarian Services
Reform and adaptation of existing legislation is important to helping URMs;
however, implementation and improved services is another crucial component of
any sustainable solution in South Africa. It is insufficient to develop a plan or
program, if its implementation is ineffective and inadequate to reach the target
population. Part of the present crisis in South Africa is a direct result of poor
follow through on the part of government entities.296 In 2007, the Democratic
Alliance, a South African political party, recommended the establishment of a
transit centre near the Zimbabwean border.297
There is no question that the living conditions were deplorable and unsanitary
at the Showgrounds.2 98 However, the government was to blame for the horrific
conditions because they refused to allow permanent structures, ablution services,
292. Nathane, supra note 10.
293. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, art. XXV.
294. Breen, supra note 38.
295. Polzer, supra note 249, at 13.
296. Geddo, supra note 1; Nathane, supra note 10.
297. FMSP, supra note 234.
298. The Consortium of Refugees and Migrants in South Africa ("CORMSA") supported the
closing of the Showgrounds, but not without a long term plan in place; Breen, supra note 38.
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or security at the Showgrounds. 299 The closing of the Showgrounds symbolizes
DHA's non-responsiveness.oo Upon closure, some Zimbabweans were given
Section 23 transit permits valid for fourteen days to travel to an RRO in another
part of the country, such as Polokwane or Johannesburg.301 Undocumented
Zimbabweans that remained in Musina would be subject to arrest and deportation
and be unable to access any of the necessary services to start the asylum
application process.302
In regards to URMs, the DHA and DSD abandoned their responsibility to this
vulnerable population.303 UNHCR offered transportation to some URMs, but
304because of the large numbers of URMs, many were left without aid or services.
Eliminating services in Musina will not discourage or prevent URMs from entering
the country; it will only make it more difficult for them to find safety and realize
any legal rights.3 05 Therefore, in light of the closing of the Showgrounds, the need
for effective implementation of services and programs has become even more dire.
1. Shelters and Drop-in Centers: The Need for More Places of Safety
Problem: The DSD has not committed the necessary resources to provide
temporary and permanent housing for Zimbabwean URMs.
One of the major barriers to serving the increasing URM population in South
Africa is the lack of places of safety and drop-in centers for minors.306 The DSD is
responsible for ensuring that if a minor is determined to be in need of care, then he
or she must have a suitable, safe placement.307 After the Showgrounds closed, the
two shelters, Uniting Reformed Methodist Church Shelter and the Concerned
Zimbabweans Citizens' Shelter remained open.308 However, between these two
shelters, there is only room for approximately 170 boys.3 09 Since there are
approximately 600 URMs in Musina, there is a pronounced need for more
shelters.310 In addition, neither one of these shelters is licensed by the DSD because
they cannot meet the licensing requirements.31 However, without government
funding, the shelters cannot make the necessary improvements to meet the
government standards and ensure that the children have a clean, safe place to
299. Emily Wellman, Is how a country treats the most vulnerable of its people not a test of its
humanity? (2009), available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/is-how-a-country-treats-the-most-vuln
erable-of-its-people-not-a-test-of-its-humanity-2009-03-25
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Breen, supra note 38.
303. Nathane, supra note 10.
304. Geddo, supra note 1.
305. Breen, supra note 38.
306. Chrobok, supra note 3.
307. Nathane, supra note 10.
308. Breen, supra note 38.
309. Kwangwori, supra note 37; Matsaung, supra note 53.
310. Zosa De Sas Kropiwnicki, Proposal: Emergency Assistance to Migrant Children in Musina,
Limpopo, (on file with author) (2008); Chrobok, supra note 3.
311. Geddo, supra note 1.
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live. 312 While these shelters in Musina remain open to date, URMs cannot apply
for asylum without a RRO.
Solution: The DSD needs to commit resources to help NGOs and other
organizations open shelters for Zimbabwean URMs.
In order to ensure the safety of all children, especially URMs, the DSD needs
to establish many more shelters across the country.3 14 One possible solution would
be to create a probationary period for shelters to become licensed.315 In this period,
they would be able to receive some government funding to make the necessary
improvements and also provide shelter for URMs who are living in the streets.316
Part of a sustainable solution for URMs in South Africa is finding homes for these
minors to provide housing and eliminate the possibility of exploitation.
2. Education: Increasing Accessibility
Problem: School officials refuse to let Zimbabwean URMs enroll in school
because they do not have documentation or school unforms.
One of the primary reasons Zimbabwean children migrate to South Africa is
for the promise of education. Prior to the economic conflict, the education system
in Zimbabwe was the best in southern Africa.317 Under the South African
Constitution, all children in South Africa are entitled to an education. However, in
actuality, several barriers prevent Zimbabwean URMs from taking advantage of
this right.318 In order for a URM to attend school, school officials require
paperwork showing a child's asylum or immigration status.3 19 As discussed earlier,
most URMs enter South Africa illegally and face considerable challenges to attain
legal status. Moreover, in the rare instances where URMs can obtain
documentation, their transient lifestyle makes it nearly impossible to keep track of
such documents over time. Thus, most URMs do not have the required paperwork
to attend school.3 20 In addition, even if a child is able to enroll in school, they may
be precluded from attending school because they do not have a school uniform.321
In February, all of the secondary schools in Musina were full and not
accepting any additional students.322 In response to the Department of Education's
lack of action regarding URMs, UNICEF provided money to purchase school
supplies for the children and planned to build additional classrooms.323 Because of
the shortage of classrooms, SCUK established places of safety for adolescents at
312. Id.
313. Breen, supra note 38.
314. Geddo, supra note 1.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Kwangwori, supra note 37.
318. FMSP, supra note 234.
319. Matsaung, supra note 53.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Chrobok, supra note 3.
323. Id.
656 VOL. 3 8:4
ZIMBABWEAN UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE MINORS
the Showgrounds.324 During the day, teachers taught the children, but these lessons
were focused on life skills issues such as health, safety, and asylum application.325
These actions and services were provided before the Showgrounds closed.326 At
this point, it is unknown as to the extent UNICEF and SCUK will be able to
continue offering these programs.
Solution: School officials should waive the documentation and school unform
requirement in order to provide URMs with their constitutional right.
In response to the problem, improving access to education should be a priority
for the South African Government. While there are limited resources to enroll
children in school, the Government must partner with NGOs to provide education
in ad hoc settings such as churches, tents, etc.327 While this is not an idyllic setting,
it will help accomplish the goal of providing education to all children in South
Africa. Additionally, it is imperative that provincial and municipal governments
abolish the paperwork requirement for children to enroll in school. Moreover,
URMs should be able to forego the school uniform requirement if a child cannot
afford to purchase the clothes. Making these simple adjustments and allowances
will allow for more URMs to gain the education that they are legally entitled to
under South African Law.
CONCLUSION
Presently, there are thousands of URMs in South Africa who fled Zimbabwe
because of political and economic unrest. While they came to South Africa seeking
food, work and education, the South African government has yet to respond to
their needs in a meaningful manner. Moving forward, it is critical that the South
African government provide ongoing protection and services to this vulnerable
population. In order to affect long-term change, the government must modify the
existing asylum application process to either make it easier for URMs to be
appointed a guardian or abolish the guardian requirement entirely. Alternatively,
the DHA could also allow URMs to apply for permits under Section 31(2)(b)of the
Immigration Act. In addition, utilizing the Disaster Management Act would allow
the government to declare a crisis and provide emergency relief to URMs. These
changes to existing legislation would make it easier for URMs to attain legal status
and ensure their protection and full realization of their rights under the law.
In addition to these legislative changes, the government's practices must
reflect an intent to protect URMs from exploitation. More social workers are
needed in order to fulfill the statutory mandate of providing for children in need of
care under the Children's Act. Case management and family tracking will help
URMs locate safe places to stay and connect with family members who live in
South Africa. Currently, there are an insufficient number of shelters and places of
safety to accommodate the increasing numbers of URMs. The DSD needs to
324. Choudhury, supra note 4.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Chrobok, supra note 3.
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approve new shelters on a probationary basis; therefore, the government should
provide funds to shelters to make the necessary improvements and become a fully
registered place of safety.
Finally, because the South African Constitution guarantees a right to
education to all children in the Republic, the government must increase the number
of schools and teachers to ensure all children can attend school. Considering the
extenuating circumstances of URMs, schools must abolish the paperwork and
uniform requirements for URMs. Until these changes are made, the country cannot
create a sustainable solution for Zimbabwean URMs or future URM populations.
GOD V. GAYS?
THE RIGHTS OF SEXUAL MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
As SEEN THROUGH THE DOOMED EXISTENCE
OF THE BRAZILIAN RESOLUTION
Timothy Garvey*
INTRODUCTION
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." 1 For more than two hundred
years, this sweeping statement from the United States Declaration of Independence
has provided the starting point for conceptions of human rights. While radical at
the time of the Declaration's signing, the notion "that all men are created equal" 2 is
now a fundamental concept of human rights embraced by the international
community.
Following the barbarous human rights violations perpetrated during World
War II, the United Nations (UN) prepared its own declaration embracing this
notion of equality. Ratified in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) states:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights ....
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. 3
Almost universally since the writing of the UDHR, international human rights
documents have been routinely imbued with a spirit of equality and justice for all
people. In fact, since the dawn of the twenty-first century, most of the world's
recently-formed or recently-amended constitutions include language expressly
*University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected 2010. An earlier version of this article
placed second in the 2009 Leonard B. Sutton International Law Writing Competition. I would like to
thank Professor Ved Nanda for encouraging me to seek publication, Professor Catherine Smith for her
many helpful suggestions, the staff of the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy for its
willingness to publish students' work, and my fianc6e Jodie Kranz for her excellent editing skills and
continued support of my academic endeavors. Although all those mentioned above provided much
assistance and guidance, any errors, omissions, or defects in this article are solely my own.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. Id.
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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stating just that.4 But equality in form and equality in substance appear to be two
different things.
Throughout the world, numerous groups are routinely denied the equality
supposedly assured to them under their state constitutions or various international
documents, such as the UDHR. One group consistently denied the right of
equality is a group that international human rights scholar and professor Jack
Donnelly refers to as "sexual minorities."' This term, as used by Professor
Donnelly, includes not only those typically associated with sexual orientation
issues-persons who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgendered (LGBT)6-but
it is also meant to include "any group (previously, now, or in the future)
stigmatized or despised as a result of sexual orientation, identity, or behavior."
According to Professor Donnelly, "[i]n almost all countries, sexual minorities
suffer under substantial civil disabilities." While the most extreme violation, the
imposition of the death penalty, is mostly limited to Islamic states,9 discrimination
against sexual minorities manifests itself in numerous other ways throughout the
world.
To be sure, within the past two decades, the international community has
increasingly recognized the rights of sexual minorities. However, sexual minorities
are still subject to innumerable injustices in a significant portion of the world.
Even when excluding the nearly universal animus toward same-sex marriage, 10
4. Of the eighteen national constitutions promulgated, ratified, adopted, enforced, or amended
since the year 2000, no fewer than 16 contain references to equality. See, e.g., PERUSTUSLAKI
[Constitution] ch. 2 § 6 (Fin.) ("everyone is equal before the law"); IRAQ CONST. ch. 2, pt. 1, art. 14
("Iraqis are equal before the law"), available at http://confinder.richmond.edu.
5. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2003).
6. LGBT is the acronym most commonly used to refer to this group of individuals, although
numerous others exist. Other common versions include GLBT (gay, lesbian, bi-sexual, transgendered),
LGBTIQ (with the 'I' signifying persons who are 'intersexed' and the 'Q' signifying persons who are
'queer' or 'questioning'), a term gaining more prevalence in the field is LBGTTTIQ (here the additional
'T's are intended to signify persons who are 'transsexual and transsensual' or alternately 'transsexual
and two-spirited'). For the purposes of this article I will use the term "sexual minorities" as being
inclusive of all of these groups. The decision to do so is done only for the purpose of readability, and is
in no way meant to diminish or undermine those who would choose to use a term other than "sexual
minorities."
7. DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 229.
8. Id. at 230 (providing a list of examples, many of them horrific, describing the practice of many
countries to impose incarceration, and in several instances execution, for such minor homosexual acts
as same-sex couples holding hands or kissing in public).
9. Id. at 230 n.1.
10. Same-sex marriages are allowed internationally in only seven countries (Belgium, Canada,
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden). Additionally, a few states within the United
States allow same-sex marriages (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont as
well as the District of Columbia). Lornet Turnbull, On Gay Rights, World, U.S. Continue to Shift,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A12, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html
/localnews/2010738123_gaychanges08m.html. Additionally, a few countries will recognize foreign
same-sex marriages, even though some of them will not allow such marriages to occur within their own
borders (Aruba, Israel, France, Netherlands Antilles, and within the United States - New York). See
ILGA, LGBTI Rights in the World, http://www.ilga.org/ilga/en/article/1161 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
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sexual minorities are subject to "persistent human rights violations"" that range
from death and torture, 12 to inequitable access regarding housing and education,13
to the forced imposition of attaining heterosexual norms, 14 and "pressure to remain
silent and invisible."1 5 Laws criminalizing sodomy and other homosexual acts still
exist in nearly eighty countries. 16 In fact, it was not until 2003 that the Supreme
Court of the United States of America struck down sodomy laws for violating
notions of liberty and equality.17  Before that decision, many states in the U.S.,
with the consent of the U.S. Supreme Court, criminalized the act of adult males
engaging in consensual sodomy in the privacy of their own homes.1 8
Given this list of inequalities, it is impossible to deny the fact that sexual
minorities are not granted substantive equality-even in countries that purport to
guarantee such equality. In an attempt to combat these continuing injustices
suffered by sexual minorities, Brazil introduced a resolution during the 2003
Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (the Commission). The
Resolution on Human Rights and Sexual Orientation (the Brazilian Resolution)
simply sought to acknowledge the occurrence of human rights violations due to the
sexual orientation of the victim and to reaffirm that the principles of the
International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) apply to all individuals including
sexual minorities. 19 Unfortunately, for reasons detailed below, the Brazilian
Resolution never even made it to a vote before the Commission.
11. Michael O'Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 208 (2008).
12. Id. at 208-10.
13. Id. at 211.
14. Id. at 208.
15. Id. This article's purpose is not to recount all the injustices suffered by sexual minorities
throughout the world; however, those interested in a deeper discussion of that issue may wish to read
the cited article. Another good source of information is AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CRIMES OF HATE,
CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT BASED ON SEXUAL IDENTITY (2001),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT40/016/2001/en.
16. See DANIEL OTTOSSON, INTERNATIONAL LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX
ASSOCIATION, STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME-SEX
ACTIVITY BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS 4 (2008), available at http://www.ilga.org/state
homophobia/ILGA State Sponsored Homophobia 2008.pdf ("[in 2008, no less than 86 member
states of the United Nations still criminalize consensual same-sex acts among adults, thus institutionally
promoting a culture of hatred. Among those, 7 have legal provisions with death penalty as punishment.
To those 86 countries, one must add 6 provinces or territorial units which also punish homosexuality
with imprisonment.").
17. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("[t]he State cannot demean a homosexual
person's existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government. 'It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter' (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992))).
18. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (holding no "fundamental right [for]
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy") (overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538
(2003)).
19. The Brazilian Resolution on Human Rights and Sexual Orientation, U.N. Econ & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC] 59th Sess., U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/2003/L.92 (April 17, 2003) (proposed but not
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This paper explores the story of the Brazilian Resolution. Part I discusses the
Brazilian Resolution's history. In so doing, it examines prior attempts to legislate
the rights of sexual minorities, as well as prior attempts to adjudicate such rights
within international law. Part I also discusses how those prior attempts to create a
body of law regarding sexual orientation presented an inherent problem in Brazil's
presentation of the Brazilian Resolution and discusses how those problems
materialized once Brazil introduced it to the Commission.
In preventing the Commission from voting on the Brazilian Resolution, those
who so vehemently opposed it presented three main arguments against its
introduction. First, they argued that issues of gender and sexuality do not fall
within the concern of international human rights.20 Second, they argued that the
term "sexual orientation" is not adequately defined in international law. 2 1 Finally,
they argued that religious law prevents them from accepting a notion of equality
for sexual minorities.22
Part II of this paper examines and subsequently dismisses each of these
arguments. It explains why, despite arguments to the contrary, issues of gender
and sexuality fall squarely within the concern of international human rights law. It
also counters the second argument by proving that the term "sexual orientation" is
clearly defined in international law. It then takes a step back and examines the
issue from a broader perspective-looking at the role of religious law within the
context of international law. In accepting the third argument as true-that religious
law prevents them from ever accepting a notion of equality for sexual minorities-
the third subsection of part II explains how such an argument necessarily denies
citizens of their right to freedom of religion, thereby invalidating that argument as
well.
Finally, Part III briefly discusses events subsequent to the Brazilian
Resolution's demise. Although the Brazilian Resolution failed to make it to a vote
before the Commission, its existence was not in vain. The mere introduction of the
Brazilian Resolution considerably raised the concern of human rights for sexual
minorities within the international sphere. Since 2003, international organizations,
acting both within and outwith the UN, have actively pursued the acknowledgment
and rectification of human rights violations due to the sexual orientation of the
victim. Both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs) joined these efforts with the motivatation of forcing states to
recognize that the spirit and the plain language of the UDHR is meant to do what it
says: ensure "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
adopted), available at http://www.arc-international.net/L92.html [hereinafter Brazilian Resolution].
20. Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in International Law, INT'L GAY &
LESBIAN ASS'N FILES: U.N. COMM'N ON HUM. RTS, Nov. 5, 2005, http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/577
(stating that opponents circulated a letter asserting that in their perspective sexual orientation is not a
human rights issue).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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religion, political or other opinion."23 Accordingly, Part III discusses a few of
these advancements made in the wake of the Brazilian Resolution.
I. THE BRAZILIAN RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & SEXUAL ORIENTATION
What is commonly referred to as the Brazilian Resolution is an international
document officially titled The Brazilian Resolution on Human Rights & Sexual
Orientation.24 Brazil presented the Resolution during the 59th Session of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (Commission) on April 17, 2003 .25 The purpose of
the Brazilian Resolution was the promotion and protection of human rights for
sexual minorities.26
The Brazilian Resolution did not seek to establish any new rights for sexual
minorities. By its plain text, it merely sought to reaffirm (as applied to sexual
minorities) rights already granted to all persons in documents such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),;
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).27
Based upon the rights already established in the aforementioned documents,
the Brazilian Resolution "[e]xpress[ed] deep concern at the occurrence of
violations of human rights in the world against persons based on their sexual
orientation," 28 and it "[s]tress[ed] that human rights and fundamental freedoms are
the birthright of all human beings ... and ... should not be hindered in any way
on the grounds of sexual orientation." 29 It also "[c]all[ed] upon States to promote
and protect the human rights of all persons regardless of their sexual orientation."30
It further "[r]equest[ed] the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
to pay due attention to the violation of human rights on the grounds of sexual
orientation."31
A. The History of the Brazilian Resolution
The Brazilian Resolution's history is rather minor-mostly because Brazil
gave no advance warning that it was going to propose such a resolution and
introduced it during the final days of the 2003 Session. 32 However novel the
Brazilian Resolution may have seemed at the time of its introduction, it was not the
23. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 2.
24. Brazilian Resolution, supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Sanders, supra note 20. The 59th session of the Commission ended on April 25th, 2003.
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first attempt by a UN member state to bring issues concerning sexual orientation to
the attention of the UN. In fact, "Brazil ha[d] been at the forefront of government
efforts to include language on sexual orientation and human rights in the context of
the UN" since 2001. Nonetheless, Brazil should have been more cautious with
the Resolution's introduction, as even the most minor prior attempts to insert
recognition of rights for sexual minorities into international documents were
routinely met with staunch criticism.34
Much of the earliest work concerning the recognition of human rights for
sexual minorities was done within the European system-not the UN. 3 Relatively
speaking, the UN has been slow to recognize human rights for sexual minorities,
despite its assurances of equality. And while other international organizations
began doing so as early as the 1980s, it is only since the 1990s that UN member
states have consistently attempted to work the concerns of sexual minorities into
the language of UN documents. However, as previously mentioned, such attempts
were routinely plagued with problems, and it was not until the twenty-first century
that member states made any consistent progress. Accordingly, those who criticize
Brazil's late introduction of its Resolution assert that, had Brazil followed the lead
of those advocating for the rights of sexual minorities within Europe, the rights of
sexual minorities within the UN may have faired better.36
The following subsections give a short history of the fight for recognition of
human rights for sexual minorities in international law. As previously mentioned,
the UN was not nearly as quick as other international organizations in recognizing
such rights. Accordingly, this section concentrates on other organizations'
attempts, while only briefly discussing such attempts within the UN. The first
subsection examines prior attempts to legislate rights of sexual minorities in
international law, and the second subsection examines prior attempts to adjudicate
rights for sexual minorities in international law.
1. Prior Attempts to Legislate Rights of Sexual Minorities
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the UN's legislative process was routinely
plagued with an inability to insert language regarding sexual orientation into any
UN document.37 Even into the early 2000s, attempts to add such language to UN
documents repeatedly failed.38 This was so, despite the fact that most of these
33. INT'L GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMM'N, RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: CAMPAIGN DOSSIER 4 (2003), available at http://www.iglhrc.org/binary-
data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/213-1.pdf.
34. See Sanders, supra note 20 (describing numerous failed attempts to insert language concerning
sexual minorities into U.N. documents).
35. Id. (discussing the history of rights for sexual minorities in international law).
36. See Pratima Narayan, Somewhere over the Rainbow . . . International Human Rights
Protections for Sexual Minorities in the New Millennium, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 313, 345-46 (2006) ("[o]ne
key failure of the first Brazilian proposal was that the nation's representatives did not offer advance
warning that they would be proposing the bill to gain support").
37. See Sanders, supra note 20 (describing numerous failed attempts to insert language concerning
sexual minorities into U.N. documents).
3 8. Id.
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attempts sought only to add language expressly recognizing that sexual minorities
were included within the scope of a proposed document. While there were many
UN members who opposed the insertion of such language, those countries with
strong national ties to religion (mostly Catholic or Islamic) were the most
vehement in their opposition.39
It is only within the twenty-first century that the UN has made consistent
progress in inserting language recognizing the rights of sexual minorities. Those
acknowledgments, few as they are, have come sporadically and with much debate
and concession.40
The . . . (CESCR) has dealt with [sexual orientation discrimination] in
its General Comments . . . Nos 18 of 2005 (on the right to work), 15 of
2002 (on the right to water) and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the highest
attainable standard of health), it has indicated that the Covenant
proscribes any discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sex and sexual
orientation "that has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the
equal enjoyment or exercise of [the right at issue]."
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also dealt with the
issue in a General Comment. In its General Comment No. 4 of 2003, it
stated that, "State parties have the obligation to ensure that all human
beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the Convention [on the
Rights of the Child] without discrimination (Article 2), including with
regard to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status. These grounds also cover [inter alia] sexual orientation." 41
Additionally, "Concluding Observations" submitted by the CESCR and the CRC
have mentioned sexual-orientation-related discrimination.4 2
Although any acknowledgment regarding non-discrimination of sexual
minorities is significant, it is also significant that those in favor of such rights face
an uphill battle. While the UN allows many NGOs to be involved in lobbying
efforts, such groups must first be granted consultative status. As of 2009, the UN
has not granted consultative status to any NGOs dealing specifically with the rights
of sexual minorities.43
2. Prior Attempts to Adjudicate Rights of Sexual Minorities
Given such limited success in the prior attempts to legislate the rights of
sexual minorities, critics argue that those rights may have been better protected had
Brazil left it to the various judicial and quasi-judicial international human rights
bodies. Such arguments seem appropriate since Europe's international judicial
3 9. Id.
40. Id.
41. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 214-15 (internal citations omitted).
42. Id. at 215.
43. Sanders, supra note 20.
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bodies began recognizing rights for sexual minorities in the early 1980s. 44 In fact,
by the start of the twenty-first century, European law had developed a consistent
body of law protecting sexual minorities.
Conversely, the UN was much slower in recognizing such rights, with its first
decision regarding sexual minorities not coming until the middle of the 1990s. 45
Arguably then, the rights of sexual minorities may have been better protected had
Brazil allowed the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies of the UN to further develop
interpretations of how sexual orientation falls within the context of international
documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), or the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
The following subsections further examine the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR)46 and the United Nations Human Rights Council
(UNHRC), as regards sexual minorities.
a. Prior Attempts to Adjudicate Rights of Sexual Minorities within the European
Court of Human Rights
To best understand the prior attempts to adjudicate rights of sexual minorities,
it is necessary to first look outside of the UN to Europe where those rights were
first recognized. While the UN judicial bodies were not particularly quick to
acknowledge the rights of sexual minorities, their European counterparts were (at
least comparatively speaking). Starting in the early 1980s, the ECHR slowly
began developing a series of decisions that upheld the basic rights of sexual
minorities. While development of this body of law was slow, it was nonetheless
consistent.
Throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the ECHR consistently struck
down sodomy laws as violating notions of privacy.48 The ECHR first applied such
a rationale in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom in 1981, finding that a Northern Ireland
law criminalizing male homosexual activity violated the petitioner's right to
44. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 4 Fur. H.R. Rep. 149, 63 (1981),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight
=dudgeon&sessionid=52029168&skin=hudoc-en (holding Northern Ireland's laws prohibiting buggery
and acts of homosexual indecency constitute "a breach of Article 8" of the European Convention on
Human Rights).
45. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. H.R. Comm., No. 488, 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992
(1994), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48298b8d2.html (determining that a
Tasmanian statute prohibiting private homosexual behavior violates articles 17, paragraph 1, juncto 2,
paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
46. Until 1998, the European Convention on Human Rights operated under a dual system. There
was the European Court of Human Rights, and for those who lacked access to the Court (most often due
to the Court's refusal to hear cases of individuals) there was the European Commission of Human
Rights. However, in 1998 all state parties to the Convention accepted Protocol 11, which abolished the
Commission and allowed the Court to hear more cases (including those of individuals). For the
purposes of this essay, ECHR will refer to the decisions of either body.
47. Sanders, supra note 20.
48. Id.
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respect for his private life.49 In subsequent cases regarding sodomy laws, the
ECHR continued to apply Dudgeon, and repeatedly struck down sodomy laws. 0
But, beyond striking down sodomy laws, the ECHR was reluctant to apply the
rationale of Dudgeon to other notions of privacy regarding homosexual activity.
Such was the state of the law until 1997; the ECHR struck down sodomy laws on
privacy grounds, but other laws regulating homosexual activity survived.
It was not until 1997 that the ECHR finally began to expand on that basic
notion of privacy it found in Dudgeon. However, in a few a short years the ECHR
dramatically expanded its jurisprudence in the area, and by the end of the twentieth
century it had a full body of law protecting the rights of sexual minorities. This
jurisprudential renaissance began in 1997 when the ECHR struck down a United
Kingdom law that established an unequal age of consent for heterosexual and
homosexual acts.52 Within the next three years, the ECHR also found the U.K.'s
discriminatory ban on homosexuals in the military to be unnecessary,53 and ruled
that a father, who lost custody of his child because of his homosexuality, had been
unfairly deprived of his rights.54
With the dawn of the twenty-first century, the ECHR continued to expand its
jurisprudence regarding sexual minorities. In 2002, the ECHR ruled that a male to
female transsexual could lawfully marry a man. In 2003, the ECHR "upheld
successor tenancy rights for same-sex partners."56 Crystallizing the differences
between the ECHR of the twentieth century with that of the twenty-first century,
49. See Dudgeon, 4 Eur. Ct. HR T 63 (holding Northern Ireland's laws prohibiting buggery and
acts of homosexual indecency constitute "a breach of Article 8" of the European Convention on Human
Rights).
50. See Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. HR Rep. 186 (1989)
available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlightnorris%/o201
o2Ov.%o2 0 20ireland&sessionid=52029506&skin=hudoc-en (holding that an Irish law criminalizing
homosexuality violates Articles 8 & 25 of the ICCPR); Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89 16 Eur.
HR Rep. 485 (1993), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm
&action=html&highlight-Modinos%20|%20v.%201%2OCyprus&sessionid=52029568&skin=hudoc-en
(holding that a Cyprus law prohibiting homosexuality violates Article 8 of the ICCPR).
51. Sanders, supra note 20.
52. Sutherland v. United Kingdom (striking out), 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item1 &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=sutherland%201%20v.%2
01%20united%201%20kingdom&sessionid=52029703&skin hudoc-en.
53. Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlightLustig-
Prean&sessionid=52029837&skin hudoc-en.
54. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action html&highlight=33290/96&sessionid=520
29866&skin=hudoc-en.
55. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://cmiskp.echr.
coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight-goodwinv.unitedkingdom&ses
sionid=46838382&skin=hudoc-en.
56. Sanders, supra note 20 (citing Karner v. Austria, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action-html&highlight40016/98&
sessionid=52029974&skin=hudoc-en).
2010 667
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the ECHR stated in Karner v Austria, "[j]ust like differences based on sex,
differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way
of justification."57 Such a bold statement, equating sexual orientation
discrimination with sex-based discrimination, perfectly exemplifies the ECHR's
jurisprudential shift. Whereas the ECHR of the twentieth century refused to
expand protections for sexual minorities, the twenty-first century ECHR equated
discrimination against sexual minorities with that of gender-based discrimination.
To be sure, this jurisprudential shift did not occur overnight. In fact, it could
not have. It was only by creating a consistent body of law protecting the basic
rights of sexual minorities that the ECHR was subsequently able to understand the
full scope of such rights and begin to expand those rights. Without the well-
documented complaints of sexual minorities from a period spanning nearly two
decades, it is unlikely that the ECHR could have ever recognized the rights of
sexual minorities on par with those of women. However, because the ECHR had
such a record, it was able to properly assert such a claim.
b. Prior attempts to adjudicate rights of sexual minorities within the United Nations
Human Rights Committee
Most of the UN's disputes regarding sexual minorities arose as an issue under
the ICCPR. As such, those disputes were subject to the jurisdiction of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee. 8 While the ECHR began to recognize rights
for sexual minorities in the early 1980s, it was not until nearly a decade and a half
later (1994) that the UNHRC first recognized such rights.
Much like the ECHR, the UNHRC's first opinion recognizing rights for
sexual minorities involved a complaint regarding a member state's sodomy laws.
In Toonen v. Australia, Nicholas Toonen filed a communication with the UNHRC
alleging that Tasmania's sodomy law (Australia's last remaining sodomy law)
violated his right to privacy under articles 2, paragraphs 1, 17, and 26 of the
ICCPR.5 9 While the UNHRC could have simply declared the Tasmanian law to be
in violation of the ICCPR, it went much further. Not only did the UNHRC agree
with Toonen that the law interfered with his privacy rights under the ICCPR,60 it
further asserted that the ICCPR prohibits any discrimination based on sexual
orientation. In drawing such a conclusion, the UNHRC declared "the reference to
57. Karner, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. 137.
58. While not an official judicial body, the UNHRC operates as a quasi-judicial body within the
UN. It was established to oversee the compliance of states party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). The UNHRC allows for individuals within States that have adopted the
ICCPR to obtain an opinion regarding violations of the ICCPR. However, those opinions are non-
binding and are merely the interpretation of the UNHRC. See Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htn (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). Most of the UN "cases" dealing with
discrimination of sexual minorities have arisen as an issue under the ICCPR, and thus were subject to
the opinions of the UNHCR.
59. Toonen, U.N.H.R. Comm., No. 488 T 3.1.
60. Id. at 18.2.
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'sex' in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual
orientation," 61 rather than simply referring to gender.
Since this landmark decision, the UNHRC's jurisprudence regarding sexual
minorities has kept pace with that of the ECHR. The UNHRC, much like the
ECHR, has subsequently found "that sexual orientation-related discrimination is a
suspect category in terms of the enjoyment of the [ICCPR] rights . . . . The
[UN]HRC has persistently observed, however, that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation . . . is not inherently invidious . . . as long as it is based on
reasonable and objective criteria." 62
Although the UNHRC was not as quick as the ECHR to recognize the rights
of sexual minorities, at the time Brazil introduced the Brazilian Resolution, the
UNHRC had addressed the issue of sexual minorities on several occasions. More
importantly, the UNHRC was even going so far as to repeatedly assert that
violations of human rights based on sexual orientation violated the ICCPR by
slowly developing a consistent series of decisions protecting the rights of sexual
minorities. While it is true that the decisions of the UNHRC are non-binding, it is
also true that the UNHRC was much more open to recognizing rights for sexual
minorities than were the member states involved in the UN's legislative process.
Accordingly, the following sections of Part I discuss the problems inherent in
Brazil's promulgation of the Brazilian Resolution, and how those problems
manifested once it was introduced.
B. The Problems Inherent in Brazil's Promulgation and Presentation of its
Resolution
A number of scholars have written articles about the Brazilian Resolution, but
those articles have rarely discussed the Resolution's inherent problems. While the
ideals behind the Brazilian Resolution-the protection of rights for sexual
minorities-are commendable, the Resolution was arguably flawed from the outset.
And, those flaws manifested into foreseeable issues once Brazil introduced the
Resolution to the UNHRC. This section discusses each of these perspectives.
Section I examines the problems inherent in the mere promulgation of the
Brazilian Resolution, while section II discusses how those problems manifested
upon its introduction to the Commission.
1. The Problems Inherent in Brazil's Promulgation of the Resolution
As discussed above, prior attempts to insert language concerning sexual
orientation into UN documents were routinely met with much hostility and marred
by zealous resistance.63 While Brazil occasionally succeeded at inserting language
protecting the human rights of sexual minorities into UN documents, these were
only very recent developments. 64 Over the course of the preceding decade, the
61. Id. at T 8.7. See also O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 216 (discussing the implications
of Toonen).
62. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 216-17 (citing Young v. Australia, U.N.H.R. Comm.,
No. 941, T 104, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003)).
63. Sanders, supra note 20.
64. Id.
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majority of attempts to work the phrase "sexual orientation" into even non-binding
UN documents, such as conference statements, failed repeatedly.65 As such, prior
to introducing its Resolution, Brazil should have either: (1) waited for the
international courts and committees to develop a more concrete view of the subject
matter, or (2) made sure that it had enough supporters to pass the Resolution.
However, Brazil did neither.
Brazil's decision to stop waiting for the judicial branch to fully recognize
such rights is understandable. After all, rights for sexual minorities had been a
(minor) concern of international law for more than twenty years by the time it
introduced its Resolution. 66 Furthermore, the sexual-minority jurisprudence of the
UNHRC was behind that of the ECHR, and perhaps Brazil felt that the issue
deserved more immediate attention.
Brazil's decision to forgo the second option-securing enough votes to pass
the Resolution-is more questionable. Despite Brazil's awareness that several
member states were fiercely opposed to the UN's recognition of rights for sexual
minorities, Brazil gave no advance warning to other states that it was going to
introduce its Resolution and introduced it during the final days of the 2003
session.67 Understandably, its brash decision to do so caught many states off-
guard. In fact, the Brazilian Resolution's introduction was so surprising that a
large number of states that might have otherwise supported the Resolution
abstained from voting on the motion.68  After its introduction, as discussed in
further detail below, states did not vote on the Brazilian Resolution in 2003, and it
was held over to the following session.
Given that the adjudication of rights for sexual minorities had been much
more favorable than the legislation of such rights, the Brazilian Resolution would
have faired better had Brazil simply waited for the judiciary to recognize the rights
asserted by its Resolution. While neither the ECHR nor the UNHRC universally
recognized rights for sexual minorities, they were both quicker (and more
successful) in granting judicial protections against discrimination based on sexual
orientation than member states were in legislating such protections. Another
advantage of advancing such rights through the judicial process is that it allows
advocates to avoid the stalling tactics often employed by states opposed to
recognition of such rights. Quite foreseeably, those opposed to the Brazilian
Resolution immediately employed such tactics, which led to the Resolution's
ultimate demise.
2. The Flaws in Brazil's Introduction of its Resolution
Having been essentially doomed from its inception, the Brazilian Resolution
fared no better once introduced. Introduced on April 17, 2003, the Brazilian
65. See id. (describing failed attempts at The Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and
The World Conference on Racism (2001), among others).
66. See Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. T 63 (holding in 1981 that sodomy laws constitute a breach of
the European Convention on Human Rights).
67. Sanders, supra note 20.
68. Id.
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Resolution was immediately entwined in a political quagmire. While twenty seven
co-sponsors immediately supported the Resolution,69 there was fierce opposition
from both the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and various Vatican-
influenced states, as well as the Holy See itself.70 Those states combined to form a
conglomeration of more than fifty states strongly opposed to the measure based on
religious grounds. 71 They were so opposed, that several Islamic states
immediately moved for a vote of "no action," which would have kept the
Resolution from even being heard on the floor of the Commission.72 However,
that motion was successfully voted down.73 Nonetheless, the Resolution failed to
make it to a vote of the Commission in 2003. Just a few days after Brazil
introduced its Resolution, the Commission voted 24 to 17 (with 10 states
abstaining) to hold over discussion of the Brazilian Resolution until the
Commission's 2004 session.74
Despite the best efforts of many NGOs advocating for the passage of the
Brazilian Resolution, it fared no better during the Commission's 2004 session. In
fact, it faired worse. Although the Commission voted in 2003 to hold-over
discussion of the Brazilian Resolution until the 2004 session, considerable pressure
from the Catholic/Islamic alliance convinced Brazil to withdraw its Resolution
from the 2004 session. In 2005, the Brazilian Resolution died a quite death when
76Brazil failed to re-introduce it to the Commission.
Had Brazil thought about the possible (or even probable) repercussions of the
Resolution's failure, it may not have introduced it so impulsively. However,
because the Resolution was introduced and roundly dismissed, it now presents two
major problems. First, states may now be free to refuse to grant its citizens the
rights advocated by the Brazilian Resolution. That is to say, states may now argue
that because the Commission never even voted on the Brazilian Resolution, it did
not (and does not) intend for sexual minorities to be included within the documents
invoked by the Brazilian Resolution's language. Second, some may argue that
because states expressly refused to accept the language of the Brazilian Resolution,
such states cannot be bound by any interpretations of those documents that include
protections for sexual minorities-including non-binding judicial interpretations.
Additionally, it seems highly likely that had Brazil never presented its Resolution,
the UNHRC would have continued to protect the rights of sexual minorities-
eventually securing the rights advocated by the Brazilian Resolution. Moreover,
those opinions would have been powerfully persuasive over those states that would
ignore such rights.
6 9. Id.
70. Id; Narayan, supra note 36, at 341.
71. Juan Perez Cabral, Vatican, Muslim States Slam Queer Human Rights: Arm-twisting,
Procedural Shenanigans at UN in Geneva, THE GULLY, Apr. 25, 2003, http://www.thegully.com/
essays/gaymundo/030425_UN vatican muslims.html.
72. Sanders, supra note 20.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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While the Commission failed to pass the Brazilian Resolution (or even vote
on it), the Resolution succeeded in raising the profile of issues concerning sexual
minorities. When it became apparent that the Resolution would not pass, several
countries formed their own statements on the issue of sexual orientation.77 Part III
discusses those statements; however, Part II first discusses many of the inherent
flaws in the arguments of the Catholic/Islamic alliance that so vehemently opposed
the Brazilian Resolution.
II. THE INHERENT FLAWS IN THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BRAZILIAN
RESOLUTION'S ADOPTION
While this paper criticizes Brazil's presentation of its Resolution, it is not
meant to suggest that Brazil was at fault for the Resolution's demise. It was not.
In fact, one can argue that those most responsible for the Resolution's death were
those silent states that failed to support the Brazilian Resolution out of fear for
political repercussions. The truth of the matter is that the Brazilian Resolution was
a simple re-affirmation of basic human rights for sexual minorities and should have
been passed. This Part II examines why this is so, exposing the flaws in the
arguments of those who so vehemently opposed adoption of the Brazilian
Resolution.
Although the Catholic/Islamic alliance was successful in leading the Brazilian
Resolution to a rather quiet death, it did not need to be that way. The flaws in their
arguments against recognition of human rights for sexual minorities are threefold.
First, the Organization of the Islamic Conference's (OIC) assertion that sexual-
orientation discrimination is not a concern for the global south, 8 while potentially
true, is simply inapposite with the goals of international human rights laws. While
it may not be a concern of the global south, that does not negate the fact that
human rights violations against sexual minorities still occur-nor does it excuse
them. Second, at various points throughout the debates surrounding the Brazilian
Resolution, the opponents asserted that the term "sexual orientation" had not been
defined in international law.79 However, as discussed below, such a statement is
simply erroneous. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, those opposing the
Brazilian Resolution did so out of a religious bias,80 a bias that, as also discussed
below, necessarily violates international law. The following sections examine each
of these issues in turn.
A. Issues of Gender and Sexuality Fall Squarely within the Concern of
International Human Rights Law81
Once introduced, the Brazilian Resolution was met with immediate
77. Id. The various statements are discussed in detail below, infra Part II.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The title of this subsection is borrowed from a quote of Nicholas Bamforth wherein he makes
such an assertion. See Nicholas Bamforth, Introduction to AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SEX RIGHTS:
OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1 (Nicholas Bamforth ed., 2005) (stating "issues of gender and sexuality
fall squarely within the concern of international human rights law").
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opposition. Those states most opposed to the Brazilian Resolution's introduction
were Islamic and Catholic states. Additionally, both the Vatican and the OIC
circulated letters urging states not to adopt the Brazilian Resolution. The letter
circulated by the OIC between the Commission's 2003 and 2004 sessions stated,
among other things, that in the OIC's perspective sexual orientation is not a human
rights issue.82
While such a statement may have persuaded some states against voting for the
Brazilian Resolution, the veracity of the assertion is questionable. It is true that
those within the OIC may not believe sexual orientation to be a human rights issue,
but there are many who disagree. Numerous scholars, many advocating the
recognition of human rights for sexual minorities, repeatedly assert just the
opposite. As Nicholas Bamforth states in the introduction to an Amnesty
International article, "[t]hat issues of gender and sexuality fall squarely within the
concern of international and national human rights law cannot be doubted." 83 That
is, "at least if one believes that human rights concern a person's ability to lead a
valuable life free from oppression."84
While many scholars write on the topic of sexual orientation and human
rights, " the scholarly argument is not the only one opposed to the OIC's view.
The full body of international law also supports the notion that sexual orientation is
an issue within international law. Throughout the world, sexual minorities
routinely experience persecution and a denial of rights granted to the sexual
majority.8 6 Accordingly, such discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has
been ruled to be violative of both the ICCPR 7 and the ECHR, concern over such
discrimination has found its way into numerous international documents89 and
numerous NGOs focus specifically on human rights violations that affect sexual
minorities.90 With so many players in the field of international human rights law
82. Sanders, supra note 20.
83. Bamforth, supra note 81, at 1.
84. Id. at 14.
85. For an in-depth discussion of this topic, see generally Vincent J. Samar, "Family" and the
Political Landscape for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People (LGBT): Gay-Rights as a
Particular Instantatiation ofHuman Rights, 64 ALB. L. REv. 983 (2001).
86. See O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 211 (describing numerous forms of persecution
endured by sexual minorities).
87. See Toonen, U.N.H.R. Comm'n, No. 488, 1 8.3 (determining that a Tasmanian statute
prohibiting private homosexual behavior violates articles 17, paragraph 1, juncto 2, paragraph 1, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
88. See Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 63 (holding Northern Ireland's laws prohibiting buggery and
acts of homosexual indecency constitute "a breach of Article 8" of the European Convention on Human
Rights).
89. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 214-15.
90. For various political reasons, however, most of those groups have been denied observer status
within the UN. One of the major international organizations dealing with the rights of sexual minorities
is the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA). ILGA was initially granted observer status
within ECOSOC in 1994, but that status was rescinded at the behest of the United States in 1994. Since
then, all attempts to gain observer status by groups representing sexual minorities have been denied.
For a more in-depth discussion of this topic, see Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual
Orientation in International Law, INT'L GAY & LESBIAN Ass'N FILES: U.N. COMM'N ON HUM. RTs,
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spending time on protecting the rights of sexual minorities, it was disingenuous for
the OIC to assert that sexual orientation is not a concern of international law.
Not only are such rights a clearly recognized concern of international human
rights law, international bodies have a moral imperative to recognize these rights.
Now that the issue is clearly a part of the international debate, failure to protect
such rights would be a failure to uphold the human rights of all persons. As such,
the OIC's assertion to the contrary was wrong; but it was also wrong for other
states to acquiesce to the OIC's demands that were based upon such a
disingenuous assertion.
B. International Law Does Define "Sexual Orientation"
The letters circulated by the Vatican and the OIC also expressed concern that
international law does not define the term "sexual orientation." 91 As such, they
suggested that inclusion of the term could lead to protections for universally-
despised acts such as pedophilia. Such an assertion is inaccurate for at least two
reasons. First, it is simply erroneous. International law clearly defines the term
"sexual orientation" and this term is well understood. Second, this assertion
demonstrates the basic misunderstanding between the granting of special rights and
the recognition of human rights. This article discusses each reason below.
The OIC's assertion that "sexual orientation" is undefined in international law
is plainly erroneous. As previously discussed, the term has been used in
international law for more than two decades. Even within the UN, the UNHRC
issued decisions dealing with sexual orientation long before the Brazilian
Resolution's introduction. For example, in Toonen, the UNHRC's first decision to
mention "sexual orientation," the UNHRC definitively stated, "the reference to
'sex' in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 [of the ICCPR] is to be taken as including
sexual orientation."92
It would have been unfathomable for the UNHRC to make such a grand
statement if the term "sexual orientation" was not a clearly defined term.
Likewise, if the term did not have a clear meaning and understanding, the UNHRC
certainly would have taken care to define it before making such a bold
pronouncement. This is especially true given the importance of the term to the
case. However, at no point during its decision did the UNHRC undertake such an
effort. To the contrary, the term "sexual orientation" is so well defined in the
general parlance that the UNHRC used it sixteen times in Toonen without ever
finding a need to officially define it.93
It is not only within the UN that "sexual orientation" is clearly defined; it has
a universally understood definition. Courts and committees of national and
international jurisdiction (including, inter alia, those in France, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States) have included the term "sexual
Nov. 5, 2005, http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/577.
91. Sanders, supra note 20.
92. Toonen, U.N.H.R. Conun'n No. 488 T 8.7.
93. Id. (including individual opinion of Mr. Bertil Wennergren).
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orientation" in their judicial decisions94 Not only have judicial and quasi-judical
bodies readily adopted the term because of its plain meaning; numerous binding
and non-binding international documents and reports throughout the world have
adopted the term.95 Given the broad official use of the term "sexual orientation"
throughout the world, the assertion that "sexual orientation" is an undefined term is
simply preposterous.
It is, in fact, the immediate reaction of those opposing the Brazilian
Resolution that proves the argument's flaw. At no point did any in the opposition
ask for clarification or definition of the term. Yet, they still knew they were
opposed to the introduction of the Brazilian Resolution. That the Vatican and the
OIC immediately reacted against the introduction of the Brazilian Resolution
proves the term "sexual orientation" has a plain and well understood meaning.
Had this not been so, then neither the Vatican nor the OIC could have been
immediately opposed to the Brazilian Resolution. It was only because the meaning
of the term was so well defined that Vatican and OJC were immediately against the
Brazilian Resolution.
Additionally, the claim that the term "sexual orientation" is too vague rings
hollow. The term is certainly no more vague than the phrase used to punish sexual
minorities throughout the OIC's member states. Laws prohibiting "carnal
knowledge of any person against the order of nature"96 are common in many of the
countries represented by the OJC. Yet, these countries use these laws, vague as
they are, to routinely punish only sexual minorities. This is true despite the science
indicating it is the nature of these individuals to desire having sex with someone of
the same-sex.97
94. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581 (2003) (using the term "sexual orientation" without
defining it); EB v. France, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., 4, 9, available at (finding the same); Ghaidan v.
Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, T 9 [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1533 (appeal taken from England) (U.K.),
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/1d200304/ldjudgmt/jd040621/gha-1.htm (finding
the same); Kamer, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R., 133; Halpern v. Canada, [2003] 14 BHRC 687, O.J. 2268, T 6
(Ct. App. Ont. June 10, 2003), available at http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2003/june
/halpernC39172.htm (finding the same).
95. See supra Introduction (discussing prior attempts to legislate rights of sexual minorities).
96. See Douglas Karekona Singiza, Exorcising the Antiquity Spirit of Intolerance: Possibilities
and Dilemmas of Decriminalising Sodomy Laws in Uganda, 11 (Oct. 29, 2007) (unpublished LL.M.
dissertation, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa) available at
http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/5851/1/singiza 2007.pdf. (quoting the Uganda statute that
criminalizes homosexual acts).
97. While the cause of homosexuality is far from settled, much science supports the proposition
that homosexuality is a genetic predisposition. See George Rice et al., Male Homosexuality: Absence of
Linkage to Microsatellite Markers at Xq28, 284 SCI. 665, 665 (1999) ("Several lines of evidence have
implicated genetic factors in homosexuality"), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint
/284/5414 /665.pdf. But see, P.S. Bearman, Opposite-Sex Twins and Adolescent Same-Sex Attraction,
107 AM. J. Soc. 1179, 1179 (2005) ("the pattern of concordance (similarity across pairs) of same-sex
preference for sibling pairs does not suggest genetic influence independent of social context").
However, even if sexual orientation is a choice made by homosexuals, the argument that those choosing
homosexuality should be granted the same rights granted to all individuals is not diminished by such a
conclusion. This is because homosexuals and other sexual minorities are nonetheless human and
therefore just as deserving of basic human rights.
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The second reason the argument is flawed is that it shows a basic
misunderstanding between granting special rights and protecting human rights.
The Brazilian Resolution sought to do only the latter. Even if one accepted the
argument that the term's vagueness would lead to the inclusion of pedophilia, such
an inclusion would not grant pedophiles any special rights.98 The Brazilian
Resolution sought to grant all sexual minorities (including, hypothetically,
pedophiles) only the basic human right to be free from discrimination for their
existence. Such a basic recognition of human rights would not remove any
domestic sanctions that might be imposed for non-consensual (i.e. forced or
exploitative) acts. The difference is one of being versus doing, and those fearful of
the inclusion of persons such as pedophiles miss the key element present in the
legal acts of sexual minorities; they are committed between consenting adults.99
International law clearly defines the term "sexual orientation." Universal use
of the term with a clear understanding of its meaning spans several decades. And,
even if some construe it to include persons such as pedophiles or rapists, such an
inclusion would have been of no consequence to the adoption of the Brazilian
Resolution. As such, the argument that international law does not define "sexual
orientation" is simply devoid of merit.
C. Freedom ofReligion Necessarily Includes Freedom from Religion
As their third argument against the Brazilian Resolution, both the OIC and the
Vatican asserted that religious law would prevent them from recognizing the
Brazilian Resolution and that, if adopted, there would be severe consequences.100
By invoking the tenants of their religious laws to negate the human rights of sexual
minorities, the OIC and the Vatican exposed the inherent flaws in allowing
religious law to exist within the framework of the UN.
This section discusses those flaws, but in the process it presents a much
broader argument than the previous sections. It looks at the history and framework
of the UN, using the case of sexual minorities to expose why religious law cannot
co-exist with international human rights laws within the UN. In so doing, the
purpose is not to promote religious intolerance, but rather to promote religious
freedom. This section argues that when religious law and religious freedom
conflict, as is often the case, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
98. It is odd that the concern expressed is for pedophiles rather than rapists. Perhaps that is
because a concern for rapists would require the OIC to acknowledge the many acts of rape its member
states perpetrate against sexual minorities in an attempt to "correct" their behavior. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, BREAKING THE SILENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION (1994) and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CRIMES OF HATE, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE:
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT BASED ON SEXUAL IDENTITY (2001), available at http://www.amnesty.
org/en/library/info/ACT40/016/2001/en.
99. At all times, this paper takes as a given that the sex acts discussed consist of acts between two
consenting adults. While the issue of what constitutes consent is an interesting one, it is not for this
paper. Nonetheless, this paper does not suggest that those persons (sexual minorities or otherwise)
engaged in non-consensual sex acts, should be outside the reach of the law.
100. Sanders, supra note 20.
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requires religious freedom to reign supreme. To best represent this argument, this
section takes as its example the existence of Shari'a law 01 within the UN. 102
To properly understand the rights guaranteed by the UDHR, one must look
beyond the text of the document. That is not to say that the text should be ignored;
only that one must consider it within its broader context, taking into account both
the document's history and the framework of its guarantees. This section briefly
discusses each of these concerns-looking first to the text, then exploring both the
history and framework of the UDHR. After properly framing its significance, this
section proceeds to the broader discussion of why religious law cannot properly
co-exist with international human rights law.
1. The Text, History, and Framework of the UDHR
To best understand the significance of the UDHR's guarantee of religious
freedom, one must first look to the document's text. Article 2 of the UDHR states
"everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as ... religion."10 3 Article 18 further asserts,
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manfest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance."104 Read together, these two Articles
clearly affirm the right of all persons, without distinction of any kind, to freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion, which includes the right to practice and
worship in one's own way. Such is the text of the UDHR, but as simple as that
statement may sound, one cannot fully understand its meaning without looking to
both the history and framework of the UDHR.
When trying to understand the UDHR's guarantee of religious freedom, one
must also look to the UN's history-including the horrific events that preceded its
formation. Specifically, one must not forget the enormous role religion played in
fostering the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis during World War II. It was the
extermination of millions of people, based on both religious and ethnic grounds,
which led to the birth of the UN in 1945. Not only did World War II see the most
rapid killing of members of a religious minority in human history,05 but the Nazis'
actions were condoned, and at times assisted, by numerous religious organizations
101. Islamic law. "The Arabic word means literally 'a way to a watering place,' and thus, a path to
be followed. According to Muslim belief, it is the path ordained by God for the guidance of mankind,
and must be followed by all Muslims." JAMILA HUSSAIN, ISLAM: ITS LAW AND SOCIETY 28 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
102. This is not done in an attempt to disparage Islam or Shari'a law. It is done only because
Shari'a law provides the clearest example of the inherent conflict between religious and international
law. However, within the context of the Brazilian Resolution, the arguments put forth below would
apply equally to those states that followed the lead of the Vatican, which also asserted that religious law
would prevent it from recognizing the Brazilian Resolution.
103. UIDHR, supra note 3, art. 2.
104. Id. art. 18 (emphasis added).
105. D. NIEWYK & FRANCIS NICOSIA, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO THE HOLOCAUST 45 (2000)
(estimating that more than 5,000,000 Jewish people were killed by the Nazis between the years 1933
and 1945).
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throughout the world.106 It is with these circumstances in mind that one must look
at the UDHR's promise of religious freedom. 107
Additionally, the Preamble to the UDHR clearly shows the intent to rectify
these travesties of World War II. Among other things, the Preamble states:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people. 108
Now, having read the UDHR's text, including the Preamble and the articles
specifically relating to religion, and considering those words within its historical
context, a clearer intent of its meaning emerges. Not only does the UDHR
guarantee religious freedom, but it does so for the purpose of rectifying and
preventing barbarous acts that have outraged the conscience of mankind.
However, a full understanding of the UDHR's religious-freedom guarantees also
necessitates a consideration of the UDHR's framework.
Understanding the framework of the UDHR helps solidify the proper
understanding of its religious-freedom guarantees. The U.N. General Assembly
adopted the UDHR on December 10, 1948. It is part of the U.N.'s International
Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) which consists of the UDHR, as well as the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (and its two
Optional Protocols). The U.N. General Assembly completed the IBHR in 1966
when it adopted both the ICESCR and the ICCPR. These documents work in
conjunction with one another to protect human rights throughout the world.
In reading each of the documents that make up the IBHR, it becomes clear
that the IBHR grants religious freedom to the individual, not the state. For
instance, Article 55 of the U.N. Charter states that the UN shall "promote . . .
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."1 09 The UDHR
further compels religious freedom for the individual in its statement that,
106. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT, 235-51 (2007) (describing the acquiescence of
the Vatican, which signed the very first diplomatic accord undertaken by Hitler after his seizure of
power, and other religious organizations throughout Europe who failed to even try to stop the Nazi's
attempted extermination of the Jews).
107. Article 2 of the UDHR states "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . religion," and article 18 further asserts,
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion." UDHR, supra note 3, arts. 2
& 18.
108. UDHR, supra note 3, Preamble.
109. U.N. Charter, art. 55.
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"[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights ... without distinction of any kind, such as .
. . religion."110 The ICCPR is no less precise in according the right to the
individual within the state by expressing, "the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized in the present
Covenant without distinction of any kind, such as . . . religion."" Likewise,
Article 5 of ICESCR asserts, "[n]othing in the present Covenant may be
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or
freedoms recognized herein."11 2 Taken together, these documents unequivocally
establish that the rights of the individual are paramount, and that the rights
provided for and protected by these documents exist with the individual.
Having established that the UDHR's religious-freedom guarantee is granted
to the individual and intended to prevent future atrocities executed in the name of
religion, the following sub-section proceeds to the broader discussion of why
religious law cannot co-exist with international human rights law.
2. Why Religious Law Cannot Co-Exist with International Human Rights
Law
Having explored the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (UDHR) text,
history, and framework within the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR), it is
now possible to explore why religious law cannot co-exist with international
human rights law. Simply put, the IBHR prohibits the existence of theocracies
within the UN because its religious-freedom guarantees reside with the individual
(not the state), and it granted these guarantees to prevent states from executing
future atrocities in the name of religion. As such, the IBHR's goals are in direct
conflict with the goals of theocracies.
Theocracies exist not to guarantee religious freedom, but to impose religious
law upon their citizens regardless of whether their citizens ascribe to those beliefs
or not. Accordingly, theocracies necessarily violate international law in at least
two ways. First, by denying individuals the ability to worship according to the
dictates of their own conscience, theocracies deny individuals of their right to
religious freedom as guaranteed under the IBHR.113 Second, as demonstrated by
the OIC's refusal to allow the Brazilian Resolution to come to a vote, theocracies
often deny groups or individuals of basic human rights under the guise of religious
doctrine. This paper discusses both of these concepts in further detail below.
110. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 2 (emphasis added).
111. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), arts. 2, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, (emphasis added).
112. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), arts.
5, December 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, (emphasis added).
113. As previously mentioned, this argument is examined by considering the U.N. member states
that apply Shari'a law. This is done not in an attempt to disparage Islam, but simply because such states
- by deriving their domestic law almost entirely from religious texts - provide the clearest example
from which to understand this argument. Again, much of the rationale used herein can also be applied
to the Vatican and other states that rely heavily on other religious texts for their domestic law.
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By denying individuals the ability to worship according to the dictates of their
own conscience, theocracies subject religious minorities to state persecution and
deny individuals of the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees. Although not
always recognized, these guarantees necessarily embody both negative and
positive rights. All would agree that the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees
prevent a state from discriminating against individuals because of religion. This is
typically understood to mean that states may not discriminate against individuals
based upon the individual's religion. However, since the IBHR's religious-
freedom guarantees exist to prevent the types of tragedies that precipitated its
creation, it must also be true that states may not discriminate against persons
because of the state's religion. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the
IBHR's history and that its religious-freedom guarantees reside with the individual
rather than the state.
Exploring the case of sexual minorities within Shari'a law shows why this
must be the case. In countries that abide by Shari'a law, there is no other source of
law (such as the common law) and all citizens of that country are subject to the
requirements of Shari'a law. 1 14 This is true, for example, of sexual minorities who
choose to live by a religion other than Islam (presumably one that does not
condemn them for their homosexual acts)."' Although states applying Shari'a law
may allow such individuals the choice to practice another religion, many of those
states still condemn non-Islamic individuals for their homosexual acts.
Accordingly, while Shari'a law may allow sexual minorities to choose a religion
that would not condemn their sexual acts, that freedom of choice does not, by
itself, protect them from the state condemning such acts. Such a result is untenable
given the IBHR's clear intent to prevent state discrimination based upon religion.
Not only do theocracies wrongfully subject sexual minorities to state
discrimination, they also prevent sexual minorities from fully practicing the
religion they choose. As previously discussed, Article 18 of the UDHR ensures
that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in teaching practice, worship and observance."1 16 However, by requiring non-
Islamic citizens to adhere to Shari'a law, such states deny those individuals of the
right to "manifest [their] religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance." Accordingly, by subjecting sexual minorities to punishments for acts
not prohibited under their own religion, Shari'a law prevents sexual minorities
114. HUSSAIN, supra note 101, at 6 ("Islamic law is entirely religious. In theory, there is no
separation between 'church' and state.").
115. While many Islamic interpretations of both the Qur'an and the Hadith assert that both
explicitly refer to homosexuality as a grave sin punishable by stoning, there are those who contest
whether homosexuality is even prohibited by the tenets of Islam. See id at 9 ("Islamic law prohibits ...
some types of personal relationships, such as . . . homosexual relationships"). But see, Narayan, supra
note 36, at 342 ("historical analyses indicate that there is great variance in the interpretation of Islamic
religious principles with respect to homosexuality . . . [which] is not explicitly referenced in the
Q'uran").
116. UIDHR, supra note 3, art. 18.
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from fully practicing the religion of their own choosing. Unless the state allows a
person to both freely choose and fully practice their right to religious freedom, that
state denies its citizens of the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees.
Certainly, however, one could argue that the IBHR's goal is only to prevent
states from discriminating against individuals because of their chosen religion,
rather than preventing states from instituting religious law. Put another way, it is
arguable that the IBHR requires only that a state treat all religious groups equally
and not grant certain rights to one religious group while denying such rights to
other religious groups. Therefore, one could assert that Shari'a law's presence
within the UN does not violate the IBHR, because the law in those states applies
equally to all citizens regardless of their religion. However, such an understanding
of the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees is horribly restrictive and does not
offer the protections necessary to prevent the types of atrocities that prompted the
UDHR's creation."
As previously discussed, nations developed the UDHR in response to the
barbarous acts perpetrated during World War II. Given the oppressive historical
backdrop of the UDHR's creation, it is difficult to imagine how the UDHR's
framers would condone the imposition of religious ideals upon any group in the
name of religious freedom. That the Jews of Europe were free to exercise their
religion did not prevent the Nazis from killing several million of them. Likewise,
that sexual minorities living under Shari'a law are free to practice a religion that
would not condemn them in the afterlife does not prevent states from applying
Shari'a law to condemn them in this life. That the IBHR's religious-freedom
guarantees would allow such a curious result seems dubious, especially given the
fact that sexual minorities also endured the wrath of the Nazis' extermination
attempts.118  Consequently, if the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees mean
anything, they must include not only the freedom of religion, but also the freedom
from religion. Theocracies necessarily deny their citizens of the latter right, and as
such their existence within the UN is inconsistent with the IBHR's religious-
freedom guarantees.
While theocracies necessarily deny individuals of the IBHR's religious-
freedom guarantees, they also violate international law by using religious doctrine
to cover blatant human rights violations. Exploring the story of the Brazilian
Resolution more closely shows why this is true. In opposing the Brazilian
Resolution, the OIC and Vatican asserted that homosexuality is contrary to their
religious law. 119 However, the OIC went even further. Speaking on behalf of the
OIC, Pakistan stated that adoption of the Brazilian Resolution would lead to
significant repercussions. 120 By invoking the teachings of their religious law, the
117. See supra Part IIJ.C (explaining the history leading to the UDHR's creation).
118. It is estimated that "some 50,000 gays were branded criminals and degenerates by the Third
Reich and 10,000 to 15,000 went to concentration camps, from which few ever returned." BBC News,
Berlin to Mark Nazis' Gay Victims (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/3314887.stm
119. Sanders, supra note 20.
120. See id. (stating that the Pakistan delegate asserted that "attempts to develop norms which
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OIC and Vatican exposed the second flaw of allowing theocracies to exist within
the UN; theocracies often deny groups or individuals of basic human rights under
the guise of religious doctrine.
In preventing the Commission from voting on the Brazilian Resolution, the
OIC and Vatican also denied those citizens of many other rights. The Brazilian
Resolution's adoption would have affirmed that sexual minorities are included
within the scope of numerous international human rights documents, thereby
explicitly granting such rights to sexual minorities. Had the Commission adopted
the Brazilian Resolution, there would have been no question that the protections of
those documents included sexual minorities. However, because the Commission
never voted on the Resolution, whether the Commission intends for sexual
minorities to be included within the documents invoked by the Brazilian
Resolution's language remains an open question. And, at least for now, states are
arguably free to continue subjecting sexual minorities to "persistent human rights
violations." 21
Nevertheless, in considering whether the Brazilian Resolution's stagnation
leaves the question open, it is important to note that "[h]uman rights have a
particular pre-occupation with disadvantaged individuals and groups. This pre-
occupation is reflected in numerous provisions of international human rights law,
not least those enshrining the principles of non-discrimination and equality." 22 As
such, the IBHR's text and history caution against an interpretation that would
negate the human rights of sexual minorities. Throughout history, millions of
people have been and continue to be slaughtered in the name of religion. 123 Sexual
minorities are one such group that continues to be subjected to "persistent human
rights violations."1 2 4 This, despite the UDHR's clear dictate that "[e]veryone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in [the UDHR], without distinction
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status."125
It is immaterial whether the UDHR should include sexual minorities within
the guise of "sex," "other status," or "everyone." Under any interpretation, it is
difficult to understand how one could read the UDHR's broad language as
excluding sexual minorities, especially when considering that sexual minorities
were among those intentionally killed by the Nazis. 126 Accordingly, even without
directly contradict fundamental value systems need to be avoided . . . . No Islamic society would be
able to accept any obligation which directly contradicts the basic tenants of our religion.").
121. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 208.
122. Paul Hunt & Gillian MacNoughton, A Human Rights-Based Approach to Health Indicators, in
EcoNOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION 303 (Mashood A. Baderin & Robert
McCorquodale eds., 2007).
123. See HITCHENS, supra note 106, at 235-51 (discussing numerous examples of mass killings
perpetrated in the name of religion).
124. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 208.
125. UIDHR, supra note 3, art. 2.
126. It is estimated that "some 50,000 gays were branded criminals as degenerates by the Third
Reich and 10,000 to 15,000 went to concentration camps, from which few ever returned." BBC News,
Berlin to Mark Nazis' Gay Victims, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe
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the Commission's adoption of the Brazilian Resolution, those human rights
documents invoked by the Resolution's text necessarily extend to sexual
minorities. But, by invoking religious doctrine, the OIC and the Vatican have so
far succeeded in denying these basic human rights to sexual minorities. Such a
result is inapposite with international law, and exposes one reason why theocracies
should not exist within the UN.
III. PROGRESS MADE IN THE ADVANCEMENT OF RIGHTS FOR SEXUAL MINORITIES
SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN RESOLUTION
To be sure, Brazil made a major misstep in presenting the Brazilian
Resolution without first gamering enough support to ensure its passage. However,
that does not mean that no good has come from its introduction. As previously
mentioned, the Commission's inability to pass the Brazilian Resolution was not a
complete failure in terms of advancing sexual minorities' rights. In fact, by raising
the profile of human rights and sexual orientation, the Brazilian Resolution helped
advance those rights throughout international law-despite its demise. And,
perhaps that is all that Brazil sought to do by introducing its Resolution.
Since 2003, when Brazil first introduced its Resolution to the Commission,
supportive governments have introduced numerous similarly themed documents to
other UN bodies. On December 18, 2008, France and The Netherlands presented
the U.N. General Assembly with the first declaration concerning gay rights.
Although originally intended as a resolution, it lacked support for adoption as such
and was quickly met with an opposing statement from the OIC.127 It is now known
as the United Nations Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity ("Statement"). 128 Interestingly, the Statement is more strongly worded
than was the Brazilian Resolution. It condemns, among other things, "human
rights violations based on sexual orientation or gender identity wherever they
occur."1 29 However, despite its strong language, the Statement won the support of
sixty-six countries in the U.N. General Assembly.130
Additionally, countries signed multiple statements expressing concern for
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, and altogether sixty
countries have signed at least one statement.131 Most significantly, on January 12,
2006, Norway presented the U.N. Human Rights Council with a "statement on
human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity on behalf
of ... 54 states,"13 2 which "urge[d] the Human Rights Council to pay due attention
/3314887.stm.
127. Neil MacFarquhar, In a First, Gay Rights Are Pressed at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008,
at A22.
128. Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, G.A. Res. 2435, T 6, 4th
plen. mtg., (Dec. 18 2008).
129. Id.
130. MacFarquhar, supra note 127, at A22.
131. ILGA, SUPPORTIVE GOVERNMENTS: 60 COUNTRIES HAVE PUBLICLY SUPPORTED SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AT THE CHR/HRC BETwEEN 2003 AND 2008 (2008), available at http://ilga.org/ilga/
en/article/583.
132. The Norwegian Statement, Human Rights Council, Dec. 1, 2006, http://www.ilga-
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to human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity." 133 The
Norwegian Statement was particularly notable because several Islamic States
actually signed onto it, 134despite Pakistan's assertion that no Islamic state could
ever support any document expressing concern over human rights violations of
sexual minorities.13 5
Outside of the UN, numerous Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) have
continued to work feverishly to protect the rights of sexual minorities. Although it
did not occur during a session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Brazil did
eventually get a version of its Resolution passed by an international governing
body. In 2008, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a slightly
modified version of the original Brazilian Resolution. The "non-binding resolution
was passed by consensus, meaning that all OAS countries agreed including the
United States."l36
In addition to the work of IGOs, individual experts in the field of human
rights and sexual orientation have been hard at work as well. In March of 2007, a
group of human rights experts launched the Yogyakarta Principles on the
Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity (Yogyakarta Principles). The Yogyakarta Principles are a
collection of twenty-nine principles relating to human rights and sexual
orientation. Each enumerated principle contains recommendations directed at
states to assure their fulfillment. "The Principles are intended as a coherent and
comprehensive identification of the obligation of States to respect, protect and
fulfill the human rights of all persons regardless of their sexual orientation or
gender identity." 137
Although the Commission failed to pass the Brazilian Resolution, it is
arguable that Brazil managed to do indirectly what it was unable to do directly.
After all, it can be assumed by Brazil's actions that it sought merely to raise the
profile of human rights violations based on sexual orientation. Certainly it has
managed to do that. While there are still numerous states that vehemently oppose
adoption of such a resolution, many other states, IGOs, and NGOs have worked
tirelessly over the past six years to advance those rights.
europe.org/europe/issues/international/norwegian-statement at the un.
133. Id.
134. The Norwegian Statement was signed by Albania, which is member state of the OIC.
Additionally it was signed by Bosnia & Herzegovina and Cyprus, both of which have observer status
with the OIC. See id. (listing all signatories); Organization of the Islamic Conference, Member States,
http://www.oic-oci.org/member states.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (listing OIC member states);
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Observers http://www.oic-oci.org/page detail.asp?pid=179
(last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (listing OIC observers).
135. Sanders, supra note 20.
136. Samantha Singson, Brazil Successfully Pushes Homosexual Rights at OAS Meeting, 34 CATH.
FAM. & HUM. RTS. INST. 1, 1 (2008), available at http://www.c-fam.org/publications/id.696/pub
detail.asp.
137. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 207.
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All this adds up to show that the rights of sexual minorities are a concern of
the international community, and that those concerns are being recognized and
slowly advanced. The Commission was designed so that all states would be held
to the same human rights standards. With that in mind, the Brazilian Resolution
should have passed, for it sought nothing more than a mere acknowledgment that
states show concern for violations of human rights based on sexual orientation.
However, the states opposing the Brazilian Resolution were those states most
likely to be guilty of committing egregious violations of human rights against
sexual minorities. In failing to pass the Brazilian Resolution, the Commission
itself failed in its duty to promote and protect human rights.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the world, numerous groups are denied basic human rights
because of their status within society. Oftentimes, those committing violations of
human rights against these groups assert that they have a perfectly valid reason for
doing so. In the case of sexual minorities, the reasons asserted for such violations
appear at first glance to be logical. Surely, no one wants to grant special rights to
sexual predators such as rapists and pedophiles, nor does anyone wish to rely upon
laws that are based on undefined terms. Furthermore, religion is a very important
and sacred part of millions of lives, and deserves the utmost deference.
However, this paper has attempted to explain why those arguments are not as
sound as they may first seem. Sexual minorities are not seeking special rights,
only basic human rights. Moreover, sexual predators are easily distinguishable
from sexual minorities. The latter group deals with adults who have consensual
sexual relations with one another, whereas the former does not. Additionally,
while the use of undefined terms can bring havoc upon the legal system, the term
"sexual orientation" presents no such problems. Numerous laws and judicial
decisions throughout the world use the term. And as for religion, while it does
deserve a certain level of respect, a concern for human rights deserves more. The
international community cannot allow religion to excuse persistent human rights
violations.
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GLOBAL LEGALISM:
THE ILLUSION OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Reviewed by Christopher J Eby*
ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
PRESS, 2009).
I. INTRODUCTION
In our increasingly complex and interconnected world, problems emerge that
cannot be solved by the actions of one nation. For those problems that exceed the
scope and capability of individual governments, international law and international
government become the only possible solution. If international law aligns with
state interests, compliance is both expected and easy to explain. However, when a
state is confronted with international law antithetical to their self-interest, nothing
prevents the state from simply violating or withdrawing from the international law.
Global legalists believe that international law will solve complex global
problems and that states will comply because a legalistic culture will establish faith
in international law. American global legalists generally believe that "the very
high value of international law creates a presumption against violating it that is so
strong that, for all practical purposes, it may never be violated."' European global
legalists argue that "international law has value for its own sake ... and therefore
it is wrong for states to evaluate potentially illegal conduct with a cost-benefit
analysis that uses national interests as a metric."2
Nevertheless, states do use self-interest as their standard when contemplating
compliance. These interests are result of a nation fulfilling its obligations to its
citizens. "A state's interest is fixed - the product of the domestic political process,
reflecting the values and preferences of the public in a democracy, and those of a
narrower elite in an authoritarian system. In short, the state's interest comes from
within, and mainly concerns the security and prosperity of the state's citizens."
While campaigning, President Obama declared, "[p]romoting-and respecting-
clear rules that are consistent with our values allows us to hold all nations to a high
standard of behavior, and to mobilize friends and allies against those nations that
* University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Juris Doctorate expected 2011, Staff Editor of the
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
1. ERIc A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM xii (2009).
2. Id.
3. Eric A. Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court's 2003-2003 Term: Some
Skeptical Observations, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 23, 24 (2004).
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break the rules. Promoting strong international norms helps us advance many
interests . . . ." Recommendations from the United Nations Association of the
United States of America in an occasional paper titled "Renewing America's
Commitment to International Law" framed many of the recommendations in terms
of American self-interest. "To secure agreement and cooperation on issues central
to American security, the US needs to lead by example and ratify and implement
existing arms control and environmental treaties."5  "US adherence to the
international treaty regime is essential to America's ability to induce other nations
to join in the cooperative action necessary to address the great many global
problems that are far beyond our ability to solve alone."6
Global legalism creates an illusion of order that loses its luster when removed
from the vacuum of theory and exposed to the harsh light of global reality. In The
Perils of Global Legalism, Professor Posner critically examines the arguments set
forth by leading global legalists, addressing the fundamental flaws in their logic.
He categorizes global legalism as "an excessive faith in the efficacy of
international law" and cautions against adopting this mistaken view of the world.
In this book review, I analyze Professor Posner's arguments by answering the
following questions: (1) What is global legalism? (2) What are the flaws of global
legalism? and (3) What impact does the presence of a large network of
international courts have when considering the validity of global legalism?
II. DEFINING GLOBAL LEGALISM
A. Collective Action Problems
Nationally, goods services exist that private organizations cannot routinely
provide for citizens. Classic examples of these public goods include transportation
and national defense. Globally, the same types of problems exist; private
organizations and national governments cannot solve them on their own. Professor
Posner categorizes these as "collective action problems." Examples of these
problems are war, pollution, overfishing, disease, terror, global macroeconomic
shocks, and transnational crime.9 The efforts of any one nation are simply
insufficient to combat such problems. However, they have serious ramifications
and the potential to impact the quality of life for every citizen of every nation.
Unfortunately, resolving these collective problems on a global level is a far
more challenging task than identifying them. Exceeding any single nation's
authority or capability, collective action problems require just that: collective
action. This cooperation is hard to come by for several reasons. First, states are
4. The American Society of International Law, International Law 2008 - Barack Obama,
http://www.asil.org/obamasurvey.cfm (quoting then-Senator and Presidential Candidate Barack Obama)
(emphasis added) (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
5. LAWRENCE C. Moss, RENEWING AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(2010) (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
7. POSNER, supra note 1, at xii.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 3-6.
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motivated by their self-interest. "International law emerges from states' pursuit of
self-interested policies on the international stage."10 Additionally, the tremendous
heterogeneity of the global population brings countless values and needs to the
bargaining table." The divide is particularly wide between developing and
industrial nations. Industrial nations have the ability to address long-term
problems like environmental protection. 12 "For the developing world, the pressing
environmental problem is not over-development, but rather the absence of
economic development. The horrors of poverty, war, disease, malnutrition, and
starvation are immediate evils in themselves, and they contribute directly to
environmental devastation in the developing world."1 3  This heterogeneity is
unavoidable and complicates the development of international law. States acting
to further their conflicting self-interests frustrates the goal of a well-defined, well-
functioning international law.
These challenges are so great that some, including Professor Posner, argue
that the resolution of global problems is unlikely.
It seems plausible that global collective action problems cannot be
solved-or not very well. If it is true that national governments are
needed to solve national collective action problems, then it seems that it
would follow that a world government would be needed to solve global
collective action problems. If a world government is not possible, then
solving global collective action problems is also not possible. 14
B. Global Legalism
Global legalism has been offered as a solution to these collective problems.
"[L]egalism defined broadly is the view that law and legal institutions can keep
order and solve policy disputes. It manifests itself in powerful courts, a dominant
class of lawyers, and reliance on legalistic procedures in policymaking bodies."
Strong legal institutions and ideology support legalistic societies. The codification
of rules, thorough procedural safeguards during the trial process, the adversarial
system, and the central role of detached judges increase the faith citizens have in
the law. 1 6 Global legalism applies these factors on an international level. Global
legalism "is most easily understood as an alternative to the other approaches to
solving global collective action problems. According to global legalism,
international law will solve these problems. Global legalism is the world
government approach except without the government."1 7  In spite of the severe
limitations of world government, global legalists believe that international law can
10. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIc A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005).
11. POSNER, supra note 1, at 7.
12. John S. Applegate & Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction: Syncopated Sustainable Development,
9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2001).
13. Id.
14. POSNER, supra note 1, at 7-8.
15. Id. at 21.
16. Id. at 19-21.
17. Id. at 24.
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solve global problems.1 8 However, "global legalism is not a doctrine or theory. It
is akin to an attitude or posture-a set of beliefs about how the world works, one
that, in various forms, dominates the thinking of academic international lawyers, as
well as practicing government officials." 19
Global legalists believe "that law without government can nonetheless solve
global problems."20 International disputes should be resolved through international
law. For example, "[w]ars should not be fought without the approval of the United
Nations; disputes should be submitted to international courts."21 States must
bolster international institutions to increase the efficacy of international law;
increasing the importance of treaties and establishing effective international courts
are fundamental to an effective international law. "[T]hough global legalists
acknowledge that a full-fledged world government is not possible in the near term"
international institutions "should be promoted to the extent possible."22 Global
legalists also "believe that domestic political institutions should be bound by
international legal obligations." 23 The combination of effective global government
institutions and compulsory laws would strengthen international law's ability to
solve global problems.
Several factors explain the rise and prevalence of global legalism.
"[P]roblems of global collective action have multiplied and increased in
seriousness, and alternative mechanisms for solving them, such as world
government, are no more plausible today than they ever have been in the past."24
Unlike a global govermment, international law as a solution to world problems has
not concretely failed.25 Meanwhile, the success of legalism on a national level in
countries like the United States has spread to other countries.2 6 Encouraged by the
success and spread of domestic legalism, faith in international law, at first glance,
appears appealing. In the face of global collective action problems beyond state's
control it is reasonable to attempt to emulate the most successful nations' approach
to resolving their own great problems. Finally, legalism thrives in heterogeneous
cultures. "When people cannot resolve their differences by appealing to common
religious beliefs, or common ethnic norms, or common historic memories, or tribal
elders, they can at least appeal to the law."27 With an immensely diverse global
population, values and beliefs do not translate across all borders, and detached and
neutral judges can resolve conflicts without imposing ethnic or historic biases.
18. Id. at xiii.
19. Id. at 16.
20. POSNER, supra note 1, at 24.
21. Id. at 25.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 38.
25. Id. at 26.
26. POSNER, supra note 1, at 23.
27. Id. at 18-19.
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III. THE FLAWS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM
A. International Law Lacks Institutional Support
Legalists believe in "law without government."28 They reject the notion that
international government is necessary to ensure compliance with international law.
Nevertheless, international law "does not have the capacity to command respect as
domestic law (in some countries) does, because it is not backed by a world
government that has the support of a global community." 29 Two institutions are
noticeably absent from the international stage: an effective legislature, and
effective enforcement institutions.
In most states, law is made through legislative process. Formal legislative
structures provide legitimacy and ensure that the law reflects the will of the people.
Internationally, this is not the case.30 "The United Nations General Assembly
lacks the power to enact legally binding rules. The Security Council does have the
power to issue legally binging orders, but its power is limited. It does not have the
power to issue legislation."31 As a result, international law is made through
treaties. There are several problems with this approach. First, "[a] state can be
bound by a treaty only if it consents to it; thus, a treaty that will solve a global
collective action problem requires the consent of all states, or all states that
contribute to that problem."3 2 Requiring this unanimity imposes a heavier burden
on international lawmakers and the resulting treaties "usually end up imposing
weak obligations."33 Finally, treaties are difficult to amend. States are wary about
entering into long-term irrevocable agreements, resulting in fewer and weaker
treaties.34
Additionally, international law lacks capable enforcement mechanisms.
Domestically, states have organized institutions that enforce their law. Police
make arrests, subject to the limitations of the law.35 Courts often require
institutional support to impose their final judgments. The functions of enforcement
agencies are vital not just for the administration of any legal system, but also the
economic health of the nation. "Economies can function only if contract and
property rights are respected."36  Moreover, enforcement agencies maintaining
order and prevent violations of citizens' rights. In the absence of strong
enforcement agencies, "it would be too easy for the state to abuse its citizens, and
for some citizens to use the state to abuse other citizens."37 The UN Security
28. Id. at xiii.
29. Id. at 39.
30. Id. at 29.
31. Id.
32. POSNER, supra note 1, at 29.
33. Id. at 30.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 32.
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Council is the sole global enforcement agency, and its power is severely limited.38
According to Posner,
Even when the Security Council can agree to approve some action, it
cannot call upon an army or police force to carry out its will. It can only
authorize or order states to call upon their armies to carry out the
Security Council's will, but the states have ample reason not to
participate, and few do.39
The lack of an international enforcement agency threatens the global legalist
contention that states will comply with international law when it contradicts their
self-interest. In the absence of a compelling inducement to follow international
law, such as the threat of a powerful enforcement agency, total compliance with
international law is unexpected.
B. Considerations ofLegitimacy
International law must be perceived as legitimate in order to effectively
govem the nations that consent to its authority. Professor Posner notes,
"[i]nternational law has force because (or to the extent that) it is legitimate."40
National governments acting contrary to the interests of their citizens are perceived
41
as illegitimate and individuals challenge the authority of those governments. On
the global level, national governments, rather than individuals become the
constituents. "[V]irtually everyone around the world owes his or her primary
loyalty to a state, which delivers goods such as security that promote local values
,42
and interests." As a result, international government lacks a direct connection to
the individuals governed. Professor Posner explains the implications:
The problem with global legalism is that because international law
reflects the interests of governments, it will not always be consistent
with the moral sense or legitimate interests of populations, so it will lack
the authority that law needs to command general assent among
individuals. This is not to say that populations will reject all
international law; many people will benefit from specific treaties and
support them accordingly. Rather, it is to say that international law will
always be more appealing in theory than in practice.43
In contrast to domestic law, "[i]nternational law is a series of compromises
between somewhat better governments, mediocre governments, and bad
governments. It is not a reflection of the will or interests of a political community
in the way that law created by democratic governments may be."" However,
ignoring the will of the people ultimately governed by the law reduces the
perception of legitimacy. "[N]o system of law will be perceived as legitimate
38. POSNER, supra note 1, at 32.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 35.
41. Id.
42. Id. at xii.
43. Id. at 37.
44. POSNER, supra note 1, at 51.
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unless those governed by that law believe that the law does good-serves their
interests or respects and enforces their values."45 With both state and individual
constituents, international law must maintain accountability to both parties in order
to preserve its legitimacy and effectively govern the globe.
C. Problems ofSovereign Equality
International law also faces the challenge of sovereign equality. Because
international law requires state consent, effective international law requires all
states that participate in the creation of a problem to consent to law governing their
behavior. "What this means is that if nearly everyone in the world agrees that
some global legal instrument would be beneficial (a climate treaty, the UN
charter), it can be blocked by a tiny country like Iceland (population 300,000) or a
dictatorship like North Korea."4 6  This mandate of unanimity is a far higher
threshold for a law to pass than the majority rule required by most legislatures.
This impedes the establishment of strong international laws because "international
law cannot be created unless all agree."47 A proposed international law will either
be defeated by the absolute veto power possessed by every nation, or will survive
in a diluted form. In either case, sovereign equality sharply contradicts global
legalists' reliance on strong international law.
D. Global Fragmentation
Global legalists point to the increase in treaties as an indication of the
increased importance and efficacy of international law. They argue that "the
lawmaking and institution-building activities of the last sixty years show that
ordinary people and elites have thrown their lot with international law."48
Professor Posner attributes this increase to the fragmentation of states, rather than
the value of international law, noting: "the greater-than-threefold increase in states
since World War II surely accounts for much of the international legal activity-
the treaty making, the institution building-that we continue to observe today." 49
The larger number of states increases the necessity and possibility of interstate
agreements to govern a nation's interactions with another. "When only 50 states
existed, the number of possible state pairs was 1,225. With 190 states, the number
of state pairs is 17,995.",50 The fragmentation of single states like Yugoslavia leads
to the creation of other countries. These countries in turn establish treaties with
one another. However, the creation of these diplomatic ties do not signify "that
international law is stronger or more reliable, or entitled to more respect, than
before.""
Moreover, the heavy increase of treaties reflects the diminishing ability of
states to provide public goods for their citizens. "International law becomes more
45. Id. at 35.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 98.
49. Id. at 95.
50. POSNER, supra note 1, at 95.
51. Id.
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necessary and important as states crumble into smaller and smaller bits, but only
because states can accomplish less for their populations when they are small than
when they are large."52 While "[d]emand [for international law] will increase
because as states shrink, they can no longer supply public goods above a certain
scale without cooperating with other states . . . . supply will fail because
international law depends on states for those same structures of institutional
support."53
The tremendous fragmentation of the globe has undeniably increased the
number of international laws and treaties that govern states. However, global
legalists' assertion that this trend strengthens the efficacy of international law is
dangerously misguided. "[W]e do not know how much states comply with
international law, and until we do, it is hazardous to draw conclusions about the
prospects of global legalism in a world of fragmenting states."54 International laws
may be more common, but it does not necessarily follow that it is more effective or
that states are more willing to comply with it.
E. Disaggregation Theory
Global legalists argue that legalism will succeed on an international level
because of the success of legalism domestically. By disaggregating the internal
factors within a state and determining what aspects enhance legalism, it is possible
to understand what is necessary for legalism to function on a global level. Posner
argues "the two kinds of legalism are fundamentally different: domestic legalism
flourishes because governments support it; global legalism has no government to
turn to."55 Former Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh56, a global legalist, asserts
that "states comply with international law because internal actors-including
bureaucrats, citizens, politicians, and businesses-and external actors-including
other states, NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and international legal
institutions-pressure them to comply with international law." Professor Posner
rejects this argument, responding that "Koh never explains systematically why
these various entities expend resources to force states to comply with international
law. Sometimes, he seems to think that interest alone provides them with an
incentive; often, it is ideology or 'habit' or sympathy."5 8 By examining the various
state and nonstate actors, including courts, government officials, interest groups,
NGOs, and citizens, Professor Posner concludes that the disaggregation theory
fails to account for the purported efficacy of international law.59
52. Id. at 98.
53. Id. at 99.
54. Id. at 97.
55. Id. at xiv.
56. Professor Koh served as Yale Law School Dean from 2004 until 2009. Yale Law School,
Faculty, Harold Hongju Koh, http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/HKoh.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
On June 25, 2009, Professor Koh was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Legal Adviser to the United
States Department of State. Id.
57. POSNER, supra note 1, at 41.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 45-48.
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The first problem with the disaggregation theory is that "[t]here are many
intrastate actors, and it is not clear which ones will matter for the decision of
whether to comply with international law."60 Second, many of the actors that
global legalists argue compel states to comply with international law have little or
no effect on states. For example, domestic courts in the United States "cannot
force the American government to comply with a treaty for the simple reason that
the government has constitutional authority to withdraw from or violate treaties
either through the unilateral action of the president or the joint action of president
and Congress." 61 Global legalists also argue interest groups will compel states to
comply with international law. However, because there are often interests groups
on both sides of a single issue, "in theory interest groups can both enhance the
probability of compliance with a treaty and reduce the probability of
compliance."62 If these competing interest groups cancel each other out, their net
effect on compliance with international law will be minimal.
Finally, global legalists falsely attribute apparent "compliance" with
international law to situations where states are merely acting in their own self-
interest. Claiming this success for global legalism, in situations where there is no
causal connection to compliance, amounts to an artificial victory. Simplifying
Professor Posner's hypothetical, imagine two bordering nations: Big State and
Small State. 63 Big State has never invaded Small State. The global legalist would
point to this example as a sign of strong international law; Big State complied
because it was illegal to invade Small State. However, self-interest may also have
played a role. Among other factors, potential international backlash, the cost of
invasion, and economic ties would also account for Big State's failure to invade
Small State. Simply not violating international law, especially through an act of
omission, fails to prove that international law is effective or that states routinely
comply with it.
IV. INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Despite the apparent flaws of global legalism, a complex network of
international courts exists. "International adjudication, unlike international
legislation and enforcement, is an accepted part of international relations."64 The
growth of these courts "is the most distinctive and lasting contribution of global
legalism, as well as a phenomenon to which global legalists point with pride."65
Though the international community lacks established legislative and enforcement
institutions, dozens of adjudicative agencies exist on the international level as well
as nearly thirty proposed or existing judicial bodies.66 Additionally, legalism
places great importance on the judiciary. Therefore, any critique of global
legalism must account for, or discredit, the well-established system of international
60. Id. at 41.
61. Id. at 45.
62. Id. at 54.
63. POSNER, supra note 1, at 43.
64. Id. at 33.
65. Id. at 130.
66. Id. at 167.
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adjudication. Professor Posner does both, arguing that the success of domestic
judiciaries cannot be replicated on an international plane; "courts, like plants,
flourish only in the right environment."67
A. Success, Failure, and Fragmentation
The large number of international courts is a poor gauge of their efficacy.
"[A]n increase in supranational institutions should not be mistaken for a world law.
Rather, they are simply creating courts with universal jurisdiction to hear certain
limited types of cases."68 Professor Posner examines several of these courts and
concludes that issues of compliance, infrequent use, and enforcement render
international courts ineffective. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights
(IACHR), adjudication through GATT or the WTO, and the European Court on
Human Rights (ECHR) all face monumental problems of compliance. 69 Each of
these courts has non-compulsory methods of ensuring compliance, resulting from a
lack of enforcement measures.70
The only adjudicatory body that can be deemed successful is the European
Court of Justice (ECJ). EU member states appear to comply with ECJ decisions
frequently.71 Admittedly, "it is reasonable to conclude that the ECJ has been an
effective tribunal-in some periods, a vital institution that spurred integration
when the efforts of national governments flagged." 72 However, the success of the
ECJ is the result of Europe's unique geopolitical climate. The European Union is
an example of "'supranational' cooperation in which individuals owe loyalty to
multiple levels of government authority."7 3 Unlike other international courts,
[t]he ECJ is just one of a number of European institutions-including
the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the
Commission-and it works with these institutions to ensure that
European law develops properly and flexibly in response to changing
circumstances and the needs and interests of the populations of the
member states.74
However, the ECJ has the vast institutional support of the EU. Additionally, other
international adjudicatory bodies lack the loyalty of member states the EU enjoys.
As a result, compliance and use of those international courts is understandably
lower.
Although an increasing number of international courts exist, Professor Posner
argues "the proliferation of international courts is a sign of the weakness of the
67. Id.
68. Russell Menyhart, Changing Identities and Changing Law: Possibilities for a Global Legal
Culture, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 157, 184 (2003).
69. POSNER, supra note 1, at 151-159.
70. Id. at 157-158.
71. Id. at 160.
72. Id. at 161.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 162-163.
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international system, not its strength." While international courts appear at first
to be expanding, they are, in fact, dividing and becoming increasingly fragmented.
"[T]he fragmentary tribunals are the result of a collision between the ambitions of
global legalism and the realities of politics." 76 As states lose control over existing
courts, they quickly establish more to retain authority. There are numerous
consequences to this fragmentation. First, international courts are stripped of their
power, and the number and types of cases before a specific court are limited. In
turn, the power of international judges is diminished. Professor Posner notes,
"global legalism has lead to a system of judges without (or with greatly limited)
power."78  Considering the importance legalism accords to the role of judges,
fragmentation defeats any legalist benefit a large international court system
provides. Finally, this division of international courts poses institutional problems
including "conflicting law, jurisprudential overlap, and forum shopping."79 Global
legalists hail the growing number international courts as the surest sign of their
accuracy. Nevertheless, it reflects an actual decline in the power of international
law.
B. Lack of Compulsory Jurisdiction and Adequate Enforcement Procedures
Perhaps the largest barrier to effective global adjudication is the lack of
compulsory jurisdiction. "International adjudication, however impressive in
outward appearance, lacks an essential feature of adjudication that occurs within
states: the absence of mandatory jurisdiction." 0 The root of this problem is
simple-jurisdiction requires state consent. Therefore, state-interest influences the
jurisdiction of an international court. However, "disputing states, whose interest
and passions are engaged, need not consent to a panel's jurisdiction."" The
solution to the problem, in Professor Posner's view, is to grant compulsory
jurisdiction to international courts.82 Unless and until international courts have the
ability to bring unwilling states before them, international adjudication will remain
an ineffective and diluted defense for international law.
Equally damaging is the lack of sufficient enforcement procedures. Even if
an international court can clear the difficult hurdle of establishing mandatory
jurisdiction, any judgment they order will be opposed during enforcement.
Domestic courts garner support from powerful executive and enforcement bodies.
On a global level "there is no such international enforcement agency on which
courts can depend, with the limited exception of the Security Council, which has
never shown any inclination to enforce a judgment of the International Court of
75. POSNER, supra note 1, at 173-174.
76. Id. at 151.
77. Id. at 174.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 167.
80. Id. at 33.
81. POSNER, supra note 1, at 133.
82. Id.
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Justice." 83 The consequence is that only wealthy and powerful countries can
receive the full measure of the decision of an international court. Posner stipulates,
While formally a weak country can bring a case against a powerful
country, the remedy available is limited to authorization to use self-help.
But small countries cannot harm big countries by closing their markets
to them; they can only hurt themselves by doing this. The remedy thus
has value only for powerful countries, both with respect to their
relations with each other and with small countries.84
Acting without the benefit of legitimate and powerful institutional support,
international courts simply cannot achieve one of their major goals: compliance
with their decisions.
C. Lack ofInstitutional Safeguards
Domestic courts, particularly in the United States, benefit from institutional
safeguards that protect the legitimacy of the law and the courts. According to
Posner,
[N]umerous institutional safety valves ensure that bad judges have
limited influence on people's behavior. When judges misinterpret laws,
legislatures can amend the laws so as to eliminate the misleading
ambiguities; executive officials can also intervene in court to argue
against bad interpretations and soften their impact by modifying
enforcement priorities. Multiple layers of review by appellate courts,
the possibility of collateral challenges, redundant civil/criminal claims,
presidential and gubernatorial pardons, paneling, and so forth, ensure
that incompetent or biased judges have limited impact. The ultimate
check on judicial abuse is the political system. The government can
investigate and impeach judges; it can strip the judiciary of jurisdiction;
it can defund the judiciary and harass it in other ways. In most
American states, state judges are disciplined by electoral pressures or
the threat of nonrenewal by the governor or legislature. In the United
States, the balance of power between the judiciary and the other
branches has worked over two hundred years.
Such safeguards are noticeably absent from international courts. "No analogous
world legislature can modify the law in question; instead, states must convene an
international convention which must operate by consensus."86  As a result,
international judges have dramatically reduced power to make important and
necessary policy decisions. While "domestic courts can make policy and assert
their power ... because of government safety valves," international courts lack the
83. Id. at 34.
84. Id. at 156.
85. Id. at 165-166.
86. Id. at 166.
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institutional support necessary. Moreover, this tension leaves the international
community with "no hierarchical structure to ensure uniformity in the law."
V. CONCLUSION
At first glance, global legalism is an appealing solution to complex global
problems. However, it does not withstand the challenges of global reality.
Legalist ideals are not easily translated to international law. The tremendous
heterogeneity of the global population, and lack of international institutions to
define and enforce international law prevent legalism from working on a global
scale.
Absent strong enforcement institutions that have the capability to ensure
compliance, countries will only comply with international law when it aligns with
their self-interest. In The Perils of Global Legalism, Professor Posner forcefully
rejects the notion that compliance can simply be presumed. He notes from the
beginning, "[i]f this book has a single theme, it is that politics, idealism, and
careless thinking conspire to produce a picture of international law that bears little
resemblance to reality."88
The collective action problems our world faces are very real. They have the
potential to impact the lives of citizens in all corners of the globe. Though
optimistic, global legalism is poorly matched for strong rebuttal of Professor
Posner. He concludes The Perils of Global Legalism arguing that states will
continue to act in their self-interest. "Only those who have lost sight of the
geopolitical interests of nations and have mistaken the legalistic rhetoric of Europe
and the United States for reality can be surprised by those events. Those people
will continue to be unprepared to address such events as they occur."89 Global
legalism's hopeful and optimistic approach to solving global problems is laudable.
However, failing to acknowledge the practical impediments to global legalism
ignores the pernicious consequences that surely follow.
87. POSNER, supra note 1, at 150.
88. Id. at xv-xvi.
89. Id. at 228.
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